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
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AN
INQUIRY,
WITH A VIEW TO ASCERTAIN
HOW FAR
NATURE AND EDUCATION
RESPECTIVELY DETERMINE
THE
MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER
OF
MAN.



Let us try to trace
What Good, what Evil, from ourselves proceed:
" How best the fickle fabric to support
" Of mortal Man, in healthful body how
" A healthful mind, the longest to maintain."

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND ;
AND
J. AND A. ARCH, CORNHILL.

1823.

PREFACE.

THOUGH many highly distinguished persons have published their thoughts upon the nature of the Human Mind, yet there appeared to us to be still wanting a *familiar* analysis of it, that would enable us readily to trace all the actions of man to some decided principles of his nature; and this, expressly in order to qualify us for conducting either our own or the education of others with more confidence of success. The one we here offer to the Reader we flatter ourselves may afford him a few useful hints, until a far abler pen shall provide him with such as will prove much better calculated to answer the purpose. To make the fruits of our labours however, in the mean time, more acceptable to him, we have freely quoted the words of eminent writers, whenever they particularly answered our purpose, but in doing so, having often found it necessary to transpose *periods* as well as paragraphs, it became impracticable, to note the parts of the several dis-

courses whence they were borrowed; but this has not prevented us acknowledging our obligations to the proper authors; if, therefore, any omissions be made in this particular—we here beg pardon.

To Mr. Locke we are most particularly indebted for assistance; all extracts made from his immortal "*Essay concerning Human Understanding*," his "*Treatise upon Education*," and his "*Conduct of the Understanding*," are commonly inserted without a name, but are marked with inverted commas. We have profited greatly likewise by the very celebrated *Sermons* of Dr. Barrow.

NOTICE.

IN the following Work we have taken a very superficial survey of some of the Sciences, as classed into three divisions by Mr. Locke, that is, so far as it is connected with the Inquiry before us. We have made an abstract of his doctrine of Ideas—of the nature of Language, and the use and the abuse of it—of the nature and degrees of Knowledge.

We have particularly detailed the constitutional *resemblances* and *differences* that appear to us, to exist between children individually, and *originally* to determine their Moral and Intellectual Character.

Likewise in what manner apparently the mind and body reciprocally influence each other.

Also how far, such resemblances and differences are likely to require more or less similar, or opposite management, lest we interfere injudiciously, and thus cause evil, where we most earnestly desire to effect good.

We have enumerated the various excitements and dispositions most common to human nature.

The consideration of his dispositions naturally led us to reflect upon the evils man suffers, and to aim at discerning which of them are inherent in him, and which probably owing to his blindness, perverseness, or neglect.

We crave the reader's indulgence for having, in enumerating the dispositions, used sometimes the noun, sometimes the verb, but we found it answer our purpose better. Shall we be pardoned for having applied the words, Reserved, Unreserved; Decisive, Indecisive; to denote distinctions of characters?

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ERRATA.

Page 20, line 24, for *manner* read *manna*.

— 37, — 35, for *beings* read *being*.

— 148, — 12, for *compare* read *compose*.

— 207, "*Of Speech*," is from Barrow.



AN

INQUIRY,

&c.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE.

AN Inquiry into the several *Powers, Excitements, and Dispositions* of the Human Mind, seems naturally to lead us to the consideration of the most suitable mode of *Educating* it; but he who attempts the discovery of the most rational mode of educating it, without having first examined what are its powers, excitements, and dispositions, must often find himself extremely at a loss to determine, Whether his proposed management is conformable, not only to the general nature of man, but likewise, to the peculiar constitution of the individual he proposes to render virtuous, healthy, and intelligent. If we be ignorant of the different ways in which the mind operates, and is affected by its own thoughts and external objects, how can we reasonably hope successfully to encourage, regulate and restrain its very various impulses, according as circumstances may require? But in order to satisfy ourselves of the justness of our suppositions, we ought, as we proceed, to endeavour also to learn, In what manner nature commonly manifests her approbation or disapprobation of our conduct, in other words, what are most evidently her intentions in the moral world.

We do not entertain a wish to controvert, nor to establish any system whatsoever; we only desire to convey to the reader, the result of our own general observations and reflections upon the nature and education of man, in as intelligible language as we can command. It is a trite observation, that no one is free from error, we have therefore ventured to declare our dissent in opinion, upon some very few points, from the highest authorities. This dissent arises, perhaps, from our not having seen the same things in so distinct a point of view as they have done; but should we have proved successful in correcting two or three of their mistakes, we have ourselves doubtless, at the same time, furnished numerous examples of the fallibility of human judgment. We trust, however, we are such sincere lovers of truth, that we shall derive unfeigned satisfaction to find others, as willing as they may be capable, of correcting what we have done amiss.

Mr. Locke, when he attempted to distinguish the various sorts of ideas we entertain, was under the necessity of inventing some new terms, and of applying some old ones in a new sense, because he had acquired notions not before apprehended; thus he called some of our ideas Simple, others Complex; some Simple Modes, others Mixed Modes, &c. both for his own convenience, and also in order to convey his meaning more clearly to his readers. But if we will follow his advice, and fix our attention to the consideration of *things* instead of *words*, we cannot fail to perceive, that he was intent upon describing the several powers he imagined he had discerned in the human understanding, and the varieties of the ideas that give it exercise, without having any exclusive preference for certain words, or being in any way anxious, to introduce any particular terms of his own coining or application into common use. Indeed he says in answer to the Bishop of Worcester, "I would, for the satisfaction of your lordship, change the term *idea* for a better, if your lordship or any one

could help me to it; for that *notion* will not so well stand for *every* immediate object of the mind in thinking, as *idea* does. I have (as I guess) somewhere given a reason in my book, by shewing, that the term *notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain sort of those objects, which I call mixed modes: and I think it would not sound altogether so well to say the notion of red, and the notion of a horse, as the idea of red, and the idea of a horse. But if any one think it will, I contend not, for I have no fondness for, nor any antipathy to any particular articulate sounds; nor do I think there is any spell or fascination in any of them."

"Names are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions; and so they be sufficiently appropriated to them in their use, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of easy or difficult pronounciation, or of a more or less pleasant sound, and what particular antipathies there may be in men to some of these upon that account, is not easy to be foreseen." We commonly say we have a notion of dancing, sailing, of mathematics, &c.

When we speak of material things we may make our meaning, in most cases, well understood, by causing them to affect the senses; but in treating of the powers and operations of the mind, we must unavoidably depend entirely upon the candour and sagacity of the reader; for the only assistance we can afford him besides words, is to suggest some comparison to him, that may be made with sensible objects, applicable to the case in point. Abstraction, for instance, may possibly be better understood, when a person is told to imagine the pulp of any fruits removed, so that none but the germinating parts remain; and that then, instead of being classed under the genus *fruit*, they would come under the yet more general term *seed*, as all fruit is seed, but all seed is not fruit; so likewise all men are animals, but all animals are not men.

"The infinite wise Creator of us and of all things about

us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to know and distinguish things, and to examine them so far as to apply them to our uses, and in several ways to accommodate them to the exigencies of this life. We have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power, and goodness of their Author: but it appears not that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them, that perhaps is not within the comprehension of a finite being."

"As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from the view of some things, so the want of those ideas within our reach, keeps us in ignorance of others we conceive ourselves capable of apprehending. Bulk, figure, and motion, we have ideas of. But, though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some things by being too remote, in others by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think, that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe, we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter, which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings, how far they are extended, what is their motion, and how continued or communicated, and what influence they have upon one another, are contemplations in which our thoughts are lost at the first glimpse: and if we narrow our view, and confine it to this canton, I mean this system of our sun, and the grosser masses of matter which visibly move about it; what several sorts of vegetables, animals, and intellectual corporeal beings, infinitely different

from those of our little spot of earth, may there not be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain? There are no natural means, either by sensation or reflection, to convey clear ideas of them into our minds, whilst we remain in this nether world."

"Another cause of ignorance, of no less moment, is a want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have. It is evident, for instance, that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us, produce in us several sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, &c. yet these mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a colour or smell, which we find in our minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as being the effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wise Agent, and as perfectly surpassing our comprehensions. As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which (experience shews us) produce them in us; so, on the other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is equally inconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in body, is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. If experience did not convince us that it is so, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able, in the least, to discover it to us."

"Respecting the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. He who considers with what difficulty sensation is

in our thoughts reconcilable to extended matter, or existence to any thing that has no extension at all, will confess he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. *It is a point which seems to me placed out of the reach of our knowledge:* and he who will give himself leave to look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for, or against the soul's materiality: since on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended substance, or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. There are men who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding; an unfair way of proceeding, that serves not only to shew the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge, but the insignificant triumph of such sorts of arguments; which though they may satisfy us, that we can find no certainty in one side of the question, do not at all thereby assure us of being nearer the truth, should we adopt the opposite opinion. But what safety, what advantage is it to any one, who in order to avoid the seeming absurdities, and to him insurmountable rubs he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is as far remote from his comprehension? It is past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks. Our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is: and I would fain know, what substance exists, that has not something in it that manifestly baffles our understanding."

" Thus, after a due examination of the various parts of nature, whether they relate to Matter or to Spirit, we arrive at the conclusion, that the *secret abstract nature* of either the one or the other, is from all we have yet discovered, equally

beyond the reach of our capacities, but that their *powers* and *operations* are as equally the proper objects of our study."

"And of what consequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may be to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing instance; for the useful arts, and the greatest part of the conveniences of life, being unknown in a country which abounded with all sorts of natural productions, may, I suspect, be attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable stone, I mean the mineral of iron. And whatever we think of our parts or improvements in Europe, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other, yet to any one who will seriously reflect on it, it will, I suppose, appear past doubt, that were the use of iron lost among us, we should in a few ages unavoidably be reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of those, of the most flourishing and polite nations. So that he who first made known the use of iron, may be truly styled the father of arts and the author of plenty."

Yet in Europe even, after the lapse of so many ages, and the rise and downfall of such numerous and variously governed societies of men, how little progress have we made in the arts and sciences, comparatively with what it is supposed, the persevering and well-directed industry of man is likely hereafter to accomplish.

Both vice and disease, for example, are upon the whole so little diminished amongst people of all ranks, that we may reasonably conclude the art of educating man is amongst others in its very infancy, notwithstanding the many valuable works published upon the subject, and the very judicious improvements introduced in the mode of conveying instruction to youth. By continually aiming however, also to discover the

means of commonly exciting in him the determination, duly to regulate his several inclinations, as well as to obtain various and useful knowledge, we may reasonably hope, gradually to effect the general improvement in health, and the reformation in manners, so long and so ardently desired by every friend to humanity.

We are ignorant of the real essence of a horse, but the more we know from experience the extent of his powers and properties, &c. the better we understand how to feed, shelter, and shoe him; how to accommodate his accoutrements, labours, &c. to his strength and make, so as to obtain the greatest and most durable advantages possible from his services; and by studying his general dispositions, we discover by what mode of treatment he is most successfully to be rendered docile, and yet remain spirited and active.

Though we find the *active* exercise of the mind in many cases incompatible with the busy employment of the hands, yet whatever be a man's calling in life, a quick perception and ready judgment respecting the operations that concern his particular trade or profession, not only prove of great advantage to himself, as serving both to lighten his labours, and to increase his profits, but are necessarily also of considerable importance to the community at large, that either benefits by his skill, or suffers from his ignorance or want of force or dexterity in the execution of his work: whence we may infer, that a judicious education, tending more or less to perfect the several faculties of man, is commanded both by Reason and Humanity, whether he be the offspring of a prince or a peasant.

CHAPTER II.

It seems of little importance to us to know, whether our Ideas be Innate or not.—
 Thing, Idea, Quality.—Principal Division of the Sciences.—Abstract of Mr.
 Locke's Doctrine of Ideas.—Of the nature of Language, and the use, and the
 abuse of it.

It seems of little importance to us to know, whether our Ideas
 be Innate or not.

TRIFLING probably, would be the advantage we should derive from ascertaining, even beyond a doubt, whether our ideas be Innate or not, or how far they may be so; provided we do not deny, that the stock of them may be infinitely increased by the active exercise of our senses and reasoning faculties; and that we do not attempt prematurely to force their entrance into the mind, i. e. before it is fitted to receive them; we say fitted to receive them, because an idea that is not understood, is but an insignificant sound. Jurisprudence, for instance, though a very significant term when properly used, is an incomprehensible idea to one yet in his infancy.

It has been asserted, that "most of Mr. Locke's arguments against innate ideas are founded upon an *ambiguous* acceptance of the words *idea* and *innate*;" but he surely expresses himself with great perspicuity upon this subject.

"It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, some primary notions or characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being, and

brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only shew how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the idea of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects; and no less unreasonable would it be, to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves, faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind."

"The senses first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding farther abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty; and the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials, which give it employment, increase. External material things then as the objects of sensation, and the operation of our own minds within, as the objects of reflection, are, in my opinion, the only originals whence all our ideas take their beginning."

"Children when they come first into the world, are surrounded by new objects which constantly excite their curiosity; and a variety of ideas, whether care be taken of it or no, are imprinted on their minds. But though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way,

that there are few men who cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them."

"Now as the mind, by the means of the senses, comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has to think on; and we may observe how by degrees it improves in the exercise of the faculty it has, of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning and reflecting upon them."

"Thus the human capacity is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them. It is by these steps man advances towards the most sublime discoveries, and the mind, when elevated by those thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as Heaven itself, extends not an iota beyond the ideas, which sensation or reflection have offered to its contemplation."

"To ask at what time a man has first any idea, is to ask when he begins to perceive, having ideas, and having perception, being the same thing. But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after, the first rudiments or organization on the beginning of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter."

Thus we see Mr. Locke most evidently makes the same distinction between idea and innate, as between having an idea what sleep is, and the actually going to sleep. The mind may or may not at any time entertain the idea of what sleep is, but the propensity to sleep is inherent in our nature, or is innate, or born with us, and thus we suppose a child falls asleep, without having any idea what sleep means.

Thing, Idea, Quality.

The most universal term we have is Thing; for it includes God; Spirits; Finite Intelligences; Bodies; Ideas; in other

words, the great Creator of all ; all immortal beings ; all mortal beings ; all substances whatsoever ; all that can be known or imagined by the mind of man.

➤ “ Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call Idea; and the power to produce any idea in the mind, I call Quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, round, the powers to produce those ideas in us *as they are in the snow-ball*, I call *qualities* ; and *as they are sensations or perceptions in our understanding*, I call them *ideas*.”

Some things, doubtless, exist, of which we have not any idea, and others most certainly do, of which we have no determined nor adequate ideas ; and we have ideas of things that have no existence ; consequently, Things and Ideas must necessarily be distinct. Ideas ^{derived from material objects} are the images or pictures of things as entertained by the mind, just as bodies are reflected in a mirror, but a mirror cannot, like the mind, receive or retain any image independent of the thing ; neither can it reflect any thing that is not embodied. God himself, and our idea of God, are two as distinct things, as it is possible to conceive.

But there are other ideas of an abstract nature which are not images or pictures of the things in our mind, altho they are intelligent conceptions of them such as Truth, falsehood, knowledge, ignorance, virtue, vice. Our idea of God is of this nature. T.H.

Principal Division of the Sciences.

“ All that can fall within the compass of human understanding being, *First*, the Nature of things as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their manner of Operation : or *Secondly* that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially Happiness : or *Thirdly*, the ways and means by which the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated : Science may be divided into three sorts.”

“ First, the knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings, their constitutions, properties, and operations ; whereby I mean, not only Matter and Body, but Spirits also,

which have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This is Natural Philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative truth ; and whatsoever can afford any such to the mind of man, comes under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, or bodies."

" Secondly, the skill of rightly applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things *good* and *useful* : the most considerable under this head is Ethics, which is the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to Happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation and the knowledge of truth, but Right, and a conduct suitable to it."

" Thirdly, the third branch may be called the doctrine of Signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is also aptly enough termed Logic. The mind makes use of these signs for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. The consideration, then, of words, as the great instrument of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of the whole extent of Human Knowledge."

Physica.

Natural Philosophy, or Physiology.

Most of the Arts and Sciences that the wit and industry of man has established, may be classed under this head ; but we shall only particularly notice Metaphysics, as being immediately connected with our present examination.

Metaphysics.

Metaphysics are defined to be " the doctrine of the general affections of substances." For instance, the Constitution of the Mind, its *Powers, Manner of Operating, &c.* Mr. Locke has, we imagine, most clearly distinguished the several intellectual faculties we have ; the varieties of ideas we entertain ; and the degrees of knowledge they afford us.

*Practica.**Ethics.*

Ethics includes the sciences both of Education and of Government.

Education.

The science of Education is supposed to suggest the most effectual means, of bringing to the perfection they are severally capable of, both the mental and corporeal powers or faculties of children, in order to their attaining "a sound mind in a sound body."

Government.

Government or Politics we may define to be, the science of framing, establishing, and enforcing of just laws, for the general benefit of any community of men, by the promotion of virtue, and the suppression of vice amongst them. Education more particularly concerns individual happiness; Government, national prosperity.

Logica.

Under this head we class Language and Signs, Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, and Orthography.

Language—Signs.

"Man has his organs so fashioned by nature, as to be fit to frame Articulate Sounds, which we call Words, and these sounds are used as Signs of internal conceptions, whereby the thoughts of men's minds are conveyed from one to another." As words are made signs of ideas, so are certain formed Characters arbitrarily appointed to be the signs or symbols of words. These two sorts of signs are what we call Oral and Written language.

Grammar.

Making ourselves fully acquainted with the characters of any language, our next object must be, to use them in such a manner as to avoid ambiguity. It is the province of Grammar therefore, to teach us how to class them, in order that we may assign to each its proper place in any discourse, so as to speak or write with perspicuity.

Rhetoric.

Grammar having determined, by what means we may avoid ambiguity, Rhetoric communicates to us the art of conveying our thoughts to others with clearness, force, and elegance, so as to instruct, persuade, and delight them.

Logic.

Logic directs us to the most profitable use of our reasoning faculties, so as to improve not only our own understanding, but to enlighten mankind; and this it does, by professing to shew us the best method, of tracing the mutual and various relations there must always naturally exist, between consequences and their premises, i. e. between causes and their effects.

Orthography.

Orthography makes known to us the proper way of both Writing and Spelling the signs or character of words, according to the most universally approved manner.

“ This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts but in one of these three ways: either in the contemplation of Things themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about his own Actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or about the Signs, the mind makes use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them

for its clearer information. Which three, viz. Things, as they are themselves *Knowable*; Actions as they depend on us to obtain *Happiness*; and the right use of Signs in order to *Knowledge*; appear to me, to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, and wholly separate and distinct from one another."

An Abstract of Mr. Locke's Doctrine of Ideas.

A celebrated writer of the present age, whom Mr. Locke would have been proud to have called his friend, does not estimate the second book of his Essay quite so highly as the other three; yet it appears to us, to be also deserving of considerable attention. Mr. Locke's division of ideas may possibly be very defective, but still it is capable of conveying to the mind such distinct notions of their several varieties, as to induce us to attempt making a concise abstract of it in this place, in order to the better understanding the nature of language, which we shall shortly take into consideration.

The first great distinction that seems to have presented itself to Mr. Locke, was, that some of our ideas are Simple, and some Complex; the simple ideas white or red, soft or hard, an unit, &c. for example, are not definable, yet can be very readily understood by any one having sight or feeling; whereas, the complex ideas comedy, glory, faith, &c. can be all more or less easily defined, and yet are extremely liable to be differently interpreted; a savage, for instance, would readily comprehend the idea of any colour or sound, &c. upon hearing the name repeated and perceiving the thing; but could scarcely be made to understand the meaning of such a word as *equivocal*. Simple ideas are only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort; if they be not received this way, all the words in the world made use of to explain or define any of them,

will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine-apple. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, it is only exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names; and the idea of it so received, will still be very different from the true flavour of that delicious fruit itself. It is the same with light and colours, and all other simple ideas. For to hope to produce an idea of light and colours by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses; which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see, by the ears, a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pança, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay. The case is quite otherwise in Complex ideas, which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several ideas which make that composition, to imprint them in the mind. He that should use the word rainbow to one who knew all those colours, but had never seen that phenomenon, would by enumerating the figure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood; yet that definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man understand it, because several of the simple ideas which make that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and experience, no words would be able to excite them in his mind."

Mr. Locke distinguishes the several simple ideas that are received by each respective sense, and some of them by more senses than one; thus we say, such things are visible, or audible, or tangible, or palatable, or odoriferous, and we can

both see and feel number, figure, motion, and rest, &c. We see the whiteness of sugar-candy, we taste the sweetness of it, we feel its hardness and weight, and we both see and feel the size, figure, or shape of it, consequently, sugar-candy is a complex idea, formed of so many simple ones, each of which are so many distinct ideas or perceptions in our minds. Upon its being pounded however, we cannot distinguish the shape of each grain, and, instead of unity, we have the idea of innumerable parts. But simple ideas are not capable of any other change, than of degrees, as white, whiter; heavy, heavier; hard, harder; sweet, sweeter, &c.

“ Although the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their signification, yet that hinders not, but they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed modes and substances. He that knows once, that whiteness is the name of that colour, he has observed in snow or milk, is not likely to misapply that word as long as he retains that idea. This farther may be observed concerning simple ideas and their names, that they have but few ascents *in lineâ prædicamentali*, (as they call it) from the lowest species to the summum genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea, common to them both, viz. there is nothing that can be left out of the ideas of white or red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name, as rationality being left out of the complex idea Man, makes it agree with brute in the more general idea and name Animal; and therefore, when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas under one general name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow, are all comprehended under the genus,

or name, colour, it signifies no more, than that such ideas are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame a yet more general term, to comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word, that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense; and so the general term Quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction, from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain which make impressions on the mind by more senses than one."

Complex ideas are divided into Simple Modes, Mixed Modes, Substances, and Relations.

"Simple Modes are only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea without the mixture of any other, as a dozen or score, which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together, and these I call simple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea. These modifications of any one simple idea, are each of them as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind, as those of the greatest contrariety; for the idea of two is as distinct from one, as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number. Modes of Space, are a square, cubic, feet, yards, fathoms, immeasurable space, &c. Modes of Duration, a minute, hour, day, time, eternity. Modes of Motion, jumping, leaping, skipping, dancing, &c. and so of some others."

"Mixed Modes are arbitrary combinations of ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind, though commonly with some restrictions, makes at pleasure, and ties together by a name, such are ship, carriage, obligation, murder, law, divinity, good-breeding, &c. This shews us how it comes to pass, that there are in every language, many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single

word of another. For the several fashions, customs, and manners, of one nation, making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary, which another people have never had occasion to unite, or perhaps so much as take notice of, names come of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation, and so become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds. How great a number of different ideas are by this means, wrapt up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one may see who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas, which either reprieve or appeal stand for."

Substances.—" The ideas which make up our complex ones of Corporeal Substances, are of these three sorts: first, the ideas of the *Primary qualities* of things, and which exist even when we perceive them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion of the parts of bodies. Secondly, the *sensible secondary qualities*, which depend on the first, and are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in our minds, such as colours, tastes, smells, &c., but which qualities are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any effect depends on its cause; taste and smell is no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manner. Take away the sensation of them, let the eyes not see light, nor colours, nor the ears hear sounds, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i. e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts. Thirdly, the capacity we consider in any substance to give or receive such alterations of the primary qualities, as that the substance so altered, should excite in us different ideas from what it did before; thus, when clay has been operated upon by fire, it produces in us the idea of hardness, instead of softness: these are called *Powers*; the immediate operations of which powers are sometimes percep-

tible, sometimes not. The alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron is apparent; but doubtless there are a thousand changes, which bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another, that we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects."

"The greatest part of our ideas that make up our complex idea of gold, are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility in *aqua regia*, &c., all united together in an unknown *substratum*: all which ideas, but variously combined, are common to many other substances, and not confined to gold, though that *particular combination* depends on those *real* and *primary qualities* of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated upon, by several other substances. The idea which an Englishman signifies by the name swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in water, and making a peculiar kind of noise; and, perhaps, to a man who has long observed this kind of birds; some other properties, all which terminate in sensible simple ideas, united in one common subject."

"Besides these complex ideas of several single substances, as of man, horse, gold, &c.; the mind hath also Complex Collective Ideas of Substances, which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one idea, viz. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man, and such also are a constellation, flock, herd, covey, forest, city, &c."

Relations.—"Besides, the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from comparing them one with another. The understanding in the consideration of an object,

is not confined to that precise object, but can bring it, as it were, and set it by another, in order to discover as the words import, its Relation and respect. Thus, when I give to Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing; in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. There are several distinct kinds of relations, Proportional, Natural, Instituted, Moral, and others, as Cause and Effect, Identity and Diversity, &c.; Proportional, whiter, sweeter, equal, more, &c. Natural, father, husband, countryman, cousin, &c. Instituted, king, subject, citizen, burgher, general, soldier, &c. Moral, virtuous, vicious, sinful, commendable, &c. We have determined and *adequate* ideas of Relations, but not of Substances; we know precisely, for instance, what the nature of a brother is, though not of a man. Relations are innumerable, and the varieties of them well worthy attentive consideration."

Particles.—" Besides words, which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also, to shew or intimate some particular action of its own at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as *Is*, and *Is not*, are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But, besides Affirmation and Negation, without which, there is in words no truth nor falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, in order to make a coherent discourse, such are But, However, Although, &c."

" The meaning of the names of Simple Ideas can be known only by shewing: of Simple Modes and Mixed Modes, some

by definition only, and some both by shewing and defining: of Substances, both by shewing and defining: and, of Relations, by definition alone. The terms Wisdom and Cousin, for instance, cannot be clearly understood, but by definition, nor Minerals, without both shewing and defining."

Mr. Locke supposes that we have either a determined and adequate, or an indetermined, inadequate, or erroneous idea of any thing whatsoever.

"An idea is said to be Determined, when the mind has a full and evident perception of an object by its operating duly on a well disposed organ; and thus perceives it to be distinct from all others: an Indetermined idea is one, that is indistinct or confused. Thus he, that has an idea made up only of the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused idea of a leopard, it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted. So that such an idea, though it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard. How much the custom of defining words by general terms, contributes to make the ideas we would express by them, confused and indetermined, I leave others to consider. Complex ideas must of course be most liable to confusion."

A complex idea is Erroneous, when one or many of the simple ideas which we include in it, are not to be found in the pattern. The leaving out or not comprehending one or many of the simple ideas, which make up the composition of any idea, will only so much diminish its distinctness, that it may be called an Inadequate idea. When on the contrary, the numbers and sorts of simple ideas perfectly agree with those in the pattern, such an idea is said to be Adequate to, or equal to the thing implied.

Thus, we have a determined idea of the colour white, it is

distinct in our minds from that of red. Children must have either an erroneous or inadequate idea of those things beyond their comprehension, whatever words we make use of to communicate our knowledge to them. We may have determined and adequate ideas of artificial things, but of all natural bodies, our ideas, as Mr. Locke observes, must necessarily be inadequate, and are often very erroneous. We have, it is evident, very inadequate ideas of God, eternity, and immeasurable space.

Of the Nature of Language, and the Use and the Abuse of it.

“Man, though he has a great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as himself, might receive profit and delight, yet they are all within his own breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves appear. But the comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without some communication of them, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, no other means could be devised so fit, as those articulate sounds which with so much ease and variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to this purpose, came to be made use of by men, as the Signs of their ideas; not, however, by any natural connexion that there is between certain articulate sounds and our ideas, for in this case, there would be but one language amongst men; but, by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use, then, of words is, to make them *sensible marks* of ideas, as their proper and immediate signification.”

“The use men have of these marks, is either to record

their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory, or to bring out their ideas, as it were, and lay them before the view of others. The speaker at the same time supposes his words to be the marks also of the same ideas, in the minds of other men with whom he converses, otherwise he could not be understood; and by constant use, there comes to be such a connexion between certain sounds, and the ideas they stand for, that the hearing the names almost as readily excites certain ideas, as if the objects themselves did actually affect the senses. This is manifestly so in all sensible qualities, and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us."

"The cause of the greater doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some words than in others is, the difference of the ideas they stand for, and not in any incapacity there is in one sound, more than in another, to signify any idea, for in that respect they are all alike.

"Thus words having no inherent signification, the ideas which each stands for must be learned and retained by those who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others in any language; but this is most difficult to be done."

"First, when the ideas they stand for are very Complex, being made up of a great number of ideas joined together."

"Secondly, when the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in nature, and so no settled standard to adjust and rectify them by."

"Thirdly, when the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known."

"The names of *mixed modes* are most liable to doubtfulness for the two first of these reasons, the names of *substances* chiefly for the latter."

"When a word stands for a very compound idea, it is not easy for men to form and retain the idea of it correctly in their minds: hence it comes to pass, that moral words have

seldom in two different men the same precise signification; and, indeed, the same person's idea often differs from his own, that he had yesterday. What the words murder or sacrilege stand for, can never be known from things themselves, since there are many parts of those complex ideas, which are not visible in the action itself, and which have been attached to them by men framing those words. When children learn to speak, people commonly shew them both qualities and substances, and then repeat the name, as white, yellow, cat, dog; but moral words are commonly learned before they can be understood, and there not being many who afterwards search for the true meaning of them, their signification often remains very undetermined in their minds. Where shall one find either a controversial debate or familiar discourse, concerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of those ideas. And hence we see, that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications, and of limiting, distinguishing, and varying the signification of these moral words, there is no end."

"These ideas of men's making, are by men still having the same power, multiplied *in infinitum*."

"The names of substances are of a doubtful signification for a contrary reason, viz. because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and to have their archetypes in nature. In our ideas of substances we have not the liberty as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit to be the characteristical notes, to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, suit our complex ideas to *real* existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we would make their names the signs of them. But these archetypes cannot be so well known, as to leave their names without

doubtful and uncertain significations, because the simple ideas which co-exist and are united in the same subject, being often very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea, which the specific name is to stand for, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame altogether very different ideas about it."

"In philosophical inquiries and debates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found, not only not to be well established, but also very difficult to be so; for example:"

"I was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose a question, Whether any Liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves. The debate having been managed a good while, by variety of arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect that the greater part of disputes were more about the signification of words, than a real difference in the conception of things) desired, that before they went any farther in this dispute, they would first examine and establish amongst them, what the word Liquor signified. They were at first a little surprised at the proposal; and had they been persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have considered it very frivolous or extravagant, since there was no one there, who did not believe himself to understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for; which I think too, none of the most perplexed names of substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my motion, and upon examination found, that the signification of that word was not so settled and certain as they had all imagined; but that each of them used it as a sign of a somewhat different conception. This made them perceive, that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differed very little in their opinions,

concerning some fluid and subtile matter passing through the conduits of the nerves ; though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called *Liquor* or no, a thing which when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about."

" From what has been before said, it is easy to observe that the names of Simple Ideas are, of all others, the least liable to be mistaken, because the ideas they stand for being each but one single perception, are much easier got and more clearly retained. By the same rule, the names of Simple Modes are next to those of simple ideas, the least liable to doubt and uncertainty, especially those of figure and number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who that had a mind to understand them ever mistook the ordinary meaning of seven and a triangle? And, in general, the least compounded of our ideas of every kind have the least dubious names."

" Besides the imperfections natural to language, and the obscurity and confusion, so difficult to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful faults and neglects, which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs still less clear and distinct in their signification."

" Of this kind the most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas, or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified."

" One may observe in all languages certain words, which if they be examined, will be found in their first original, and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most part, the several sects of philosophy have introduced. For their authors or promoters, either affecting something singular and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or to cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words, such, as when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant terms, that having had no

determinate collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented, or, at least, having such as upon strict examination, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder if, afterwards, they prove mere empty sounds. But the multitude think it enough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishing characters of their church or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. Of this it is unnecessary to mention instances; every man's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him; or if he want to be better stored, the great mint-masters of this kind of terms, I mean the schoolmen and metaphysicians, (under which, I think, the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him."

"Others there are, who extend this abuse yet farther, who not only take little care to reject words, that in their primary notation, have scarce any clear and distinct ideas, to which they are annexed, but by an unpardonable negligence, improperly use words, which the propriety of long usage has affixed to very important ideas. Wisdom, glory, grace, &c. are words familiar to every man's mouth, yet if a great many of those who use them should be asked to explain their meaning, they would be at a loss what to answer."

"In the common occurrences of life, men find it easy to make themselves understood; but such insignificancy in their words, when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or general interests, manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral matters. Men take the words they find current amongst their neighbours, and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently without much troubling their heads about a certain and fixed meaning; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that, as in such discourses, they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to

be convinced that they are wrong; it being as vain to endeavour to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no determined notions, as to dispossess a vagrant who has no settled abode, of his habitation. This I guess to be the case, and every one may ascertain in himself and others, whether I am mistaken."

"A farther abuse of words is the taking them for things. This in some degree concerns all names in general, but particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse, those men are most liable, who most confine their thoughts to any one system, and give themselves up to a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis, whereby they come to be persuaded, that the terms of that sect exactly correspond with the real existence of things. Who is there that has been bred up in the Peripatetic philosophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be perfectly conformable to nature? Who is there of that school, that is not persuaded, that substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional species, &c. are something real? The Platonists have their soul of the world; and the Epicureans the endeavour towards motion in atoms when at rest. But there is scarce any sect in philosophy that has not a distinct set of terms, which others comprehend not; yet this gibberish, which in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to appear of all others, the terms the most significant. Thus the doctrine of aerial and æthereal vehicles may, possibly, one of these days, make impressions on men's minds, as much as peripatetic forms and intentional species have heretofore done."

"Another great abuse of words is, inconstancy in the use of them. It is hard to find a discourse written of any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not with a little

attention observe, that some words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of ideas, and sometimes for another, which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition; it is plain they only serve to cheat and abuse, when they are made to stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; therefore, the wilfully doing so, must be imputed either to great folly or great dishonesty. One who should speak thus in the affairs and business of the world, and call eight sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his purpose, would presently have clapped upon him one of two names, men are commonly disgusted with."

"If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, yet this is the least to be expected, that in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same word constantly in the same sense: if this were done (which no one can refuse without great disingenuity) many of the books extant might be spared, many of the controversies would be at an end: several of those bulky volumes swoln with ambiguous words would shrink into a very narrow compass, and many philosophical works (to mention no other) might be contained in a nutshell."

"But, after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect of the infinite variety of thoughts, that men wanting terms to suit their precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And, though in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition as often as a man varies the signification of any term; yet, the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fal-

lacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it; but where there is no sufficient clearness to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and shew in what sense he then uses such or such a term. If words were taken for what they are, only the *signs* of our ideas, and not for *things* themselves; and, if men would tell what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that wrangling in the support or search of truth that there is."

"Language being as I said before, the great bond which holds society together, and the common conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man, and from one generation to another, he who makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are in things themselves, yet he may break or stop the pipes, whereby it is distributed to the public advantage."

"Words, by long and familiar use, come as before observed, to excite in men certain ideas, so constantly and so readily, that we are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them. But, that they signify only men's peculiar ideas by a perfectly arbitrary imposition, is evident by this, that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of; and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to oblige others to have the same ideas in their minds as he has, when they use the same words he does. And, therefore, the great Augustus himself, in possession of that power, which ruled so great a portion of the old world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word; which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects."

"The same liberty Adam had, to make any complex ideas of Mixed Modes by no other patterns than his own thoughts,

all men have ever since had. The necessity he was under (if he would not wilfully impose upon himself) of conforming his ideas of Substances to things without him, they being archetypes made by nature, the same have all men from his time. The same liberty also, that Adam had of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still, especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such; but, with this difference, that in places, where men in society have already established a language amongst them, the significations of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered; because, men being furnished already with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriated known names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining of new names to express them; but men think it a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current. But in communication with others it is necessary, that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for, to their known proper significations, or else specify what new significations we apply them to."

"He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names to them, wants dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to use periphrases. He that uses words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies names to ideas different from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he that hath ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath instead thereof chimeras."

"The fallacies men put upon themselves, as well as upon others, and the mistakes common in men's notions and dis-

putes, will be found to originate in words; and their uncertain or mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think no small obstacle in the way of knowledge: and I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of language, which is the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies, which make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal more open than it does."

Of General or Abstract Terms.

"All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps, be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too, I mean in their signification, but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest part in all languages are General Terms, which, however, has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity."

It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name, for it is beyond the power of the human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with. Every bird and beast men saw, and tree and plant that affected their senses, could not find place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men should never have attempted to give names to each sheep in their flocks, or crow that flies over their head, much less to call every leaf of plants or grains of sand that come in their way by a peculiar name. But, if it were possible, it would be useless; men therefore content themselves commonly with giving proper names to those things only, which they have most need of distinguishing, as persons, countries, cities, churches, rivers, mountains, &c., and to some houses, dogs, and horses, but, to very few, if any other things."

“ It will not, perhaps, be amiss, to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are like the persons themselves only particulars. The ideas of the nurse and the mother, are well framed in their minds, and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals, and the names of nurse and mama the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have made them observe, that there are a great many things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been accustomed to, they frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in, and to that they give with others the name Man for example; and thus they come to have a general or abstract Name, wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.”

“ By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily advance to yet more general names and notions, for leaving out the shape and some other properties, signified by the name Man, and retaining only the ideas of a body with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, they comprehend other things under the name Animal; and leaving out of the idea animal, sense, and spontaneous motion; the remaining complex idea made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, comes under the still more comprehensive or abstract term Vivens, which includes also all vegetables. And not to dwell longer upon this parti-

cular, so evident in itself, it is by the same way the mind proceeds to Body, Substance, and at last, to Being, Thing, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever: to conclude, this whole mystery of Genera and Species, which make such a noise in the schools, but are with justice so little regarded out of them, are nothing more than Abstract Ideas, more or less comprehensive with Names annexed to them."

"When, therefore, we quit Particulars, the Generals we use, *are entirely of our own creation*; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a *relation*, which, by the mind of man, is added to them."

"The next thing therefore, to be considered is, what kind of signification it is that general words have. It is evident they do not signify barely one particular thing, for then they would not be general terms, but proper names: church, for instance, is a general term, but, St. Peters, at Rome, a proper name: so on the other hand it is as evident, they do not signify a plurality, for man and men would then signify the same, and the distinction of numbers (as grammarians call them) prove superfluous and useless; whereas, man and men are both general terms, though the one is singular, the other plural. That then, which general words signify, are the *Sorts* of things, and each *General Term* being a sign of an *Abstract Idea* in the mind, it is thus things existing, as they are found to agree, come to be ranked under one name; for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have a right to the name man, is the same thing. All nouns that are not proper names are general terms."—*Locke*:

"There is nothing in the world Universal but Names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. One universal name is imposed on many things, for their

similarity in some quality, or other accident; and whereas, a Proper name bringeth to mind *one* thing only, Universals reach *any* one of those many."—*Hobbes*.

A highly eminent philologist, and whose profound learning we cannot pretend ever to fathom, in making some few comments upon the Essay concerning Human Understanding, says, "I only desire you to read the Essay over again with attention, and see whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded will not hold equally true and clear, if you substitute the composition, &c. of Terms, wherever he has supposed a composition, &c. of Ideas." But after a second, and even third perusal, we still retain the opinion that Mr. Locke is correct, and that the proposed alteration would not upon trial be found to answer. According to Mr. Locke, "Ideas are whatsoever may be the object of the understanding when a man thinks," whereas, terms, he says, are only the Symbols of ideas; and whether they are to be considered as particular or general, must be determined entirely by the nature of the ideas to which they are annexed. "Terms become general by being made *signs* of general ideas, and Ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time, place, and any other particular existence," as man, theatre, &c. The mind first makes a collection of ideas; secondly, it unites them into one; and thirdly, gives stability to the union by a name, as a tragedy, phoenix, bankrupt, &c. But

"What's in a name? that which we call a Rose,
By any other word would smell as sweet."

The term universe is the same, whether used by the learned or the ignorant; the idea attached to it too, so far as it is supposed to include all beings, is the same; yet how greatly more sublime,

though infinitely short of the original, will the composition of the picture be to the eye of knowledge than to that of ignorance. Besides the mind can conceive, and by circumlocution enable another to conceive, the like arbitrarily composed ideas, even before terms are affixed to them; for instance, inventions ere they have been carried into execution, and the numberless chimeras entertained of beauty or deformity, whence, indeed, the expression "Ideal beauty." The hands cannot execute what the eye hath not seen, nor the mind conceived. Imagination it is that "bodies forth the forms of things unknown," and the artist's, like the poet's hand,

" Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing

A local habitation and a name."

Simple terms have been invented, and afterwards as occasion required, variously compounded. Simple terms are the uncompounded names of any ideas whatsoever, as John, man, fleet. Compound terms, Johnson defines to be, two or more terms united into one. The apparent intention of compounding them is, not only in general to spare the invention of new terms, but sometimes also to mark particularly either some sort of relation, with which certain things are considered, or some preeminent power or quality, or remarkable deficiency of either, discernible in them; *e. g.* the simple term, umbrella, a shade, does not specify from what it is to shade one, but the compound terms, parasol and parapluie, are no sooner pronounced, than the mind considers those instruments with relation to the things parried, *i. e.* with the sun and rain. Such, too, are thermometer, contemporary, coal-heaver, turnspit. By the term ventriloquist, we distinguish those persons remarkable for speaking, as it were, from the belly; clear-sighted, able-bodied, shallow-brain, &c. are of the like description. A very superficial examination of the most copious languages would serve to convince us, that the composition of terms is extremely limited, while that of ideas we find to be

as boundless as the imagination of man: *e. g.* in the term religion there is little composition, yet it represents a great composition of ideas, of a Creator, of a superior, of a benefactor, of one created, of an inferior, of gratitude, of adoration, and perhaps of many others.

Great numbers of the general Ideas of one nation are common to all others, and must necessarily be so, man and things being fundamentally the same every where; whereas, the Terms affixed to those ideas, often very widely differ, as the vast variety of languages testify, and some of which bear no manner of resemblance to each other, *i. e.* neither in the composition nor in the sounds of words.

Mr. Locke's Analysis of our Ideas and Language has, we apprehend, something peculiar in it. He confined his attention solely to the examination of the nature of our ideas, and of the manner in which the mind severally entertains and modifies them; and also how far, and which kind of words are the most liable to be differently interpreted and abused; it lay out of his way, therefore, to meddle with the business either of the grammarian or lexicographer. Young people might, perhaps, derive profitable amusement from occasionally examining the force of words according to his directions. This would lead them to consider in what manner language is fitted to represent our ideas, what are the sorts of ideas affixed to the words they would define, and whether they have a determined, adequate, and correct, or a confused and inadequate notion of the thing nominated. Should they be induced, for a time, frequently to engage in such exercises, it is to be presumed, they could not fail shortly to acquire a habit of both thinking and speaking correctly.

CHAPTER III.

Of Man.—Power.—Action.—Corporeal Powers.—Native Character.—Mental Powers.—Excitements.—Principal Directing Dispositions.—Primary Dispositions.—Indescribable Natural Peculiarities.—Circumstances.—Original, Acquired, and General Character.—Children of the same family often differ as widely from one another as from the rest of the species.

Of Man.

“MAN doth consist of two parts, one Material and external, whereby each individual becomes a sensible part of nature, and hath an eminent station amongst visible creatures, this we term Body, Person: the other the interior, and Invisible principle of operations, properly called the Soul, Spirit, Mind. There is an evident relation between our bodies and souls, the members and organs of our bodies being wonderfully adapted to serve the operations of our souls, and we (as inward experience, or conscience of what we do, may teach us) determine ourselves commonly to action, and move the corporeal instruments, subject to our will and command, not by force of any precedent bodily impression or impulse, but either according to mere pleasure, or in virtue of somewhat spiritual, and abstracted from matter, acting upon us, not by a physical energy, but by moral representation, in a manner more easily conceived than expressed. This invisible power renders man the author of actions so worthy, and works so wonderful; capable of wisdom and virtue; of knowledge so vast, and of desires so lofty; apt to contemplate truth and affect good; able to recollect things past, and to see things future; to search so deep into the causes of things, and disclose so many mysteries of nature; to invent so many arts and sciences, to

contrive such projects of polity, and atchieve such feats of prowess: briefly, it capacitates him, to perform all those admirable efforts of human wit and industry, which we daily see and hear of."—*Barrow*.

Experience assures us that the Mind and Body have continually a reciprocal influence upon each other; that the body is so organized, as to be affected in various ways, by external objects, and by the thoughts of the mind; and the mind, by the impressions external objects make upon the body, and also by its own voluntary, or involuntary contemplations; and moreover, that the changes which take place in the body, commonly effect some alteration, more or less durable, in the mind; as the alterations in the mind do in the body, though not often so certainly perhaps, nor to the same degree.

Judging from the appearance of idiots, there seems to be strong evidence of the understanding being more or less confined and cramped, when lodged in an ill-shaped tenement. But as many of the derangements of the body frequently produce not only slow, but also very rapid and various sorts of changes, both transient and permanent in the mind, we suspect that other parts of it, besides the skull, and which are far more liable to alteration, also greatly determine the constitution of the mental faculties. And do we not find all infants more or less irritable, and more or less sprightly, according to their present state of ease and health? We conclude, therefore, that the force of the digestion, and the quality of the several humours, &c. very strongly influence the *native* as well as the *acquired* character of all men.

The Understanding we denominate the Mental Faculties, which faculties we find to have the power (more or less) of

exciting, modifying, calming, and suppressing the emotions consequent upon either thought or sensation, or both. The various emotions that commonly determine the man to action, whether caused by sense or thought, we call Dispositions. The ordinary tenor of his mind, the Temper, and the general sensibility that animates him, and gives a peculiar character both to his temper and dispositions, the Temperament.

The effects both external objects and inward thoughts are calculated *universally* to produce upon us, we distinguish by the word Excitements, such as are pleasure and pain, hope and fear, conscience, &c.

Some of our dispositions appear to be the origin, directly or indirectly, of the greatest part of our actions, and thus to give a certain character to our general conduct; ambition, for instance, gives one direction to our conduct, the desire of pleasure another, &c. we therefore denominate all such, Principal Directing Dispositions.

Those dispositions we first betray, we name Primary; children for example, very early appear addicted to anger, resentment, obstinacy, &c.

Power.

The mind being every day informed by the senses, of the alterations which take place in the physical world, in which some things *cease to be*, and others *begin to exist*: Reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a frequent change of opinions, occasioned sometimes by the impressions received from outward objects, and sometimes by its own operations about them, it concludes from the changes it has so often seen, that the like changes will in future be made in similar things, by the like agents, and the like ways; thus the mind being led to consider the possibility of making that change, comes by the idea we call Power.

Action.

Man has two sorts of Action, viz. Thinking and Motion: thinking is the exercise of his mental, and motion that of his corporeal powers. "We easily distinguish two sorts of objects; the first is of those we perceive to have a spontaneity, or self-moving power, and several properties and affections similar to those of our own minds, such as reasoning, judging, willing, loving, hating, &c. the second is of those in which no such affections appear, and which are so far of a passive nature, that they never move of themselves, neither do they when in motion ever stop, without some external influence. If one of these moves out of its place, without the appearance of a mover, we immediately conclude it to be owing to some invisible agent, so much are we persuaded of its own inertia. If we lay one of them up in any place, we expect to find it there at any distance of time, provided no other powers have had access to it. This passive nature or inertia is what chiefly distinguishes the second class, and is called Matter, as the former is Spirit."—*Maclaurin's Newton*, Book ii. chap. 1.

"Thus matter seems to be wholly destitute of Active power, as its author, God, truly is above all Passive power. The intermediate spirits alone probably are endowed with both active and passive power." Matter operates only by necessity, whereas spirits operate more or less freely, and are operated upon; consequently, man's *voluntary* actions must all of them indubitably originate in the mind.

Corporeal Powers,
general Frame, and Constitution of the Body.

As beauty still has blemish, and the mind
The most accomplish'd, its imperfect side,
Few bodies are there of that happy mould
But some one part is weaker than the rest,
The legs, perhaps, or arms refuse their load,
Or the chest labours.—*Armstrong's Art of Health.*

The Shape of the Skull,
Somewhat different in each individual.

The Digestion,
More or less rapid, and stronger or weaker.

The Circulation
Of the blood, and the several humours of the body, more or less rapid, stronger or weaker, and more or less irritating.

The Appetites,
Severally more or less keen or vehement.

The Senses,
Severally more or less acute.

Other Parts of the Body,
The limbs, &c. severally more or less vigorous.

The general Constitution,
Stronger or weaker.

Native Character.

“Some there are in whom, as one expresses it, one would think, nature had placed every thing the wrong way—depraved in their opinions, unintelligible in their reasonings, irregular in their actions, and vicious in every disposition. Whilst in some others, we see almost every thing amiable and excellent, that can adorn and exalt the human mind under the disadvantages of mortality. So that I am very ready to believe, that there is not a greater difference between an angel and some of the best and wisest of men, than between a devil and some of the worst and wickedest.”—*Mason on Self-Knowledge.*

The Temperament,

Sanguine or Phlegmatic, and of both sorts there are the Cheerful and Melancholy, of several characters and degrees.

The Temper,

Easy or Difficult, and of several characters and degrees.

Dispositions,

Severally more or less kindly, or perverse, and there are numberless combinations, characters, and degrees of them.

Mental Powers.

“The difference is exceeding great between some men and some other animals; but, if we compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little, that it will be difficult to say that that of the man is either clearer or more capacious.”—*Locke*.

Perception,

Judgment,

Discerning,

Compounding,

Retention,

Abstracting,

Comparing,

Reasoning,

Severally stronger or weaker, and betraying in many individuals more or less

Genius,

Mimickry,

Imagination,

Cleverness,

Wit,

Dexterity, and

Humour,

Good or bad Taste.

And of all these there are numberless combinations, characters, and degrees.

Excitements.

Various excitements are implanted in all human beings

(idiots excepted), in order to urge them to the active exercise of their several faculties.

Pleasure and Pain.

Felt more or less keenly according to the character of the individual, thing desired, and present state of his mind and body. From these originate all our desires, both good and bad.

Desire or Volition.

Felt more or less keenly according to character, thing desired, and to circumstances. From it arise all our actions, both good and bad.

Love and Hatred.

More or less vehement towards the several objects desired or deprecated, according to character and circumstances. From these arises the *renewal* of all our desires, either to obtain or to avoid any thing.

Hope and Fear.

Stronger or weaker according to character and circumstances. From these arise all our expectations of both good and evil.

Self-Love.

Stronger or weaker, and more or less exclusive. Thence originates our propensity to do whatsoever is agreeable to us, or what we believe to be good for us, in some way or other.

Social Love.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. From it arises our propensity to love our fellow-creatures, or to regard any animal, and consequently to desire their society and reciprocal affection, and more or less to confer benefits upon them.

Sympathy.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. Thence originates our propensity to pity and succour the distressed, and to rejoice with the fortunate; also to be affected by the physical uneasinesses we see others suffer, as from surgical operations, yawning, &c. It likewise makes known to us in what manner we can most annoy and torment others.

Conscience.

More or less sensitive generally, and likewise upon some particular subjects, according to the situation and character of the individual. From it arises our propensity to act, rather as our sense of duty dictates, than as our inclinations prompt us.

Desire of Reward and Fear of Punishment.

Respectively stronger or weaker according to the character of the individual. From these originates our propensity to follow the suggestions of our conscience; also to be obedient to both public and private authority. They dispose us likewise to do evil, in order to obtain the one and to avoid the other.

Desire of Praise and Fear of Blame.

Respectively stronger or weaker, according to character and circumstances. From these arises our propensity to court the approbation of men, and to deprecate their censure, by the practice either of virtue or of vice, according to the associates we are most influenced by.

PRINCIPAL DIRECTING DISPOSITIONS.

These are the dispositions every man has, to urge him to seek more or less steadily the very various things that are good, useful, and agreeable to him.

Desire of Happiness both in our Present and Future State of Existence, or to obtain Good and to avoid Evil.

Respectively stronger or weaker according to the character of the individual. It directs him upon all occasions to do what his reason and conscience dictate to him, whether agreeable to his present inclinations or not.

Desire of Ease, or Relief from Present Pain.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to free himself, as soon as practicable, from any annoyance likely to injure either his mind or body; it often induces him also to rid himself of pain, though his impatience is likely eventually to be more or less disadvantageous to him.

Desire of Superiority, or Ambition.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to aim at excelling in any pursuit whatsoever, whether good or bad.

Desire of Pleasure.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to enjoy the various bounties provided for him by indulgent nature; it tempts him also to use them to a more or less criminal excess.

Desire of Independence or of Liberty.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to rely principally upon his own exertions, both for subsistence and amusement; it renders him also apt to resist the most wholesome authority.

Desire of Power.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to become more or less, and in a variety of ways, the benefactor or the scourge of individuals, families, or nations.

Desire of Wealth.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to accumulate riches either by honest or dishonest means, and for good or bad purposes, or for hoarding.

Consciousness or Belief of Superiority or Pride.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him properly to support the dignity of his nature, character, rank, and situation, in life: it often leads him also to forget what is justly due to the self-love and pretensions of others.

Desire of Appearing to Advantage, or Vanity.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to display his acquirements or possessions in a manner more or less agreeable and advantageous to, or more or less offensive and injurious to, the fortunes or morals of others.

Desire of Change.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It is in many cases irresistible; in others it directs him to vary his actions, so as to give his body and mind each a wholesome degree both of exercise and repose; it leads him also to indulge himself in the most wanton caprices.

Desire of Novelty.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to seek new objects in order to extend his acquaintance with nature, and to give new zest to his enjoyments. It also inclines him to become soon disgusted with sameness, and to be fickle and dissipated.

Curiosity.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to search out the secrets of nature, both physical and in-

tellectual, and to make himself acquainted with the past and present state of the world ; it disposes him also to be more or less impertinently inquisitive and prying into the affairs of others.

Desire of Occupation.

Stronger or weaker, and of different characters. It directs him to employ his time in different degrees, either well or ill.

Primary Dispositions.

These dispositions betray themselves with the dawn of reason, and every child is disposed to be, in various degrees,

Active or Indolent,

Patient	or Impatient,	Docile	or Obstinate,
Contented	or Discontented,	Reserved	or Unreserved,
Courageous	or Fearful,	Decisive	or Indecisive,
Bold	or Timid,	Attentive	or Inattentive.

He is disposed to Love and Hate ; also to be
 Angry, Forgiving, Jealous,
 Resentful, Grateful, Envious.

Indescribable Natural Peculiarities.

As every individual has some peculiarities, more or less easily made known to a certain degree by words, so has he others, that we can as clearly discern, without however, being able to describe them. Some, for instance, have a peculiar grace in their carriage, looks, manners, and motions ; others in their language and sentiments. Some have an extraordinary tenderness, delicacy, or coarseness of feeling. Some are remarkable for their gentleness, awkwardness, boisterousness. Some have peculiar sorts of expression in the countenance, as of goodness, malignity, intelligence, acuteness, archness, inquiry,

suspicion, carelessness, vacancy, imbecility, &c. in short, such and similar peculiarities, though they cause men very apparently to differ still more widely from each other, yet want names to distinguish them to any one a stranger to the subject in whom they reside.

We cannot discover any other excitements than those we have classed as above. We suppose a certain degree of pleasure or pain generally accompanies almost every action, sensation, and thought, consequently that we either love or hate to repeat them; that we have a constant succession of desires, and either hope or fear to gratify them; that we have conscience, and a sense of right or wrong in most, if not in all things we do, because we find ourselves very frequently subjected to a greater or less reward or punishment of some kind, either natural or instituted; and that we commonly incur either praise or blame: all our voluntary actions too must from the very nature of things, have their original in the separate or joint influence of self-love, social love, and sympathy.

"Self-love and Social are the same," says Mr. Pope; but, we suspect the selfish but too frequently and forcibly prove them very distinct; however, they most certainly commonly concur, to urge man to action, and sympathy no less frequently lends its aid. Whenever we unjustly indulge our inclinations at the expense of others, we must be moved, it is evident, by self-love alone, and surely directly war against both social love and sympathy. If we be thirsty and drink, self-love urges us to it: but, if we be hungry, and yet give our meat to another also in want of it, sympathy it is that makes known his cravings to us, social love induces us to satisfy them, and self-love is gratified by our beholding his consequent joy and thankfulness. Self-love will determine us to act thus, provided we feel more pain, in be-

holding the sufferings of another, than in bearing the evils attendant upon the degree of hunger, we at the moment suffer. If an animal appear to require our aid, sympathy stirs us to administer it. We here speak of the natural operations of these three excitements on the mind, without taking into account the moral feeling that serves to strengthen their proper influence over us.

We suppose all men not idiots, to have a certain degree of each of the Principal Directing Dispositions; and that they would otherwise be less fitted to live in community.

The Primary Dispositions also seem to be common to the whole race.

Experience continually proves to us, that as precisely the same sort of actions have their original in very different propensities; so likewise, does each propensity give rise to very different actions, which makes it the more reasonable to conclude, notwithstanding the infinite variety of conduct we find amongst men, that each man is urged to the exercise of his several faculties by few, if any other Excitements, Principal Directing, and Primary Dispositions, than those which have so long had distinct names assigned them. If we take a walk for example, we may do so, because we desire health, or pleasure, or to oblige another, or to exhibit ourselves in public, or to escape some annoyance, &c. Does a man commit murder, he may have been instigated to it by jealousy and revenge, by ambition, by the desire of wealth, or of pleasure, or of ease from pinching want, &c. On the other hand, to what a variety of actions does ambition, vanity, the desire of pleasure, &c. urge not only different men, but the same man. In short, we cannot imagine any voluntary action that may not be traced to one or more of the excitements and propensities classed as above. The having clear notions of them, qualifies us, we apprehend, to judge more correctly in the first place, of the best mode of educating man; in the second, of the probable

motives for his conduct, and of the manner in which he is likely to act under the different circumstances of his life; and thirdly, what laws and customs are calculated the most effectually to encourage his virtuous, and to check his vicious propensities; the first and second deeply concerns parents and teachers; the third, rulers of all denominations and legislators.

Circumstances.

Children may be nursed and educated more or less judiciously with respect either to their mind or body, or both. They may have more or fewer companions, and these may be severally, more or less intelligent, active, amiable, virtuous, and well informed, or the contrary, or differently mixed. They may be educated at home, or at school, public or private, larger or smaller, well or ill conducted, containing more or fewer virtuous or vicious, active or indolent scholars. They may, at home, see more or fewer visitors, and the society of these visitors may be more or less advantageous to them. They may be left more or less with servants, and the language and conduct of these servants may be more or less exceptionable. They may be treated with more or less indulgence by their parents or guardians, and may associate more or less with them. Their parents may be more or less virtuous, intelligent, active, well informed, and amiable, chearful or melancholy, healthy or sickly, more or less opulent, more or less elevated by birth, or rank, or both, more or less engaged in public or private life, more or less powerful, more or less dissipated, or domestic, &c. &c.

Young men may form friendships and acquaintances more or less valuable or objectionable. They may go to college, enter any profession, engage in any trade, devote themselves to any branch of literature, or to any art or science, and do

any one of these under peculiar circumstances, or remain idle, &c. &c. They may become husbands, or remain in a state of celibacy, fathers or not, governors, subalterns, &c. live under a more or less limited monarchy, or a more or less free democracy, in peaceable or turbulent times, at court, or remote from it, &c. They may be more or less fortunate or unfortunate in their several connexions or transactions at any one or more periods of their life, or through the whole of it, and be more or less favoured by chance.

All these and numberless other circumstances, and all the before enumerated peculiarities of corporeal powers, general constitution, native character, mental powers, excitements, and dispositions, may be differently combined *in infinitum*, and moreover, each individual is liable, as we said before, not only to continual changes himself, but also to be affected by the alterations that are as incessantly taking place in every thing around him.

“ But, these alterations are often like the quantity in a regular cone, where, though there be a manifest difference in the diameter at remote distances, yet, in those parts which immediately touch one another, it is hardly discernible.”

Need we seek farther, in order to account for the endless variety we see in man, and the ever succeeding revolutions that take place in all human affairs ?

The Original, Acquired, and General Character.

The physical and mental constitution of each individual form his Original character. The effects produced upon it by the excitements and circumstances determine, we apprehend, what is commonly called his Acquired character ; and, that the two together, with his conduct, make up his General character ; since, when we inquire what is the general character of such a one, we desire to be made acquainted with

his principal actions, his natural endowments, and the degree of cultivation they have had.

Children of the same family often differ as widely from one another as from the rest of the species.

We sometimes see children of all characters, degrees of intellect, &c. born of the same parents. The intelligent and imbecile, the good and bad tempered, the interesting and dull, the graceful and awkward, the beautiful and ugly, &c. more or less powerful minds united to weak bodies, and *vice versa*. The poor, like the rich, casually give birth to genius, and both mental and corporeal grace and beauty; and being vastly more numerous, prodigies start up amongst them more frequently than amongst their superiors in many adventitious advantages.

We proceed to examine the Human Mind more in detail.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Soul or Mind, Understanding, Sensibility, Volition.—Of the Body, Senses, Sensation.—Indifference.—Temperament.—Desire.—Temper.—Dispositions.—Differences of Temperament and of Temper.—Prevailing Dispositions how discerned.—Thought, Reflection.—The several Faculties of the Understanding.—Genius.—Imagination.—Wit.—Humour.—Mimickry, &c.—Cleverness.—Dexterity.—Taste.

Of the Soul or Mind.

Understanding, Sensibility, Volition.

It is not our intention to discuss the *nature* of the Soul, we here consider it distinct from the body, therefore merely for the purpose of rendering our meaning more intelligible to the reader.

The Soul or Mind has not only a power or faculty to perceive things singly or together; but likewise their resemblances, differences, relations, and reciprocal operations upon each other, &c. this power is termed the Understanding.

The soul's susceptibility of pleasure and pain, upon its various perceptions of things, we call its Sensibility.

From perception and sensibility arises Volition, i. e. a preference for certain actions, and certain impressions, rather than others.

The effect of the temporary excitement of the sensibility we suppose to be expressed by the word Emotion.

We cannot imagine the soul or mind in any state of existence to be devoid of either Understanding, Sensibility, or Volition; of understanding to apprehend its existence, sensibility to feel it, and volition to will good or evil. Understanding, for

instance, to apprehend Infinite Intelligence, sensibility to adore it, and volition to will the performance of what is due to the Author of its unspeakable happiness.

Whether in other worlds, the soul will be capable of feeling uniformly supremely blest, or be permitted only occasional exquisite emotions, is a question, seemingly as far removed from our present comprehension, as it most certainly is from our present concerns in life.

Of the Body.

Senses, Sensation.

Five Senses are distinguished, as being the organs of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting.

These several senses, we find, are fitted to convey sensations to the body, and perceptions to the mind, thus Sensation evidently expresses the sensibility of the body.

A Sensation, therefore, must be to the body what an Emotion is to the mind, a temporary affection of it.

Physical things only can excite sensations in the body, without the *active* agency of the mind. If we touch a dead person, for example, it excites in us merely the sensation of coldness, but that sensation serves to awaken emotions in us, according to our character, present state of mind and health, and the degree of attachment we bore the deceased. The distress, however, the mind suffers, may afterwards disorder the body, and cause it to experience many painful sensations. But all things, both real and ideal, may reach the mind; it may be enchanted with substantial beauty, or with such imaginary forms, "as float in light vision round the poet's head."

Though the influence of the emotions upon the body, as of the sensations upon the mind, is vastly extensive, yet there are numerous and insurmountable limits to it. No emotion can cause the sensation of extreme hunger in the body, neither can any sensation *of itself*, excite despair in the mind. But

the smell of a violet, by delighting the olfactory nerves, may animate the mind to make a thousand reflections, and these reflections cause the beholder to see new and inexpressible charms in this modest and fragrant flower. The same tune striking upon the ear, will at one moment or one period of our lives, awaken us to joy, in another plunge us into grief.

The sensations of many persons appear to be wonderfully more lively than their emotions, while the dulness of some of those of another, seem far from corresponding with the force of their emotions. The first will be found to have their senses superior to their intellect, the second, *vice versa*; but where there is nearly an equality of understanding and temperament, he who has the most acute senses, will necessarily be found to have the most lively emotions; *cæteris paribus*, therefore, the more lively the sensations, the more lively the emotions.

Indifference.

When things fail to excite any sort of emotion in the mind, we are said to be Indifferent to them. We may behold a place with perfect indifference to-day, and shortly after, regard it with the deepest emotion, as containing the ashes of a darling child.

The Temperament.

The union of sensibility and sensation is, we apprehend, what is called the Temperament, i. e. the susceptibility of the whole man to be affected with pleasure or pain, by every object both of sensation and reflection; which susceptibility must necessarily be wonderfully modified by the peculiar constitution of his mind, as well as of his body. This will explain to us, how it comes to pass, that though we can distinguish by peculiar terms the general characters of the temperament and temper of each individual, and so call them ardent or phlegmatic, easy or difficult, accordingly; yet that we could

not find words to express the varieties of them, they being, we believe, numerous as the race of man. Each person, from his infancy, has a certain something in his way of speaking, feeling, and acting, peculiar to himself; and which he always retains, whatever changes circumstances may afterwards effect in him. Thus one with an ardent temperament has a sweet temper, noble courage, generous thoughts, &c. another is brutal, fierce, malignant; and there are some of all shades between these two extremes. We find the same pleasing and disagreeable tempers and dispositions amongst the phlegmatic, but of a more sober complexion.

Desire.

From the temperament springs Desire; it being excited either by the sensibility of the mind, or the sensations of the body, or both. It is the union of volition with the appetites; for volition expresses the propensities of the mind, and the appetites those of the body. What seems to prove our desires to be the expression both of volition and the appetites is, that we find the appetites to be the *Will* (if we may so call it) of the body; it would eat and drink to satisfy its hunger and thirst, &c. just as the mind would fain discover the cause of any phenomena to satisfy its curiosity. In fact, we may observe, that some of our desires are purely spiritual, as the appetites are entirely corporeal: such is the desire of apprehending and worshipping God, and of attaining knowledge independent of all worldly considerations. But most of them are more or less corporeal or spiritual as it may happen. He, for instance, who desires cheerful company and good cheer, may have a higher relish, either for the dainties before him, or for "the feast of reason, and the flow of soul," that animates his associates.

Man being thus framed to derive pleasure or pain from every object, both of sensation and reflection, he must neces-

sarily desire to obtain that, which he has found to be agreeable to him, and to avoid what has proved otherwise. Moreover, his desires cannot but be more or less intense or feeble, according to his temperament, general character, present state of mind and body, and things desired.

The Temper.

The Temper seems to be the *continual* susceptibility of the mind, to be affected by the operations of things, both within and without it, and by the state of the body. The temperament must, therefore, necessarily determine the character of the temper, for the temper can be no other than the general manifestation of the temperament.

The Dispositions.

The terms desire and disposition, both in fact express the inclinations we have for certain actions or things; but *Desire* is applied to any appetite or wish whatsoever, that may urge us to action; whereas, *Disposition* is confined to express the effect a continual repetition of the same desire produces upon the mind; thus a man may desire to read a particular book, without being addicted to reading in general; but a great reader is said to have a turn for literature, or if he steadily direct his attention to the attainment of any art or science, we call him studious, or declare him *disposed* to study. We may therefore define the Dispositions to be The occasional and successive propensities that move us to make use of our several operative faculties, according as our wants, either natural or factitious, may suggest, and thus lead us to acquire a habit of acting after a certain fashion.

Thus the union of Sensibility with Sensation constitutes, we imagine, the Temperament. That of Volition with the Appetites, the Desires; and that the frequent repetition of the same desires, cause them to become Dispositions. The Temper,

we suppose, to be the general effect of the temperament upon our frame, both of mind and body.

Differences of Temperament.

Men have, as we said before, distinguished two principal sorts of temperaments, the Ardent and the Phlegmatic, and of both there are the cheerful and melancholy, of all characters and degrees.

The Ardent commonly are easily excited to feel, and persuaded to exert themselves in the service of others; but many of them are much wanting in steadiness and determination.

The Phlegmatic we find, on the contrary, difficult to work upon, they seeming little disposed to accommodate themselves to other people's wishes, or to take any trouble, or even interest in their concerns; but when prevailed upon, they generally remain firm in their friendships and purposes.

With a good understanding and easy temper, the Ardent, it must be acknowledged, are far more interesting and agreeable than the Phlegmatic, of the same pretensions. But some of them have shallow heads, weak sensibility, and lively sensations, which union they betray by what is called strong animal spirits, i. e. a corporeal restlessness and mental inactivity. Such persons are often vastly troublesome to the more sober part of mankind, and cause men heartily to wish rather for the quiet dulness of their compeers for sense amongst the phlegmatic. Such subjects loudly demand sufficient manual occupation, to keep them out of mischief: to employ their minds, and to leave their bodies at rest, is to do great violence to nature.

The temperament, we imagine, never altogether changes its character from sanguine to phlegmatic, and *vice versa*, though it unquestionably does in degree. The varieties of each seem pretty nearly as follows, but in innumerable degrees.

Of the Sanguine.

Placid,
 Cheerful,
 Lively,
 Sprightly,
 Gay,
 Irritable,
 Grave,
 Pensive,
 Melancholy,
 Gloomy.

Of the Phlegmatic.

Placid,
 Cheerful,
 Irritable,
 Grave,
 Pensive,
 Melancholy,
 Gloomy.

The Temperament or sensibility betrays not only the above differences, but has other peculiar characters. Each individual, for instance, feels in a manner quite his own. Persons of the most lively sensibility, some of them quickly betray themselves, while others will be as deeply, though silently moved. Many are as remarkable for tenderness as others for roughness. Some are easily and violently affected, but soon forget their grief, whereas others are not agitated by trifling occasions, but dwell long and heavily upon their misfortunes.

Differences of Temper.

Each peculiar temperament disposes each individual, as we have before said, to be generally more or less agreeably affected by all things whatsoever, so as to occasion his having, what we call, an Easy or Difficult Temper, in a greater or less degree. For we cannot but observe, that things seem to produce a sort of almost continual irritation upon some minds, whereas others again appear seldom disturbed, and this from their very birth.

Of Tempers there are of all degrees, the

Easy,	Difficult,
Placid,	Peevish,
Sweet,	Sulky or Sullen,
	Fretful,
	Irritable,
	Choleric,
	Irascible.

*Prevailing Dispositions, Propensities, Inclinations, Passions,
how discerned.*

The various propensities we have, frequently to repeat certain actions, are, as before observed, termed our Dispositions. Certain things being commonly desired or deprecated, induce regular habits of seeking or avoiding them, and the same actions are performed, and the same opinions entertained in different ways by different persons, with so much uniformity, as to stamp the character of each individual, and thus to betray the general complexion of his mind.

These modes of actions, having many of them peculiar names assigned them, we pronounce a man to be disposed, severally, and in different degrees, to activity or indolence, to economy or extravagance, to be docile or obstinate, &c. The Passions, we apprehend, are no other than dispositions in their excess, since we say such a one is Inclined, or has a Propensity, or is Disposed to, or is Passionately devoted to gaming, drinking, painting, &c. according as he more or less, passionately or dispassionately, pursues any one of these objects. Inclination seems to express an incipient desire. It is by his *Dispositions*, and *Manner* of shewing them, that we judge of a man's natural and acquired character.

Thought, Reflection.

A Thought is, we imagine, one or more ideas that sponta-

neously, and without effort present themselves to the mind, or are excited in it by sensation. Reflection, the active operation of the mind upon any thoughts arising in it.

The several Faculties of the Understanding.

It appears unimportant in what manner an author may distinguish the Mental Powers or faculties, provided he can make his meaning clearly understood, by a candid and intelligent reader. For as long as we remain ignorant, of the nature of the understanding, we must content ourselves with observing the *operations* of the thinking thing within us, and give the several sorts of them distinct names, as perception, retention, &c. And we may afterwards examine, whether any of the thoughts we entertain are of a description that cannot be classed under the varieties nominated. We have adopted Mr. Locke's method, because we observe, that one individual has a quicker Perception; another, a nicer Discernment; a third, a more tenacious Memory; a fourth, a greater penetration in Comparing or discovering relations between any two or more things; a fifth, a more correct Judgment; a sixth, a greater readiness at Compounding or Imagining new ideas; a seventh, in Abstracting or generalizing, or classing various objects in nature; also, that there are numberless combinations, of the various degrees of each of these, and likewise, that all men (idiots excepted) have more or less a power of Reasoning.

Perception.

“ Perception is the first faculty of the mind, exercised about its ideas, and is by some called thinking in general, though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active, where it with some degree of voluntary attention, considers any thing; for in bare, naked perception, the mind is for the most part only passive, and what it perceives it cannot

help perceiving; *e. g.* we cannot but perceive colours, sounds, densities, flavours, and odours, whenever our senses are exposed to be strongly acted upon by them. Perception then, is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge to our minds; it is the notice the mind takes of any thing in any manner whatsoever, whether by thought or sensation."

Retention.

"Retention is the next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge. It is the power by which we keep or retain the ideas, the power of perception has introduced into our minds. This is done two ways, one, by retaining the idea that is brought into the mind, for some time actually in view, and we call it Contemplation; the other the reviving, or bringing back to our minds those ideas, which after being imprinted or retained, have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid out of sight, this is Memory, which we may consider the storehouse of our ideas. It is by the assistance of this faculty, that we have all those ideas in our understanding, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities, that first imprinted them; we Contemplate the Heavens, and Remember or Recollect the eclipse of yesterday. We commonly use the word *recollect* instead of *remember*, when it is with some difficulty we recal any ideas to our minds."

Discerning.

"Discerning is the distinguishing between the several ideas the mind has. It is not enough, to have a confused perception of something in general; for unless the mind had distinct notions of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies that affect

us, were as busy about us as they now are, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. We discern gold from lead, and that the fire has the power of hardening some bodies, and of softening others," &c.

Comparing.

"With this faculty we compare our ideas one with another, in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstances; in a word, any relation between them, *e.g.* London is larger than Bath, snow is whiter than milk, Sylla lived before Augustus; two trades are equally, or one is more flourishing than the other, &c. the ship's stores are sufficient for the length of the voyage, &c. We here compare the quantity of the stores with the probable duration of the voyage."

The faculty of comparing is most particularly exercised in matters of experience; thus we compare one circumstance with another, in order to ascertain in what respect they are similar or dissimilar, &c. and afterwards judge accordingly.

Judgment.

The faculty which God has given man, to supply the want of clear and certain, or intuitive knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is Judgment: *e.g.* we know by intuition, that white is not black; we judge, from evidence, that a man is innocent.

"The being able nicely to distinguish the relations between causes and their effects, where there is but the least difference, consists in a great measure that exactness of judgment, that enables us to determine the most correctly what we ought to think and to do; *e.g.* whether the entertainment of such and such thoughts be likely to strengthen, or weaken, or corrupt, the mind, and to what degree: whether the despatching of a ship to such a country at such a season, is likely to secure her a quick and safe voyage, &c."

Compounding.

Compounding is the power we have of enlarging our ideas by uniting several together; and by giving them, when so united, a name, we make them, as it were, into one; *e. g.* what a variety of ideas we unite by the word politics! and by compounding certain other ideas, we at pleasure imagine such beings as fairies, witches, &c.

Abstracting.

The power of abstracting enables us to class things into genera and species. We abstract or leave out certain ideas or qualities in which certain things differ, and consider them only so far as they have a common resemblance with each other; *e. g.* the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday perceived in milk, it considers that appearance alone, and having given it the name whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus universals (as was said before), whether ideas or terms, are made.

Reasoning.

The term Reason, we apprehend, to be in one sense another name for understanding, and not for a distinct power of it. Reasons are arguments for or against any proposition—Reasoning, a peculiar mode of exercising the mental faculties, the deducing consequences from certain premises, and where the consequences arise properly out of the premises, it is said to be right reasoning—otherwise, false; but we shall better explain our meaning by example:—

We perceive two men, the one regularly and usefully employed, the other not; and that one has gained wherewithal both to feed and clothe himself, the other not: we consequently discern the difference between the fate of an industrious and of an idle (poor) man; we compare the several differences one

with the other, and judge industrious habits to be the most conformable to our well-being. Our Reasons for judging so are, because we find the industrious commonly prosper in life, and make good fathers and citizens. Our arguments are the Reasons that induce us to entertain such an opinion; our Reasoning is the *chain* of arguments that ultimately brings us to the point we would arrive at, that is, to the proof or demonstration, that industry is to be preferred to idleness. We shall shortly return to this subject.

Genius, Imagination, Fancy.

There are persons of genius, we find, without imagination; others of imagination without genius; and some with both one and the other.

Wherever Genius appears, it seems to betray, not only powerful intellectual faculties, but also strong sensibility, no matter of what character. Supposing two men to have nearly similar temperaments and organization, but very different degrees of understanding, it is reasonable to conclude, that the one who has the most lively apprehensions of things will be apt commonly to experience most pleasure or pain from them. Sir Isaac Newton and Mr. Locke had indisputably the highest degree of human intelligence, but we are at a loss to conjecture what caused each of them to pursue such distinct inquiries, unless it were owing to a constitutional peculiarity. We cannot be persuaded, that any circumstances could *alone* have given their genius, respectively, so decided a bent. It seems probable that each mind was predisposed to receive certain impressions, and that the attention was forcibly attracted to notice most particularly those accidents, that afforded subjects of reflection best suited to their individual genius, for

“ The difference is as great between
The optic seeing as the object seen.”

Examples have been often quoted of men, who were not to be diverted from their strong natural bent by severe continual opposition; how much more then are they likely to take it, when no great obstacles arise to prevent them doing so? Many have appeared immediately electrified, as it were, by the perception of objects connected with the pursuit nature had constituted them to follow, and to lose the impression of genius, as soon as they turned their attention to employments not suited to their peculiar frame of mind. Nature seems wisely to have fitted the bulk of mankind for carrying on any of the common concerns of life, and men of genius to effect discoveries, inventions, and improvements, that demand extraordinary energies. Superior intellectual faculties appear to us the very essence, as it were, of genius; but this superiority is sometimes found to be more particularly in the power of invention; sometimes in that of reasoning and discovering; but in different men we may perceive all the varieties and degrees both of the one and the other, exercised in the establishing or improving of some peculiar art or science.

The temperament must necessarily determine the character of each genius, *i. e.* its manner of feeling, whether it be strong, lively, tender, stern, or morose, &c. What influence, the more or less acute organization of one or more of the senses has upon the intellect, we may perceive to be often made apparent by the comparison of opposite examples. The union of fine organization with strong intellect we suspect gives the stamp both of genius and imagination, consequently, the stronger the intellect, the more transcendent the genius—the finer the organs, the brighter the imagination. For the more acute the organs, the more lively impressions they are likely to convey to the mind, as we said before, and thus to rouse it more forcibly to notice things, and the faculty it has of imagining or compounding new objects, or of varying those it is already acquainted with, will by its operations, betray the

general strength of the understanding. We suppose also that acute organs, but an ordinary understanding, causes a lively imagination, or a happy dexterity at imitation, but not a capability of invention. There seems to be the same difference between genius and imagination as between sober reason and sportive fancy; genius ennobles imagination, and imagination imparts numerous and some exquisite charms to genius.

Mozart had evidently a most delicate perception of sounds, discerned nicely the one from the other, compared their resemblances, differences, and relations, compounded them variously, and judged how they might be arranged in the most skilful manner, to produce that extraordinary degree of melody and harmony that so greatly and generally charms all lovers of music. Is it not probable, that an exquisitely organized ear led him to employ his superior mental powers in the composition of music? Without that acuteness of the organ he could not have judged so accurately of the force and beauty of sounds, with their various modulations; and without the superior intellect he would have been wanting in invention; his very ardent temperament occasioned those impassioned feelings which, too freely indulged, seem actually to have consumed him. He who has an acute ear with mental powers of a common stamp, often succeeds in acquiring great skill in the execution of music, but never betrays genius—never greatly distinguishes himself by his compositions; the degree of delight music affords him depends also upon the nature of his temperament. We sometimes see persons of very dull intellect notable dancers and lovers of sweet sounds; their sprightliness arises probably from a fine ear and ardent temperament.

In the productions of Michel Angelo and Raphael we behold transcendent genius express itself in the most striking manner; on the other hand, it is not uncommon for a person with a remarkably correct eye, to imitate the paintings of these great masters to such a nicety, as to deceive the most practised

critic; yet he at the same time, perhaps, proves himself utterly destitute of that enviable originality of design which Nature reserves for her favourites. Thus we suppose the union of superior senses with superior intellect makes up the happy combination of genius and imagination, which has so often excited the surprise and admiration of mankind, by effecting those many wonderful works that variously adorn and benefit the world.

Whether the peculiar organization of the eye has any thing to do with mechanical genius, we are at a loss to guess, but we do not entertain a doubt of men being forcibly attracted to notice curious pieces of mechanism, and readily to suggest improvements in them when impelled to it by the common mother of genius: Mr. Watt was a highly distinguished instance of it. Great dexterity in some of the executive parts of mechanics, seems certainly to require a correct eye, and possibly too, a nice touch; but we are ignorant, if there have been men of genius of this description, some of whom have proved themselves not *fitted* to excel in the more delicate operations, though they have become eminent by directing the labours of others.

The union of Genius with imagination communicates to us the power to create, invent, or compound, with more or less skill, new worlds, new scenes, new beings, new characters, new associations of ideas, new arts; in a word, the fertile mind can in detail image to itself, altogether, a new state of existence. Shakspeare united the most sublime genius with the most creative imagination. His was

“ The poet’s eye in a fine frenzy rolling,
Glancing from Heav’n to earth, from earth to Heav’n:”

all his senses were, perhaps, so finely organized, that he was alternately attracted to note down the very lively impressions he received by their various inlets. Beauty in every part of nature’s works charmed him, whether intellectual or

physical. In him we discover the most ready perception, the most acute discernment of the infinitely various workings of the human mind, the most just comparisons, the most diversified compositions of new images, and a fine, correct judgment (in his frequent happiest moments), in introducing them, so as to affect his audience in the manner he desired.

Many persons, though they be not constituted to invent them, yet are capable of readily beholding the poetical creations of others, and of being suitably and deeply charmed and agitated by the sentiments and passions, imputed to the several personages introduced. Some again, are more or less denied the ability of enjoying the visions of genius and imagination, notwithstanding they possess as strong, perhaps stronger, powers, both to reason and judge. These differences also, doubtless, depend upon some constitutional peculiarities, both of the temperament and senses.

Lord Bacon, like Shakespeare, was enchanted with the delicious perfume,

“ Of the bank whereon the wild thyme blows,
Where oxlips and the nodding violet grows ;”

and loved to court “ the air that nimbly and sweetly recommends itself unto our gentle senses :” moreover, he delighted in music, yet, still imagination was not the distinguishing feature of his lordship’s mind. He seems to have had his faculties constituted, rather to take a vast and comprehensive view of nature, so as to have been led to discover the means of wresting from her those secrets, that most deeply concern man to become familiarly acquainted with.

The peculiar constitution of the individual determines him also, apparently, to be a wit or a humourist, or a mimic, &c. and of a certain character ; for experience serves to prove, that no education nor circumstances can make any one so, though the talents he has received from nature may be wonderfully cultivated or neglected.

The lowest degree of imagination, we presume, takes the name of Fancy. But, to conclude, superior intellect is, we believe, universally acknowledged, to *constitute* genius, consequently genius must absolutely be confined to the favoured few; but, imagination is, in fact, common to all men capable of compounding ideas, and

“ Such tricks hath strong Imagination,
That, if it would but apprehend some joy,
It comprehends some Bringer of that joy;
Or, in the night, imagining some fear,
How easy is a bush suppos’d a bear.”

A more or less ardent temperament and more or less acute senses we suppose, suitably animate both genius and imagination, but that genius only can give that bold or delicate stamp to the imagination that marks it for pre-eminence amongst men.

Wit.

“ Wit lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and the putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, or agreeable visions in the fancy, so acceptable to all people, and whose beauty appears at first sight, without any labour of thought.”—*Locke*.

“ Wit is a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof, than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusions to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale; sometimes it playeth on words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound; sometimes it is wrapped up in a dress of humourous expression; sometimes it lieth under an

odd similitude ; sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting, or smartly retorting an objection ; sometimes it is concealed in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, or in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense ; sometimes a cynical representation of persons and things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it ; sometimes an affected simplicity ; sometimes a presumptuous bluntness gives it being ; sometimes it riseth only from a lucky hitting upon what is strange ; sometimes from a crafty wrestling of matter obvious to the purpose : often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless roving of fancy, and windings of language. It raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, and reach of thought more than vulgar ; it seemeth to argue a rare quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits applicably ; a notable skill, that can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before him, together with a lively briskness of humour, not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination. It also procureth delight by gratifying curiosity with its rareness, or semblance of difficulty, by diverting the mind from its road of serious thoughts, by instilling gaiety and airiness of spirits, by provoking to such dispositions of gaiety in way of emulation or complaisance, and by seasoning matters otherwise distasteful or insipid, with an unusual and thence grateful savour.”—*Barrow*.

According to Dr. Barrow’s definition of wit, it appears to be an aptness to compound certain *notions* in various ways, so as to produce new images in the mind. Some wits have a satirical turn, either railing or laughing at the follies and wickedness of mankind ; some are sportive, some saturnine ; in short,

there are of them, of all characters and degrees, with more or less genius, imagination, &c.

Humour, Mimicry.

The Humorous, and those inclined to Mimicry, are also to be found amongst men of every description, including persons of Garrick's high stamp, and the successful imitator of mere common gestures and sounds. The jester, the punster, the wag, &c. all have more or less pretensions to imagination or fancy. In Garrick we discover the mimic, and the man of genius and imagination; his genius giving a high tone to his mimicry, and his mimicry marking the versatility of his genius. Baron Grimm says of him,

“ Garrick is beyond all praise: one must see him to form an idea of his extraordinary excellence in the histrionic art, both in tragedy and comedy. This actor is the first and the only one who has completely answered, all that my imagination expected and exacted from a comedian. He has proved to my entire satisfaction that the ideas one forms to oneself of perfection, are not so chimerical as some narrow minded people are apt to conclude them to be. We saw him act the poniard scene in the tragedy of Macbeth in a private room, in his ordinary dress, without any assistance from theatrical illusions; and, as he followed with his eyes, the imaginary receding weapon suspended in the air, his countenance assumed such a wonderfully appropriate and striking expression, that it excited a general burst of applause. Would it have been credited, that this same man, the moment after, could counterfeit with equal success a pastry-cook's boy, carrying patties on his head, who, while gaping about in the streets, let fall his dish into the gutter, then stood stupified, and afterwards burst into tears.”

Cleverness.

Cleverness, we apprehend, denotes a degree of intellect

more or less below genius, but generally something above mediocrity. It seems to be a readiness of judging what arrangements are most likely to answer in matters concerning the making or repairing of any thing. The best method of dispatching quickly and advantageously any public or private business, or of executing notably any commissions, whether it be in the serving of a banquet, or in the disposal of a ship's cargo, &c.

Those who are capable of discovering, inventing, or greatly improving things, are generally termed ingenious, as pretending more or less to genius, and thus ranking above the clever.

Dexterity.

Dexterity seems to be literally applied to the skilful performance of any manual labour. By his dexterity a man may betray the first-rate mental powers, or different degrees of cleverness, or a mere facility of imitation. When nature has favoured a pupil, he often becomes a master in his art, and invents new and improved methods of executing his work. But, if his principal merit be derived from education, he commonly continues to plod on as he has been taught to do, until he receive other instructions.

Taste.

Taste literally is, as we all know, the power we have of distinguishing one flavour from that of another by the means of our palate. Figuratively, it implies the different degrees of admiration we feel upon the perception of a variety of things fashioned or arranged in a certain manner, either by nature, or the art of man, or the preference we have for certain modes of action. To say that we have a taste for a thing or action is, in fact, to say, that we love it, or that it excites a pleasant feeling in our minds; if we neither like nor dislike it, we remain unmoved, but in proportion as the thing or action

is displeasing to us, we are said to be offended by what *we consider* a bad taste. The degree of our sensibility to the several objects of taste, must, therefore, greatly depend upon the force of our various mental powers, upon the organization of our different senses, and upon circumstances.

We cannot but observe in infants, as soon as they notice things, the different degrees of preference they shew to some, and of antipathy to others, whether they be objects affecting the sight, hearing, feeling, smell or taste, and the various tastes we subsequently have, are but the different modifications of this same feeling implanted in us by nature, and afterwards encouraged or repressed by our more or less correct judgment. Want of taste, therefore, we apprehend to be, an improper expression, but not so the want of a good, refined, chaste, or elegant taste. As children, we are "pleased with a rattle, tickled with a straw," and the same sensibility leads us in after life, to admire flowers, trees, rocks, &c. dress, furniture, statues, pictures, &c. We derive more or less pleasure from having our various senses affected by certain objects; and if we continue to seek them, in order to renew the delight they have once afforded us, we are said either to *betray* a taste for, or to *acquire* a taste for them.

The infinitely various combinations of natural powers, of temperaments, and of the casual circumstances of life, are fully adequate to account for the vast variety of tastes found amongst men. And as the character of our several tastes, depend as much upon our natural powers and temperament, as upon our education and situation in life, we may easily explain, why superior minds will sometimes, under the greatest disadvantages, have a chaste and even elegant taste; while inferior ones prove themselves incapable of understanding or relishing the beauties either of nature or of art, though placed continually before their eyes, and they fully at leisure to contemplate them.

We suppose men by their peculiar organization and by circumstances, to have, as we said before, their attention often directed to particular objects, and thereby to acquire a taste for them; but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain how far our natural powers determine the character of our tastes, or how far they are the result of education and circumstances. Of this, however, we cannot entertain a doubt, that habit has the force in most cases, greatly to improve, correct, or vitiate our taste in all things; in other words, to make us more or less relish whatever is good or bad for us. The concurrent approbation of the generality of men in all ages, is universally acknowledged, we believe, to determine the standard of good taste in most works of literature and of the arts; and those habits and things that commonly best contribute to our convenience and well-being, ought surely to be the standard of a correct taste, in matters concerning our general conduct. For to indulge in such habits, and to seek and enjoy such things as are eventually prejudicial to us, our reason tells us, must, by whatever authority established, be a vicious taste; unless we allow, that God intended man to be a sluggard, drunkard, gambler, glutton, &c. Otherwise, it cannot but be considered the duty of all parents to instil, if possible, into the minds of their children, both by precept and example, a taste for rationally early hours, useful occupations, wholesome food, fresh air, salutary exercise, and the love of general order. Man ought to be so educated, in short, as to acquire a taste for, or to be agreeably affected by whatever he believes to be good, and to have a distaste for, or repugnance to whatever he knows to be evil.

In the various productions of human industry we may discover more or less genius, more or less imagination, more or less wit, more or less humour, more or less cleverness, more or less dexterity, and a better or worse taste.

CHAPTER V.

Knowledge, Ignorance.—Degrees of Knowledge.—Truth.—Error.—Mutable, Immutable Truth.—Moral Truth, Falsehood.—Belief, Assent, Opinion, Probability, Certainty, Doubt.—Conjecture.—Assent, Dissent.—Concatenation of Ideas, Association of Ideas.

Knowledge and Ignorance.

“WE are of necessity Ignorant, and want Knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two or more ideas. When we know, for instance, that *white is not black*, what do we, but perceive that these two ideas do not agree; but that *equality to two right ones* does necessarily agree to, and *is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle*.”

This agreement or disagreement consists of four sorts—

1. Identity or diversity,
2. Relation,
3. Co-existence or necessary connexion,
4. Real existence.

“First, As to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. Identity or Diversity; it is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all; this the mind does without pains or labour,

at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction."

" Secondly, The next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its ideas, may I think, be called Relative, and is nothing but *the perception of the relation between any two ideas*, of what kind soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For since all distinct ideas, must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have with one another, in the several ways the mind takes of comparing them."

" Thirdly, The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is Co-existence, or Non-coexistence, in the same subject, and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies, and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in *aq. regia*, which makes up our complex idea, signified by the word gold."

" Fourthly, The fourth and last sort is, that of Actual and Real Existence agreeing to any idea. Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of; for all the inquiries that we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm, concerning any of them is, that *it is*, or *is not*, the same as some other idea; that it has this or that *relation* to some other idea; that *it does or does not always co-exist with some idea in the same subject*, or that it has a *real existence* without the mind. Thus, blue is not yellow, or St.

Paul's is not Windsor Castle, is of Identity: Two triangles upon equal bases, between two parallels are equal, or London is larger than Paris, is of Relation: Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions, or a shark has teeth, is of Co-existence. God is of Real existence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered under distinct heads, and not as relation in general."

Our perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, with respect to Identity and Diversity, extends of course to every thing whatsoever, we being able to perceive whether a thing is the same or another.

"The perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas with respect to Relation, extends as far as we can perceive any relation between any two things whatsoever. This, as it is the largest field of our knowledge, so it is scarcely to be determined how far it may extend, for it is not easy to discover when reason has all the assistance it is capable of receiving, for the finding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas." If we would demonstrate, for instance, that drunkenness is a vice, and sobriety a virtue, we must endeavour to find out what ideas agree or disagree with our ideas, both of the one and the other: thus our idea of the body being rendered feverish, agrees with, or is related to our idea of drunkenness, but disagrees with, or is not related to our idea of sobriety; whereas the mind not being for a time more or less deprived of its powers of discerning, judging, reasoning, &c. agrees with, or is related to our idea of sobriety, and not to that of drunkenness. But it would occupy many hours if not days, to enumerate all the evils, public and private, that may spring more or less immediately, or remotely, from the practice of this vice, and all the good that may arise from the observance of sobriety. It is by find-

ing the agreement or disagreement then, or Relation or non-Relation of all the ideas enumerated, to the ideas we have of drunkenness and sobriety, that we can arrive at demonstrating that the one is to be preferred to the other, or that one is a vice and the other a virtue.

Again, we lay down two propositions: one, That health is preferable to pleasure, and the other, That virtue is preferable to health. Now in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of these two propositions, we must examine, how far, and in what particulars, the concurring experience of mankind has proved health to be preferable to mere pleasure, and virtue to health; *e. g.* health is commonly found to be more durable than pleasure, to bring us fewer pains, to be favourable to cheerfulness, activity, and long life, &c. The pursuit of pleasure on the contrary, is apt we find, to lead us to commit excesses, enervating both to the mind and body, and to distract us unseasonably from useful occupations, &c. and we have both reason and revelation to assure us, that virtue ought to be of more weight with us than either, since it concerns our welfare, not only in this world but in the next. So far as these intermediate ideas agree with those in the two propositions in question, and with one another, so far the reasoning is said to be sound, otherwise false; for instance, it is false to say that pleasure is never dangerous, because this assertion is found to be contrary to fact; for the never-being dangerous does not agree with our idea of the eager pursuit of what is called pleasure.

Our perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, with respect to Co-existence or non-co-existence, concerns, as has been said before, mostly our ideas of substances; for instance, we may enumerate all the ideas we have that co-exist in our ideas of a sheep, a turtle, a ruby, a flower, gold, &c. Amphibious is an idea that does not agree with, or does not co-exist with our idea of a sheep; but it does agree with, and does co-exist with our ideas of a turtle; transparency co-exists

with our idea of a polished ruby, but not of gold. Experience alone can determine, what ideas we may hereafter find to agree or disagree with our ideas of any substances whatsoever, since new discoveries excite new ideas in us, upon the perception of such as have hitherto been considered devoid of certain powers or qualities, &c. for example, powers of preserving or destroying life, may possibly be proved to exist in things not at present suspected capable of any such uses. It would not perhaps, be unamusing to youth, occasionally to enumerate the several ideas that are known to co-exist in the several substances. For example, our ideas of life, birth, growth, maturity, age, decay, and death, co-exist with our ideas of all animals and vegetables whatsoever, likewise spontaneous motion in all animals, also rationality in all men, (idiots are as non-entities). The ancients, as we all know, looked upon air and water, &c. as elements, but what a variety of ideas now co-exist in those two substances! The use of the word idea in this sense, saves us endless circumlocution, and cannot we imagine, be misunderstood. We substitute the word that expresses our perception of a thing, for a quality of the thing itself, and thus speak of it, as though the idea were in the thing, instead of being in our minds.

Some persons have a wonderful power of reasoning, and by continued inference, not only make, but suggest discoveries in the intellectual as well as in the physical world. Mr. Locke says, "Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions which are so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are farther advances in mathematical knowledge; and he attained his object by finding out the intermediate ideas, which shewed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated."

"Our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas which could serve to shew the certain or probable

agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas; and in this, some men's faculties far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument, and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement, looked on many of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs, to be something more than human. And what farther improvements and helps, advantageous to other parts of knowledge, the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, I cannot pretend to guess. It appears to me, the ideas of quantity are not those alone which are capable of demonstration and knowledge, and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and domineering interests did not oppose, or menace such endeavours."

"Yet reason, though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, though it elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric, yet as it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal beings, there must be many instances in which it fails us. It perfectly fails us where our ideas fail; it neither does, nor can extend itself farther than they do; and therefore, wherever ideas fail us, our reasoning stops, and we are at the end of our reckoning; and if at any time we reason about words, which do not stand positively for certain ideas, it is only about those sounds and nothing else, that we argue."

The Degrees of Knowledge.

Knowledge is of three degrees, Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive. Thus the mind perceives that *white* is not *black*, that a *circle* is not a *triangle*, that *three* are more than *two*, and equal to *one* and *two*. Such kind of truths the mind perceives at first sight of the ideas together, by bare *Intuition*, without the intervention of any other idea; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that

human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible ; like bright sunshine, it forces itself to be immediately perceived, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination. He that demands a greater certainty than this, shews only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that in the next degree of knowledge, which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate ideas, and without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty.

The next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, *but not immediately*. The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together, as to shew it. In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were, juxta position, or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches ; and this is that which we call Reasoning. Thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in the bigness between the three angles of a triangle, and two right ones, cannot, by an immediate view and comparing them do it, because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any one or two angles, and so of this the mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case, the mind is led to find out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality, and finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know the equality to two right ones. This knowledge by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not alto-

gether so bright nor so clear, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge; besides, there is this farther difference between Demonstrative and Intuitive knowledge, that though in the former all doubt be removed, when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement or disagreement is perceived, yet before the demonstration there was a doubt, which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to a mind, capable of entertaining distinct ideas. But every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty, and this intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out; which because in long deductions, and the use of many proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men often embrace error or falsehood for demonstration.

These two, viz. Intuition and Demonstration, are the degrees of our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is indeed, another perception of the mind employed about *the particular existence of finite beings* without us, which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made, because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here, I think we are

provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting; for I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or thinks only on that savour and odour; and there is a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in one. We as plainly find the difference here is, between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. So that I think we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge, this also of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive; in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty. Thus of the Real actual existence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God; but of the existence of any thing else, we have no other than a sensitive knowledge, which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses.

“ How vain and foolish a thing it is then, to put others upon demonstrating, or ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our senses give us in this or that particular. Man has had reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly: how vain I say then, it is, to expect demonstration and certainty in things, not admitting of it, and to refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident as to surmount every the least, (I will not say reason) but pretence of doubting.”

“ There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth, each of which is called knowledge.”

“ 1. There is Actual knowledge, which is the present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have to one another.”

“ 2. A man is said to know any proposition, which having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists, and so lodged it in his memory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on, he without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, may be called Habitual knowledge. Our finite understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more, than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew most, would know but one truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.”

“ Of habitual knowledge there are also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees.”

“ First. The one is of such truths laid up in the memory, whereof we have an intuitive knowledge.”

“ Secondly. The other is of such truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction without the proofs. Thus, a man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of the truth of it. He remembers, i. e. he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of that proposition. The immutability of the same relations, between the same immutable things, is now the idea that shews him, that if the three angles of a triangle were

once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, is always true; what ideas once agreed, will always agree; and consequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If then the perception, that the same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relations, be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics. But nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newton certainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in his book to be true, though he has not in actual view the admirable chain of intermediate ideas, whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such a memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties; when the very discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of ideas, is found to surpass most readers' comprehension. But, because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does in all men more or less decay in length of time; this, amongst other differences is one, which shews that demonstrative knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive."

Truth, Error.

Truth, we apprehend, to be the conformity of our ideas to the *real* nature of things, both intellectual and physical, expressed in such terms as we usually annex to those ideas: it is true, for example, that a lion is, in many respects, unlike a serpent; that man recollects some past events; that time elapses; that a radius is less than the diameter; that two and two make four; that a square is not a circle, &c. We call

this Truth, because it is the conformity of our ideas to the very being of things themselves.

The supposing things to be different from what they really are is error ; but, which of our opinions are just, and which erroneous ; or in other words, which are conformable to truth, and which are founded in error, general and continual experience can alone determine. “ Error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.”

Mutable, Immutable Truth.

There appear to be what we may perhaps, properly enough call Mutable and Immutable Truths. It is an immutable truth (supposing no miracle) that a live elephant is bigger than a mouse ; that equal numbers added together cannot make an odd one. The truth seems to be no less immutable, that a man of sound organization is capable of receiving impressions from without by his several senses, and of entertaining thoughts within. That he is fitted to perceive, discern, judge, reason, &c. impelled to action by desire, love and hatred, hope and fear, conscience, &c. disposed to be ambitious, proud, vain, &c. to the degree to which his character and circumstances urge him, and inclined to be angry, resentful, forgiving, jealous, &c. That he sometimes restrains, and sometimes indulges his desires ; that he is sometimes inclined to virtue, and sometimes to vice, &c. &c. But, it is a very Mutable Truth, that the inhabitants of a certain country are remarkably barbarous or civilized, simple or luxurious, virtuous or vicious, handsome or ugly, brave or cowardly, &c. Man himself must be differently framed, before certain ideas of him, which we entertain, can be changed, and likewise every sort of animal, vegetable, and substance ; but our ideas of them altogether may continually differ, as new powers, qualities, and propensities, are discovered in them. Seeing the wonders that chemists have

lately brought to light, it would be perhaps rash to assert, as an immutable truth, that atmospheric air is indispensable to the continuance of human life.

Moral Truth, Falsehood.

Moral Truth is the speaking of things according to the persuasion of our minds, though such persuasion agree not with the reality of things, or as we say, is contrary to fact; *e. g.* the affirmation, that such a man is good, may be true as far as regards the speaker's veracity, being according to his belief, and yet be false in fact; for Falsehood is the uttering of words contrary to the persuasion of our minds. If a man would persuade another to receive for truth an unsound doctrine, which he himself believes to be sound, he unconsciously leads, or would lead him into error, but if he wish to *impose* upon him for Truth, the belief of that which he knows to be an error, he is in such case absolutely guilty of Falsehood.

Belief, Opinion, Probability, Certainty, Doubt.

"Probability is likeliness to be true; the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called Belief, or Opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And, herein lies the difference between *probability* and *certainty*, *faith* and *knowledge*, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step has its visible and certain connexion; in belief not so."

"The grounds of probability are these two following: First,

the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation, and experience."

"Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others is to be considered: 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies."

"Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding, and produces certain knowledge; the mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against any proposition, before it assents to, or dissents from it, and, upon a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive it with a more or less firm assent, in proportion to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other."

"If I see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability, it is knowledge; but, if another tells me, he saw a man in Russia skating during a sharp winter, this has so great conformity with what I have usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the nature of the thing to credit or believe it. If, however, the same thing be told to one, born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony. In this case, as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man, whose experience has been always quite contrary, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce prevail, as it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who, upon speaking to the king of Siam of the canals in Holland, being at times frozen so hard as to bear a weight equal to that of an elephant, was answered, *Hitherto I have believed the strange things you*

have told me, because I looked upon you as a sober, fair man, but now I am sure you lie."

"If one minute since, I saw a man existing, but have now lost sight of him, I cannot be certain that the same man is *still* in existence, since there is no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since, with his existence now. By a thousand ways he may have ceased to be, since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be certain, that the man I last saw to-day, is now in being, I can yet less be sure that he is so, who hath been longer removed from my senses, and still less of the existence of men I never saw. Though it be highly probable, therefore, that millions of men do now exist, yet, whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that certainty of it, we strictly call knowledge, but the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and makes it reasonable for me to do several things, upon the confidence that there are men, and men also of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do now in the world, but this is but Probability, not knowledge."

"Certainty implies the non-existence of doubt, as doubt does of the non-existence of certainty. Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and error."

"Knowledge, whereby it *certainly* perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas."

"Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so, which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And, if it so unites and separates them, as in reality things are, it is *right* judgment, otherwise *wrong* judgment or error."

Conjecture.

Conjecture expresses the operation of the mind, while

searching for reasons to determine it to entertain certain opinions or not, upon any subject whatsoever.

Assent, Dissent.

“ Assent is the determination of the judgment in favour of an opinion. Dissent, its determination against it. The mind Assents or Dissents to propositions, the truth or falsehood of which it presumes, but cannot feel assured of. But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability, how happens it, that men come to give their assents, contrary to probability? For there is nothing more common, than contrariety of opinion, nothing more obvious, than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes and firmly adheres to. The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet I suppose, may all be reduced to these—”

1. Want of proofs.
2. Want of ability to use them.
3. Want of will to use them.
4. Wrong measures of probability.

“ First, by want of proofs, I do not mean the want of those proofs only, which are no where extant, and so are no where to be had; but the want of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs, who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any proposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into, and collect the testimonies of others; and in this state, are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour. Thus vast numbers are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs, on which

others build, and which are necessary to establish their opinions."

" Secondly, Such as want strength of understanding, or skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities, who cannot carry a train of consequences in their head, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circumstance its due allowance, may be easily misled to adopt propositions that are not probable."

" Thirdly, There is another sort of people who want proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them; who, though they have riches and leisure enough, and are not deficient in parts, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages some men's thoughts elsewhere; laziness and oscitancy in general, or a particular aversion from books, study, and meditation, keep others from serious thoughts at all; and some out of fear, that an impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions, which best suit their prejudices, lives, and designs, content themselves without examination, to take upon trust, what they find convenient and in fashion. But this at least, is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen, that however they may think credit, respect, power, and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet they will find all these carried away from them by men of lower condition, who surpass them in knowledge. They who are blind will always be led by those that see, or fall into the ditch; and he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding."

" Fourthly, There remains yet the last sort, Those who even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either suspend their assent, or give it to the less probable opinion; and to this danger are exposed those, who have taken up wrong measures of probability, which are,"

“ 1. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles, also received hypotheses.”

2. Predominant passions or inclinations.

3. Authority.

“ The first and firmest ground of probability, is the conformity any thing has to our own knowledge, especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on as principles. These have so great an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability to that degree, that what is inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other, that the testimony not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to those established rules. Every one ought therefore, carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself by its own evidence, or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so upon the authority of others. The belief of transubstantiation will, for instance, cause a Romanist to take that for flesh which he actually sees to be bread.”

“ Whoever, therefore, has imbibed wrong principles, is not, in things inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till he is so candid and ingenuous to himself, as to be persuaded to examine those said principles, but this many never suffer themselves to do. With such staunch supporters of established principles and received hypotheses, all the arguments that can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster.”

“ Secondly, Probabilities which cross men’s appetites, and prevailing passions, run the same fate. Tell a man passionately in love that he is jilted, bring a score of witnesses of the falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one, but three kind words of her’s, shall invalidate all their testimonies. *What suits our wishes is forwardly believed*, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented; and though men cannot always openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not, but that it is the nature of the understanding, constantly to close with the more probable side; still a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its inquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. But until this be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities, that the arguments being, (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them; and the consequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them incoherent. There are very few discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which most men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt, and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of disingenuousness, or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old reply, Though I cannot answer, I will not yield. Manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent withheld, upon this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side, and therefore though I be beaten, it is not necessary I should yield, not knowing what forces are in reserve behind. * This is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.”

“ But yet there is some end of it; for a man having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness, having done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars

fairly, and cast up the sum total on both sides, he may in most cases come to a knowledge upon the whole matter on which side the probability rests, wherein some of the proofs which reason offers being suppositions upon universal experience, so cogent and clear, and some of the testimonies in matter of fact so universal, he cannot refuse his assent."

"Thirdly, the fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the others together, is the giving up our assent to the commonly received opinions, either of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets than the supposed honesty or learning, or number of those of their profession; as if honest or bookish men could not err, or truth were to be established by the votes of the multitude; yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it; other men have been, and are of the same opinion (for that is all that is said), and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions than take them up by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many points, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world and the leaders of parties, we should not always find, that it was the embracing of truth, for its own sake, that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an opinion so absurd which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no error to be named which has not had its professors, and a man will never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow."

Concatenation of Ideas.

The perception of certain ideas we find apt to excite others in our minds, and to lead us on from one reflection to another, sometimes in regular train, sometimes with strange aberrations. The idea of time, for instance, seems of itself calculated directly to awaken in us the recollection of the progress we have made in life, this progress of our approach to dissolution, and our dissolution of the final retribution that awaits us. But upon the civil war, in the time of Charles I. being mentioned, some one, says Hobbes, abruptly asked, What was the value of a Roman penny? "The thought of the war introduced the thought of the king being delivered up to his enemies, the thought of that the delivering up of Christ, that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason." Both these examples come under the head Concatenation of Ideas.

Association of Ideas.

"The ideas, which have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another, it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace and hold together in that union and correspondence, which is founded in their peculiar beings; but there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or habit—ideas, that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so connected in some men's minds, that it is very difficult to disunite them; they ever keep in company, and the one no sooner, at any time, comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and, if there be more than two that are thus connected, the whole gang, always inseparable, shew themselves together. A musician used to any tune will find, that let it but once begin in his head, and the ideas of the

several notes of it will follow one another in his mind, without any care or attention, as orderly as his fingers move over the keys of an organ, to play out the tune he has begun, though his inattentive thoughts be elsewhere a wandering."

" This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself, either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it varies in different men according to their different inclinations, education, interests, &c. Habit settles modes of thinking in the understanding, as it does of motion in the body."

" Those who have children, or the charge of their education, ought diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent, the undue connexion of ideas in their minds. Youth is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions, and though such as relate to the health of the body are, by discreet people, commonly minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt, that those which more peculiarly concern the mind, and terminate in the understanding or passions, have, though of such vast importance, been often entirely overlooked."

" This wrong connexion in our minds, of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence over our actions, as well moral as natural, our reasonings and notions, that perhaps there is not any one thing which deserves a more serious consideration."

" The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than with light; should a foolish maid, however, inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again as long as he lives, but darkness will ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas. If a man has suffered pain or sickness in such a place, if he saw his friend die in such a room, though the circumstances and places have not in nature any thing to do one with the other, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impres-

sion being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it, and he confounds them together in his mind."

"When this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not often in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and to circumstances; and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections when reason, though in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power to prevail, even with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child, who was the daily delight of his mother's eyes and the joy of her soul, rends from her heart one of the great comforts of her life and gives her all the torment imaginable. Use the consolations of reason in this case, and you might as effectually preach ease to one on the rack, or hope to allay by rational discourse the pain of his tortured joints. Till time has by disuse separated the sense of the enjoyment and its loss, that are united in her memory, from the idea of the child, all representations, though ever so reasonable, are vain; and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves."

"There are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels which, though ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of; and that by reason of some accidental association of ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive."

"Some such wrong combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between two different sects of philosophy or religion, for we cannot imagine every one of their followers wilfully to impose on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every

one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood; some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings, and prevents their seeing the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reason, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of, some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, have been by education, habit, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds that they always appear there together, and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest number, I had almost said of all the errors in the world, or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one; since, so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. This, while they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when in fact they are contending for errors; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences. How often one with amazement hears the arguments, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as daylight."

The association of ideas, it is evident, serves infinitely to modify both our pleasures and pains, and thus it is that intelligent and enlightened minds often view nature with emotions either elevating, soothing, melancholy, or painful, peculiar to themselves. A bright sun,

“ When first on this delightful land he spreads
 His orient beams, on herb, tree, fruit, and flow’r,
 Glist’ring with dew,”

may give a buoyancy of spirits to any one, and excite in him a present high enjoyment of his existence ; but the association of ideas imparts other inexpressible charms to such a scene. By this operation of the mind the spring recalls to man the lively feelings, blooming appearance, and bright hopes of youth, and the autumn awakens in him contemplations of an opposite character. What power too has music to conjure up associations long since made by the mind !

Mr. Locke observes, that madmen commonly join ideas together very wrongly, that they are kings, astronomers, &c. but that they act quite suitably to such strange conceits—so fearfully and wonderfully are we made !

CHAPTER VI.

Pleasure and Pain.—Love and Hatred.—Hope and Fear, &c.

Pleasure and Pain.

“**DELIGHT** or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas, and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not capable of producing in us either Pleasure or Pain. The infinite wise Author of our being has given us command over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also by the motion of them to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies. He has also endowed the mind with a power frequently to chuse amongst its ideas which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention; and, in order to excite us to these two actions of thinking and motion, he has been pleased to annex to several objects, and the ideas we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects to several degrees. If this perception of delight were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another, negligence to attention, motion to rest; and so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts, if we may so call it, run adrift without any direc-

tion or design, and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearance there without attending to them. In which state man, however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will, would be a very idle, inactive creature, and pass his time in a lazy, lethargic dream. Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to pursue this."

Love and Hatred.

"Any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call Love. On the contrary, the thought of the pain which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is that we call Hatred.

"Our love or hatred of inanimate insensible beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain, which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses, though with their destruction: but hatred or love, towards beings capable of happiness or misery, is often the uneasiness or delight, which we find in ourselves arising from a consideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends producing constant delight in him, whenever he reflects upon it, he is said constantly to love them."

Joy and Sorrow.

"Joy is a delight of the mind, arising from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good; and we are possessed of any good when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief, even, before he has

the pleasure of using it; and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the possession of that good; for he need but to reflect on it to have that pleasure."

"Sorrow is uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of a good lost which might have been longer enjoyed, or the sense of a present evil."

Sympathy causes us to feel joy in beholding the happiness of others, or sorrow in witnessing the uneasiness they suffer.

Apathy.

Apathy expresses the absence of all emotion upon such occasions as commonly more or less affect men, either agreeably or otherwise.

Hope, Fear.

"Hope is that pleasure in the mind which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him."

Fear, an emotion arising from the anticipation of any sort of evil we think likely to befall us.

We may hope or fear the consequences of any thing we do, or that is done to us; or the natural course of events, or the result of men's actions in general, or the effects of chance.

Hope and fear seem to have been implanted in us, not only to excite us continually to action, but also to induce us to submit to present pain, or to relinquish present pleasures, when by so doing we are likely to secure any future advantages, or to avoid any future evils.

Reasonable hopes are founded upon our confidence in Supreme Goodness, and upon our knowledge of men and things, so that we may justly reckon upon the degree of probability

there is, that the measures we pursue will be attended with the result we desire, or that circumstances may prove favourable to our wishes. Such hopes are well calculated to inspire cheerfulness, and to soothe the anxious mind during its progress through this feverish life.

“ The most vital movement mortals feel
Is Hope, the balm and life-blood of the soul :
It pleases and it lasts : indulgent Heav’n
Sent down the kind delusion through the paths
Of rugged life, to lead us patient on,
And make our happiest state no tedious thing ;
Our greatest good, and what we least can spare,
Is Hope.”——*Armstrong.*

But those who are continually entertaining idle hopes, *i. e.* such as do not rest upon reasonable probability, prepare only repeated disappointments for themselves ; and persons of this description are very apt to build their expectations upon chance, instead of depending upon their own prudence and industry, which might very possibly obtain for them the advantages they are so anxious to possess.

Reasonable fears induce the prudent to provide carefully for the future, and to guard themselves against the common accidents of life ; but the fearful are continually in dread, of even improbable casualties thus we say, groundless fears.

————— “ Some for fear of want
Want all their lives ; and others ev’ry day,
For fear of dying, suffer worse than death.
Ah ! from your bosoms banish if you can
That fatal guest, I mean the demon Fear
That trembles at impossible events,
Lest aged Atlas should resign his load,
And Heav’n’s eternal battlements rush down.
Is there an evil worse than fear itself ?
And what avails it, that indulgent Heav’n
From mortal eyes has wrapt the woes to come
If we, ingenious to torment ourselves,

Grow pale at hideous fictions of our own.
 Enjoy the present, nor with needless cares
 Of what may spring from blind Misfortune's womb,
 Appal the surest hour that life bestows ;
 Serene and master of yourself, prepare
 For what may come, and leave the rest to Heav'n."—*Armstrong*.

Children are, with great difficulty, induced to sacrifice present, to the hope of future pleasure, even when of near prospect. As to the past, it is with them literally, "the tear forgot as soon as shed." Most children are fearful, but never any of them apprehensive about possible distant evils.

Youth, not childhood, is the season, when buoyed up, and carried along by Hope, we eagerly "bid the lovely scenes at distance hail." Youth reverts little to the past, feels misfortunes acutely, but seldom either dwells long upon, or anticipates them.

In middle age our hopes begin perhaps, to be less sanguine and our fears more lively; and we are strongly instigated to action, not only to secure ourselves the goods, but also to avert the evils of life.

Both hopes and fears become more and more languid as time advances, and, in the decline of years, we dwell tenaciously "upon the memory of joys that are past," often imputing the little interest we comparatively take, either in the present or the future, not to our feelings being more obtuse, but to unfavourable changes in things themselves.

It seems the part of wisdom to provide against future evils, but that done, to enjoy during the present moment every sort of blessing we can *conscientiously* command; and, to reflect upon the past principally, in order to profit by experience, so as to obtain future good, and to avoid repeating former mistakes. This is an advantage time offers us, in lieu of the successive sacrifices he exacts from us, and, we may thus avoid the renewing of many pains, and safely indulge ourselves in numerous pleasant recollections.

Hope and Fear are the two powerful engines by which man is ruled from the cradle to the grave.

Anticipation.

We are all of us more or less prone to anticipate pleasures or pains, *i. e.* in fact, to hope or fear them. Anticipation is the enjoyment of pleasure before hand by thought, or the enduring of pain in the same manner; and, if it cause us to suffer prematurely, so does it also bring within our immediate view more or less distant pleasures.

Provident, Improvident.

Our hopes and our fears both dispose us to be Provident, in order to secure ourselves good, and to guard ourselves against evil, and consequently to prevent our losing the one, or incurring the other. The wise and prudent are provident, because they perceive, that the general welfare of man depends greatly upon his own care and exertions. The Improvident look not beyond the present moment.

Expectation, Disappointment.

Expectation implies the mind being under the persuasion, that some particular circumstance is likely to occur. Disappointment expresses the loss of hope more or less earnestly entertained. If, for instance, a man sow an abundance of fine corn, he hopes, yet fears, he may not reap a plentiful harvest, but, is disappointed upon the actual appearance of a scanty crop.

To Tantalize.

Some persons are more or less disposed, and in various ways, to tantalize others, *i. e.* to excite hope with intent to disappoint them.

Surprise, Astonishment, Wonder.

The mind experiences surprise, wonder, astonishment, upon

the obtaining of any thing wished for or desired, but not hoped for; or upon getting any thing either acceptable or otherwise, that was neither wished for, nor hoped for. We may wish for a large fortune, though we cannot reasonably either expect or hope for it; and may be surprised, or feel wonder and astonishment, at receiving a bequest from a stranger, or at being disinherited. We also feel surprise, &c. upon hearing of any circumstance, occurring contrary to our general or individual experience, or of any phenomena, the existence of which we had not suspected.

To be Shocked.

The mind is shocked by the sudden excitement of great fear, or the suppression of anxious hope, by the discovery for instance, that our house is on fire, or that a speculation has failed. We are shocked also by any unexpected and heavy calamities befalling those any way connected with us, or to any person whatsoever, or at any remarkable instance of human depravity, &c.

Anxious, Solicitous, Sanguine.

Those in whom fear is apt to predominate, are commonly the most Anxious respecting future events. Such persons are generally prudent, being seldom deluded by present appearances; whereas, the Sanguine are ever disposed to overlook threatening evils, and to magnify probable advantages. The anxious often suffer unnecessarily; for many of their apprehensions prove groundless, and fortunate circumstances not unfrequently occur, to prevent very probable evils. The sanguine, on the other hand, are too much given to despise the warnings of experience, and are thus often overtaken by misfortunes they might by timely precaution have more or less easily averted. We perceive therefore, that a moderate degree of anxiety serves to protect us from many evils; and,

that reasonably sanguine hopes lead us to anticipate many enjoyments, and thus to increase and prolong our pleasures in life.

Apprehension, Disquietude, Trouble, Care.

The past, the present, and the future, all dispose us to feel apprehension, disquietude, trouble, and care; the past by exciting in us fears for consequences that may serve to embitter our future moments.

Alarm, Fright, Terror.

The more or less lively fear, of immediate or remote danger, disposes the mind to be alarmed, frightened, terrified.

Discreet, Circumspect, Indiscreet.

Upon becoming better acquainted with the world, we feel disposed to be more guarded in our language, looks, manners, and general demeanour; in other words, to be discreet and circumspect from the fear of laying ourselves open to misrepresentation and censure.

Cautious, Heedful, Wary, Watchful, Incautious, Heedless, Negligent.

The cautious, wary, &c. earnestly endeavour to secure the advantages they possess, and to shield themselves against future dangers, because they always entertain some fear of being involved in evil, either by the follies of the imprudent, or the machinations of the designing.

Confidence, Trust, Reliance, Suspicion, Mistrust.

The knowledge of vice disposes us to be suspicious. Before vice was, suspicion could not be. The warnings of our friends, our own evil thoughts, or the experience of evil from others, causes us to regard men with a watchful eye; and we often justly mistrust the fairest appearances, and the most pro-

missing language. The wise and prudent are shy of "dulling their palm with entertainment of each new hatched, unfledged comrade." Suspicion makes the vicious live in continual fear of both provoked and unprovoked injuries.

The consciousness of virtue, and frequent experience, disposes us to hope we may safely place confidence in our friends, trust them with our concerns, and rely upon their good offices.

Dejection, Despondency, Despair.

Dejection, we suppose, expresses that state of mind, that disposes a man gloomily to support the evils imposed upon him, without making an effort either to extricate himself from them, or even to divert his thoughts from the contemplation of his misfortunes, be they real or supposed. Such a person is destitute both of hope and courage.

Despair is felt by him who has lost *all* hope, but such a loss often serves only to raise the courage of some persons, and to goad them "to do all that does become a man." But despair is also apt to drive men to the most criminal excesses, either against themselves, or others, and sometimes both.

Cheerful, Gay, Merry, Joyous, Jovial, Sad, Melancholy, Gloomy.

More or less freedom from fear, arising either from circumstances or carelessness, disposes men to be gay, merry, joyous, jovial, &c. A greater or less, or entire deprivation of hope, inclines them to be sad, melancholy, gloomy.

To be Glad, to Rejoice, to Regret, Grieve, to be Afflicted.

The realization of hope, or the occurrence of unexpected good, disposes us to be glad, to rejoice, &c. The entertaining of fears, or the occurrence of unexpected evil, inclines us to grieve, to be afflicted, &c.

To Exult, Triumph.

Many men are disposed to exult or triumph, upon having gained either any expected or unexpected advantage over others, that seems to distinguish their superiority, or to give them any.

Speculation.

Hope tempts men to engage in transactions, from which they calculate upon deriving more or less advantage. The proud, the ambitious, the covetous, people of all ranks and characters, Speculate upon promoting their own interest or wishes, or that of others, in a more or less direct or indirect, or honest or dishonest way.

To Predict, Foretel, Prognosticate, Forewarn.

The idle entertainment of certain hopes and fears leads some men with more or less credulity, to consult others upon the probability of certain events occurring, and thus invite them to predict, foretel, &c. General experience enables us to predict the probable operations of nature both in the intellectual and physical worlds, and the knowledge of men's characters, their probable actions.

CHAPTER VII.

Self-love.—Social Love.—Sympathy, &c.

Self-Love, Selfishness.

SELF-LOVE expresses the universal interest we take in every thing that concerns ourselves. It is the continual desire we have of preserving our existence, of obtaining ease, pleasure, and good; of avoiding uneasiness, pain, and evil. Any thing may affect our self-love, any thing that is fitted to excite in us the very slightest degree of emotion in any manner whatsoever. Devoid of it, we should be utterly regardless of the welfare, both of our souls and bodies.

“Self-Love is originally implanted by God himself in our nature, in order to the preservation and enjoyment of our being; the which is common to us with all creatures, and cannot any wise be extirpated; for no man (as St. Paul saith) ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it: every man living, by a natural and necessary instinct, is prompted to guard his life, shunning all dangers threatening its destruction, to purvey for the support and convenience of it; to satisfy those natural appetites which importunately crave relief, and without intolerable pain cannot be denied it; and to repel or decline whatever is very grievous, and offensive to nature.”

“God hath expressly commanded us to love all men, not excluding ourselves from the number; to love our neighbours

and therefore ourselves, who of all are nearest to ourselves, who occur as the first objects of humanity and charity; whose needs we most sensibly feel; whose good is in itself no less considerable, than the single good of any other person; who must first look to our own good, before we can be capable to love others, or do any good to our neighbour."

"He doth enforce obedience to all his commands, by promising rewards, yielding immense profits, and transcendent pleasure to us, and by threatening punishments grievous to our sense; which proceeding is grounded upon a supposition, that we do and ought greatly to love ourselves, or to regard our own interest and pleasure."

He doth recommend wisdom or virtue to us, as most agreeable to self-love; most eligible, because it yieldeth great benefit to ourselves, because (as the wise man saith) "*he that getteth it doth love his own soul, he that keepeth it shall find good.*"

He dissuadeth from vice, as detestable to self-love, because the embracing it doth imply hatred of ourselves, bringing mischief and damage to us, because "*he that sinneth, wrongeth his own soul; he that despiseth instruction, despiseth his own soul; he that committeth injury, hateth his own soul.*"

"Aristotle saith of a virtuous man, that he is the greatest self-lover."

We concur entirely both with Dr. Barrow and Aristotle, that a virtuous man does what is most agreeable to self-love, i. e. provided that his virtue is conformable to the dictates of sound reason, otherwise he may carry on continual war against it. Many a fanatic, for instance, seems to prove himself no self-lover, for he continually torments both his body and mind, without benefit to either, or to his fellow-creatures.

Those in whom self-love predominates to the greater or less exclusion of a generous sympathy are called Selfish.

Social Love.

The Social affections are most closely allied to self-love, for continual experience assures us, they are unquestionably ordained by God to be the origin of by far the greatest part, of all the conveniences we command, and of the pleasures we enjoy; and even at the hour of our final departure.

“ On some fond breast the parting soul relies,
Some pious drops the closing eye requires.”

How forcibly then, are we called upon to do all the good we justly can to our fellow-creatures, upon whom we are so unceasingly dependant for the supply both of our most indispensable wants and very numerous pleasures.

Sympathy.

Heaven perfected the gift of the social affections, by also implanting Sympathy in our minds, in order that we might mutually share and desire to promote each other's pleasures, and to lessen each other's pains. Without sympathy, we must, it is evident, have been devoid of emotion at the view or recital of the enjoyments or sufferings of all creatures whatsoever, but on the contrary, we find that we follow the traveller,

—————“ tread his deck,
Ascend his topmast, through his peering eyes
Discover countries ; with a kindred heart
Suffer his woes, and share in his escapes.”

And without sympathy, what would become of the most delightful pleasures of imagination?

Thus sympathy is the emotion produced in our minds, by the seeing, hearing, or imagining such pleasures or pains, being enjoyed or endured by any creature, as we remember to have experienced ourselves, or that we, from analogy, judge we are liable to feel; whence the expression, fellow-feeling. We have a Moral and a Physical sympathy. We sympa-

thize with the joys or sorrows of any animal, according as we see or suppose it to be in health or sickness, in plenty or want, at liberty or in confinement, &c. and,

“ His heart is hard in nature, and unfit
For human fellowship, as being void
Of Sympathy, and therefore dead alike
To love and friendship both, that is not pleas'd
With sight of animals enjoying life,
Nor feels their happiness augment his own.”

Sympathy likewise occasions corresponding gestures and motions in the person, in the same manner as it does emotions in the mind; and hence the danger of allowing children to associate much with any one who has an unfortunate nervous irritation that affects his appearance in any remarkable manner, as St. Vitus's dance, &c.

Those pains, *cæteris paribus*, we have once ourselves laboured under, or the pleasures we have once tasted of, commonly excite the strongest sympathy in us; so much so, that he who has undergone amputation of a limb, for instance, sometimes sympathizes with the patient more acutely than another, who is a stranger to the precise kind of agony such an operation occasions; though he may at the same moment be less moved by pity for the sufferer. And thus also we are said to understand, or enter better into the feelings of those who experience a joy with which we are familiar, yet we may possibly, at the very same moment, envy them the satisfaction they betray.

The effect sympathy produces in the mind of any one, depends apparently upon his temperament, temper, dispositions, state of health, and state of feeling. Appearances, that more or less shock, distress, or rejoice some persons, scarcely, if at all, disturb others; and they disturb them more or less at one time than at another; they likewise excite in them severally, as various degrees of anxiety to alleviate pain, and to promote

pleasure, or to aggravate the one, and to interfere with the other. The cruel, for instance, are taught by sympathy how to annoy and worry any creature; the selfish commonly remain indifferent to joys and sorrows, which do not directly, or indirectly concern them; but the generous are,

“ Never elated when one man’s depress’d,
Never dejected when another’s bless’d.”

And,

“ From their own, they learn to melt at other’s woe.”

“ *Ariel.* ————— your charm so strongly works ’em
That if you now beheld them, your affections
Would become tender.

Pros. Dost thou think so, Spirit?

Ariel. Mine would, sir, were they human.

Pros. And mine shall.

Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself,
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply,
Passions the same, be kindlier mov’d than thou art?”

Selfish, Interested, Disinterested, Social, Unsocial Philanthropy, Misanthropy.

When we reflect upon the advantages and pleasures we derive from the society of our fellow-creatures, we find it easy to explain, why the selfish may be very Social, and yet be regardless of the welfare of others, unless their own ease or amusement be implicated in it. The selfish appear to be anxious for the prosperity, and disturbed by the sufferings of persons, upon whom their own comfort immediately, or more or less remotely depends, because it is a disappointment or an affliction to them, to have their several connexions so circumstanced, as not to afford them continual satisfaction; but the evils, public or private, the rest of mankind endure, penetrate not their callous hearts.

The Philanthropist, on the contrary, with the true spirit of a Christian, is more or less moved with pity and regret, at

hearing of the ill treatment and sufferings of people of all kindreds and nations, and fervently desires the well-being of every one.

“ God loves from whole to parts ; but human soul
Must rise from individual to the whole.
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace,
His country next, and then all human race,
Wide and more wide the o’erflowings of the mind,
Takes every creature in of every kind.”

And if power happily falls into such hands, we see in proportion to the extent of it,

“ Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,
And Heav’n beholds its image in his breast.”

There does not appear to be a term in the English language to express precisely the reverse of selfish, as Social does of Unsocial, Disinterested of Interested. Disinterested and interested seem to be applied most commonly to persons engaged in some particular transaction. The philanthropist, or the selfish, for instance, may alike be interested or disinterested in some advice or assistance they give to others ; but a person who is continually seeking to obtain advantages over others is called interested, the contrary of this, disinterested.

Self-love is, as we have already observed, the constant desire of obtaining good for ourselves. Sympathy, the corresponding pleasure or pain we enjoy or suffer with others, and which may excite in us a greater or less desire of promoting or relieving the same. Selfish, the more or less exclusive desire of gratifying our own inclinations, without consulting the comfort or convenience of those we associate with, or engage in our service. Social, the desire of society, Unsocial, a dislike to it, or reluctance for different reasons to mix with it. We may be social, without generous sympathy, as we may abound with the milk of human kindness, without being social ; this is often caused by circumstances, but seems sometimes to arise from a

constitutional peculiarity. Misanthropy is opposed to Philanthropy. A misanthropist is commonly one who believes himself entitled to the gratitude of others, when, in fact, he has been only indulging his most selfish propensities, his desire of company and good cheer, perhaps, or of appearing generous, though it be to his more remote, at the expense of his nearer connexions. A prodigal, in his full career of extravagance, must necessarily scatter his bounties around him, but the partakers of such mere casual advantages, cannot entertain the same sense of gratitude and respect towards him, that they would towards one who, instead of distressing his family and dependants, had obtained the power of assisting them by the frequent practice of self-denial, and who thus most evidently made sacrifices for the benefit of others. The misanthropist, who quarrels with the human race, because he has had just reason to complain of ingratitude, forgets that casual circumstances may have connected him with the least estimable persons, or possibly, that the want of discernment may have grossly misled him, in the choice of friends and dependants.

Upon the due regulation of our self-love, sympathy, and social feelings, our moral character must necessarily depend, and consequently the prosperity of individuals, families, and nations.

The evils of despotism, and the calamitous effects of war, have originated in the counsels of the selfish, who however often injure themselves, and sometimes eventually work their own ruin, by the adoption of those very measures, they imagine most likely to secure their individual interests. Among the selfish are to be found all unjust conquerors, gamblers, drunkards, prodigals, misers, in short, all persons who gratify their inclinations at the expense of their moral duties; which moral duties positively require the fulfilment of the divine precept, of doing as we would be done by. And were men's actions generally to be strictly tried by that most admirable rule, not a

few, perhaps, of the decisions, would to numbers be as unexpected, as was the discovery of his wits in the lunar regions, to Astolpho of famous history.

“ The selfish look upon themselves, as if they were all the world, and no man beside concerned therein ; that the good state of things is to be measured by their condition ; that all is well, if they do prosper and thrive ; all is ill, if they be disappointed in their desires and projects. The good of no man, not of their brethren, not of their friends, not of their country, doth come under their consideration.”

“ This is the chief spring of injustice, for from hence it is, that oftentimes men regard not what courses they take, what means they use (how unjust, how base soever they be) toward the compassing of their designs ; hence, they trample upon right, they violate all laws and rules of conscience, they falsify their trusts, they betray their friends, they supplant their neighbour, they flatter and colleague, they wind about and shuffle any way, they detract from the worth and virtue of any man, they forge and vent odious slanders, they commit any sort of wrong and outrage, they (without regard or remorse) do any thing which seemeth to further their design.”

“ Selfishness therefore is the great enemy to the commonweal, that which perverteth all right, which confoundeth all order, which spoileth all the convenience and comfort of society.”

“ The frame of our nature speaketh, that we are not born for ourselves alone. We shall find man, if we contemplate him, to be a nobler thing than to have been designed merely to serve himself, and to satisfy his single pleasure ; his endowments are too excellent, his capacities too large for so mean and narrow purposes. How pitiful a creature were man, if this were all he were made for, how sorry a faculty were reason, if it served not to better uses. He debaseth himself, he

disgraceth his nature, who hath so low conceits, and pursueth so petty designs."

"Nay, even a true regard to our own private good will engage us not inordinately to pursue self-interest. As we are all born members of the world, as we are compacted into a commonwealth, as we are incorporated into any society, as we partake in any conversation or company, so by mutual support, aid, defence, comfort, not only the common welfare first, but our particular benefit consequently doth subsist. On the contrary, *our thriving by the common prejudice, will in the end turn to our own loss.*"—*Barrow.*

Self-Will.

"Self-will is the offspring of selfishness; in other words, of self-indulgence. Self-will is the pleasing one's self in one's choice and proceeding, without or against reason, as when a man unaccountably or unreasonably, with obstinate resolution pursueth any course offensive to others, or prejudicial to himself, so that he will not hearken to any advice, nor yield to any consideration diverting him from his purpose, but putteth off all with, Say what you can, let what will come on it, I will do as I please, I will proceed in my own way, so I am resolved, so it shall be."

"But we should in no case indulge our own humour or fancy, but ever look to the reason of the thing, and act accordingly, whatever it requireth."

We should never act, without striving with competent application of mind, to discern clearly some reason why we act; and, from observing the dictates of that reason, no unaccountable cause should divert us: blind will, headstrong inclination, impetuous passion, should never guide, nor draw, nor drive us to any thing; for this is to act not like a man, but as a beast, or rather worse than a beast, for beasts operate by a

blind instinct ; whereas, man is obliged by some penalties, not to follow inclinations blindly, but to act with serious deliberation and choice, to observe explicit rules and resolutions of reason."

" Men who are self-willed, are in their demeanour perverse and froward, stiff and stubborn, with much inconvenience to others, and commonly with more to themselves. It must be just as they will have it ; what, if ten to one think otherwise ; what, if generally, the wisest men are agreed to the contrary ; what, if the most pressing necessity of affairs do not admit it ; what, if public authority does not allow it ; yet so it must be, because they fancy it, otherwise they will not be quiet ; so do they sacrifice the greatest benefits of society, public order and peace, mutual love and friendship, common safety and prosperity, to their private will and humour."—*Barrow*.

Charity.

As selfishness and self-will spring from inordinate self-love, so does Charity arise from our sympathetic and social feelings. " Loving our neighbour as ourselves doth impart a rule, directing what kind of love we should bear and exercise toward him ; or informing us that our charity doth consist in having the same affections of soul, and, in performing the same acts of beneficence toward him, as we are ready by inclination, as we are wont in practice, to have or to perform toward ourselves, with full approbation of our judgment and conscience, apprehending it just and reasonable so to do."

" We cannot, indeed, better understand the nature of this duty, than by reflecting on the motions of our own heart, and observing the course of our demeanor toward ourselves ; for thence infallibly we may be assured, how we should stand affected, and how we should behave ourselves toward others."

" This is a peculiar advantage of this rule (inferring the

excellent wisdom and goodness of him who framed it) that by it very easily and certainly, we may discern all the specialties of our duty, without looking abroad, or having recourse to external instructions; so that by it we may be perfect law-givers, and skilful judges, and faithful monitors to ourselves, of what in any case we should do; for we are not only taught of God, as the Apostle saith, *to love one another*, but taught of ourselves how to exercise that duty. Wherefore, for information concerning our duty in each case and circumstance, we need only thus to consult and interrogate ourselves; hence, forming resolutions concerning our practice."

"Do we not much esteem and set by ourselves, do we not strive to maintain in our minds a good opinion of ourselves; can any mischances befalling us, any defects observable in us, any faults committed by us, induce us to slight or despise ourselves? This may teach us what regard and value we should ever preserve for our neighbour."

"Do we not sincerely and earnestly desire our own welfare and advantage in every kind; do we not heartily wish good success to our own designs and undertakings; are we unconcerned or coldly affected in any case touching our own safety, our estate, our credit, our satisfaction, or pleasure? This doth inform us what we should wish and covet for our neighbour."

"Do we not seriously grieve at our own disasters and disappointments; are we not in sad dumps whenever we incur any damage or disgrace; do not our diseases and pains sorely afflict us; do we not pity and bemoan ourselves in any want, calamity, or distress? Hence, we may learn, how we should condole and commiserate the misfortunes of our neighbours."

"Do we not eagerly prosecute our own concerns, do we not with huge vigour and industry strive to acquire all conve-

niences and comforts to ourselves, to rid ourselves of all wants and molestations? If we be well advised, do we not labour to rescue ourselves from ignorance and error, from the tyranny of sin, from the torture of a bad conscience, from the danger of hell? This sheweth how ready we should be really to further our neighbour's good, ministering to him all kinds of assistance and relief suitable to his needs, both corporal and spiritual."

"Are we so proud or nice that we disdain to yield attendance or service needful for our own sustenance or convenience? Do we not indeed gladly perform the meanest and most sordid offices for ourselves? This declareth how condescensive we should be in helping our neighbour, how ready even *to wash his feet* when occasion doth require."

"Thus reflecting on ourselves, and making our practice toward ourselves the pattern of our dealing with others, we shall not fail to discharge what is prescribed to us in this law; and so we have here a rule of charity. Thus it is from sympathy we learn what charity requires of us to do.

"The love of our neighbour doth imply readiness upon all occasions to do him good, to promote and advance his benefit in all kinds. It doth not rest in good opinions of mind and good affections of heart, but from those roots doth put forth abundant fruits of real beneficence; it will not long be satisfied with faint desires or sluggish wishes, but will be up and doing what it can for its neighbour. Love is a busy and active, a vigorous and sprightly, a courageous and industrious disposition of soul, which will prompt a man and push him forward to undertake or undergo any thing, to endure pains, to encounter dangers, to surmount difficulties for the good of its object."

"Hence charity will render a man a general benefactor in all matters, upon all occasions, affording to his neighbour all kinds of assistance and relief, according to his neighbour's

need and *his own ability*. It will make him a bountiful dispenser of his goods to the poor, a comforter of the afflicted, a visitor of the sick, an instructor of the ignorant, an adviser of the doubtful, a protector of the oppressed, a hospitable entertainer of strangers, a reconciler of differences, an intercessor for offenders, an advocate of those who need defence, a succourer of all that want help. Such is a charitable man; the sun is not more liberal of his light and warmth than he is of beneficial influence."

"Do we love to vex ourselves or cross our own humour, do we not rather seek by all means to please and gratify ourselves? This may warn us how innocent and inoffensive, how compliant and complacent we should be in our behaviour toward others, endeavouring to *please them in all things*, especially, *for their good to edification*."

"Are we easily angry with ourselves, do we retain implacable grudges against ourselves, or do we execute upon ourselves mischievous revenge? Are we not rather very meek and patient toward ourselves, mildly comporting with our own great weaknesses, our troublesome humours, our impertinencies and follies—readily forgiving ourselves the most heinous offences, neglects, affronts, injuries, and outrages, committed by us against our own interest, honour, and welfare? Hence may we derive lessons of meekness and patience to be exercised toward our neighbour, in bearing his infirmities and miscarriages, in remitting any wrongs or discourtesies received from him."

"Do we use to pry for faults, or pick quarrels with ourselves, to make foul constructions of our words, to blazon our defects or aggravate our failings, do we not rather connive at and conceal our blemishes, do we not excuse and extenuate our own crimes? Can we find in our hearts to murder our own credit by slander, to blast it by detraction, to maim it by reproach? Are we not rather very jealous of our reputa-

tion and studious to preserve it as a precious ornament, a main fence, an useful instrument of our welfare? Hence we may be acquainted how civil and courteous in our behaviour, how fair and ingenuous in our dealing, how candid and mild in our judgment or censure we should be toward our neighbour—how very tender and careful we should be of anywise wronging or hurting his fame.”

“ We may ask with St. Paul, *Why dost thou set at nought thy brother?*”

“ Is it for the lowness of his condition or for any misfortune that hath befallen him?—But are not the best men, are not all men, art not thou thyself obnoxious to the like? Hath not God declared that he hath a special regard to such?—and are not such things commonly disposed by his hand with a gracious intent?”

“ Is it for meanness of parts, or abilities, or endowments? but are not these the gifts of God, absolutely at his disposal, and arbitrarily distributed or preserved; so that thou who art so wise in thy own conceit to-day, may, by a disease, or from a judgment, deserved by thy pride, become an idiot to-morrow? Have not many good, and therefore many happy, men wanted these things?”

“ Is it for moral imperfections or blemishes, for vicious habits, or actual misdemeanors?—These indeed are the only debasements and disparagements of a man; yet do they not expunge the characters of Divinity impressed on his nature, and he may by God’s mercy recover from them; and are not we ourselves, if grace do not uphold us, liable to the same? and may we not, if without partiality or flattery we examine ourselves, discern the same within us, or other defects equivalent?”

“ We may consider that the common things, both good and bad, wherein men agree, are far more considerable than the peculiar things wherein they differ; to be a man is much beyond being a lord, or a wit, or a philosopher; to be a true

Christian doth infinitely surpass being an emperor or learned clerk ; to be a sinner is much worse than to be a beggar or an idiot.—The agreement of men is in the body and substance of things ; the difference is in a circumstance, a fringe or a shadow about them, so that we cannot despise another man without reflecting contempt on ourselves who are so very like him, and not considerably better than he, or hardly can without arrogance pretend to be so.”

“ We may therefore, and reason doth require that we should, value our neighbour ; and it is no impossible or unreasonable precept which St. Peter giveth us, *to honour all men* ; and with it a charitable mind will easily comply ; it ever will descry something valuable, something honourable, something amiable in our neighbour ; it will find somewhat of dignity in the meanest, somewhat of worth in the basest, somewhat hopeful in the most degenerate of men ; it therefore will not absolutely slight or scorn any man whatever, looking on him as an abject or forlorn wretch, unworthy of consideration.”

“ We do all conceive love and respect due to us from all men ; we take all men bound to wish and tender our welfare ; we suppose our need to require commiseration and succour from every man ; if it be refused we think it a hard case, and that we are ill-used ; we cry out of wrong, of discourtesy, of inhumanity, of baseness practised towards us. A moderate respect and affection will hardly satisfy some of us, we pretend to them in the highest degree, being disgusted with the least appearance of disregard or disaffection ; we can scarce better digest indifference than hatred. This evidenceth our opinion and conscience to be, that we ought to pay the greatest respect and kindness to our neighbour, for it is plainly unjust and ridiculously vain to require that from others, which we refuse to them who may demand it upon the same title ; nor can we without self-condemnation practise that which we detest in the rest of our species.”

“ In all reason and equity, if I would have another my friend, I must be a friend to him; if I pretend to charity from all men, I must render it to all in the same kind and measure.”

“ Hence is the law of charity well expressed in those terms, *of doing to others whatever we would have them do to us*; whereby the palpable equity of this practice is demonstrated.”

“ Charity will moreover encompass a man with friends, with many guards of his safety, with many supports of his fortune, with many patrons of his reputation, with many succourers of his necessity, with many comforters of his affliction; for is a charitable man in danger, who will not defend him? Is he falling, who will not uphold him? Is he falsely accused or aspersed, who will not vindicate him? Is he in distress, who will not pity him; who will not endeavour to relieve and restore him? Who will insult over his calamity? Will it not in such cases appear a common duty, a common interest, to assist and countenance a common friend, a common benefactor to mankind?”

“ And thus our self-love may lead us to act towards others, as we must hope they will be induced to act towards us.”

“ Uncharitableness is a very mean and base thing; it contracteth a man's soul into a narrow compass, or straighteneth it into one point, drawing all his thoughts, his desires, his affections, into himself as to their centre; so that his reason, his will, his activity, have but one pitiful object to exercise themselves about; to scrape together a little pelf, to catch a vapour of fame, to progg for a frivolous semblance of power or dignity; to soothe the humour, or pamper the sensuality of one poor worm is the ignoble subject of his busy care and endeavour.”

“ But withholding his portion from the poor, as it will pollute and profane all our estate, so it will render the fruition thereof sour or unsavoury to us; for can we with any content taste our dainties, or view our plenties, while the poor man stands in

sight, pining with hunger? Can we without regret see our walls clothed with tapestry, our horses decked with golden trappings, our attendants strutting in wanton gaiety, while our honest poor brother appears half naked, and trembling with cold? Can we carry on one finger enough to furnish ten poor people with necessaries, and have the heart within us, without shame and displeasure, to see them want. No, the sense of our impiety and ingratitude toward God, of our inhumanity and unworthiness toward our neighbour, will not fail (if ever we considerably reflect on our behaviour) to sting us with cruel remorse and self-condemnation; the clamours of want and misery surrounding us, will pierce our ears and wound our hearts."

"We should remember that we are mortal and frail; were we immortal, or could we probably retain our possessions for ever in our hands; yea, could we foresee some definite space of time, considerably long, in which we might assuredly enjoy our stores, it might seem somewhat excusable to scrape hard and to hold fast; to do so might look like rational providence; but since riches must infallibly be soon left, and there is no certainty how long we may keep them, it is very unaccountable why we should so greedily seek them, and hug them so fondly. We should reckon that it may happen to us, as it has done to many others, that after we have reared great barns, and *stored up much goods for many years*, our *soul this very night* might be *required of us*, and if it be uncertain when, it is however most certain, that, after a very short time, our thread will be spun out; then shall we be rifled and quite stripped of all, becoming stark naked as when we came into the world; we shall not carry with us one grain of our glittering metals, nor one rag of our gaudy stuff; our stately houses, our fine gardens, and our spacious walks, must all be exchanged for a close hole under ground; we must for ever bid farewell to our pomps and magnificences, to our feasts and jollities, to our

sport and pastimes—not one of all our numerous and splendid retinue, no companion of our pleasures, no admirer of our fortune, no flatterer of our vices, can wait upon us; desolate and unattended we must go down to the chambers of darkness; then shall we find that to die rich (as men are wont improperly to speak) is really to die most poor; that to have carefully kept our money, is to have lost it utterly. All our treasures will not procure us any favour, nor purchase one advocate for us in that impartial world. We shall, moreover, leave our riches behind us as marks of obloquy, and monuments of infamy upon our memories; for ordinarily of such a rich person it is true, what Job says of him, *Mén shall clap their hands at him, and hiss him out of his place*, like one who departs from off this stage, after having very ill acted his part on it.”

“But he, who out of conscience and reverence toward God, out of good-will and kindness to his brother, hath disposed and given to the poor, he shall at last find God infinitely more bountiful to him than he hath been to the needy. For when all the flashes of sensual pleasures are quite extinct, when all the flowers of secular glory are withered away, when all earthly treasures are buried in darkness, when this world, and all the fashions of it are utterly vanished and gone, the bountiful man’s state will be still firm and flourishing, and *his righteousness shall endure for ever*.”—*Barrow*.

Patriotism.

“Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land?”

We are disposed more or less to love and cherish our native land, and to befriend our countrymen. This feeling arises jointly from our self-love, social affections, and the

force of habit. We prefer it because it in a manner belongs to us, and to those most dear to us, and that it entombs the ashes of our forefathers. Habit too has endeared to us even the inanimate objects it contains.

Hospitality.

The truly Hospitable are disposed courteously to receive, and kindly to entertain their friends, acquaintance, and strangers, as far as their means will permit, without their wronging any one. To do more than this, is selfishness, it is to indulge our wish of appearing generous, or our love of society, at the expense of justice; but we may do less, either from the want of social feeling, or from some peculiar habits or circumstances. The practice of hospitality must therefore unavoidably depend, more or less, upon the government under which we live, the state of society, prevailing customs, upon the health and character of the several members of our family, &c. For instance, our propensity, to be generally hospitable, can be far more safely indulged in a thinly, than in a thickly inhabited country; remote from, than near to a town; in a small, than in a large community. But unless avarice be their ruling passion, men are commonly well-inclined both to seek and to invite frequent intercourse with each other; to suppose otherwise, is to believe man an unsocial animal, or averse to the indulgence of his inclinations. To be hospitable is to be generous, but to be generous we must be just; thus it is prostituting the word hospitable, to apply it to such as entertain strangers at the expense of injuring their family, and defrauding their dependants and tradespeople.

Benevolence.

Benevolence is the necessary consequence of our loving our brethren, for we cannot love them, without feeling disposed to

do them as much good as is compatible with our several obligations in life.

Compassion, Commiseration, Pity.

Social love and sympathy dispose us, more or less, to compassionate and pity the sufferings of humanity, or of any living creature.

To Comfort, Console, Cheer, Soothe.

And compassion and commiseration to soothe, comfort, and cheer the afflicted.

Obliging, Compliant, Accommodating, Unaccommodating, Disobliging, Offensive.

The good and amiable are spontaneously disposed to be obliging, compliant, accommodating, &c. But the selfish often put on the appearance of it, in order to answer some purpose of their own.

Considerate, Overbearing.

The considerate commonly take into account in what manner their proposed actions, are likely to interfere with the comfort and convenience of others. The overbearing are not deterred by any such restraints, from gratifying their most wanton caprices.

Conciliatory.

The philanthropist is ever anxious to maintain peace and goodwill among men, and to please them in every reasonable manner.

To Embroil, Irritate, Exasperate.

The selfish often hope, on the contrary, to find their own profit, by embroiling their neighbours in quarrels and litigations, and by irritating and exasperating them against one another.

To Monopolize.

And to monopolize every advantage they can obtain over others.

Scrupulous, Encroaching.

Well regulated minds are very scrupulous of encroaching upon the attentions, kindness, or generosity of others, but the selfish seldom lose any thing for want of asking.

To Persecute.

Some men are disposed to persecute others, either for their religious or political opinions, or from malevolence.

To Injure, Wrong, Ruin.

Many men are disposed to injure, wrong, and ruin others, some do it unintentionally, and some unavoidably.

To Annoy, Disturb, Molest, Tease, Vex, Provoke, Worry, Enrage.

And are apt to tease, annoy, &c. others in various ways, some purposely, others unconsciously, and some idly.

To Ridicule.

We are apt to ridicule those who act absurdly, or contrary to reason. The ill-disposed and thoughtless sometimes ridicule the mistakes or awkwardnesses of their associates, or of the indigent, or their mental and personal defects.

To Appease, Pacify, Mollify.

The good are disposed to appease the irritations that disturb others, and to mollify their resentments.

To Encourage, Incite, Spur on.

Also to encourage the industrious, and to incite and spur on the indolent.

To Animate, Enliven, Exhilarate.

The sprightly often animate, enliven, and exhilarate their associates, and also the depressed.

To Intimidate, Depress, Cast down.

The tyrannical and overbearing endeavour to intimidate and depress the weak and defenceless.

Like, Love, Adore, Idolize, Dislike, Hate, Detest, Abhor, Abominate.

We are disposed to like, love, in numberless ways and degrees, also to hate, detest, &c.

To be Infatuated.

When we love contrary to the dictates of our reason, or desire to have that which would evidently be hurtful to us, we are said to be infatuated.

Preference, Partiality, Impartiality.

The greater degree of love we are disposed to bear to one person or thing more than to another, is expressed by the words preference, partiality. When we do not betray any preference, we are said to be impartial.

To be Zealous, Earnest, Lukewarm.

We are more or less zealous or lukewarm, in the pursuit of any business or pleasure, either on our own or on another's account.

To Enjoy, to be Charmed with, to Delight in, to be in Transports, Raptures.

We are all of us disposed to be delighted with, to be transported with the perception of things we consider eminently great, beautiful, curious, sublime, &c.

To have a Repugnance to, an Aversion to, Antipathy to, to be Disgusted with, to Loathe.

Some of our antipathies are as unreasonable as our pre-

ferences. We have a repugnance to whatever is disagreeable, and loathe what is nauseous to us.

Chaste, Unchaste.

Chastity, we apprehend, expresses such a temper of mind, as indisposes it to entertain thoughts, or to commit actions unsuitable to the dignity of virtue, or to hold intercourse with persons any way inclined to insult our natural modesty, and whom we term unchaste.

Modest, Immodest.

We consider those persons modest, whose looks, air, language, manners, and dress, bespeak a mind unsullied by the contamination of unchaste thoughts. Alarmed or offended modesty expresses itself by blushes.

Coquetry, Love.

Coquetry, in the good sense of the word, is the first and indirect expression, we apprehend, of those feelings, nature has implanted in the two sexes towards each other; and thus all young persons of one sex, are apt to experience a peculiar sort of anxiety in the presence of the other, a perturbation, a vague hope, they are unconscious of themselves, though it is commonly, more or less apparent to bystanders. As this feeling becomes stronger and stronger, it finally takes the name of Love.

“ Oh happy love, where love like this is found,
 Oh heart-felt raptures! bliss beyond compare!
 I've paced much this weary mortal round,
 And sage experience bids me this declare;
 If Heaven, a draught of heavenly pleasure spare,
 One cordial in this melancholy vale,
 'Tis when a youthful, loving, *modest* pair,
 In other's arms breathe out the tender tale,
 Beneath the milk-white thorn, that scents the evening gale,”

Friendship, Conjugal Affection.

Friendship implies the strongest degree of social affection we are capable of entertaining towards one another; and it serves to confirm the empire of love itself.

“ ’Tis Friendship makes the bondage sweet,
And feeds their mutual loves.”

But love often exists without friendship; the voluptuary has only the baser propensity, and thus,

“ Unknown to him when sensual pleasures cloy,
To fill the languid pause with finer joy.”

But Conjugal Affection is friendship founded upon love. True friendship leads us spontaneously to do as we would be done by, and when we act otherwise, we are moved by selfishness, not friendship.

Selfishness is most particularly baneful to conjugal affection, because so strict a union cannot be long comfortably maintained, but by *mutual* endeavours to support each other, through the various trials all, even the most fortunate, are liable to encounter in this state of probation. Whereas, how common is it to see one of the party become more exacting, in proportion to the sacrifices made by the other, and the most earnest devotion repaid with neglect.

To Flirt.

The propensity to flirt is at best, a mere idle habit, originating in vanity; but it is sometimes a meretricious art, leading to the worst consequences.

To Jilt.

Some flirts, whether men or women, jilt, because they have unintentionally excited hopes; others are disposed to it,

and find their amusement in the disappointment of their lovers; few of these, however, it is to be hoped, have allowed themselves to weigh the very probable consequences of their cruel proceedings.

Licentious, Profligate, Debauched.

Some persons abandon themselves, more or less, and in different ways, to licentiousness, profligacy, and debauchery.

Parental Affection.

When a father beholds his children, he sees beings he has made tenants of a thorny and intricate world, and whose welfare through, perhaps, a long life, principally depends upon his judicious management of them during their minority. He must therefore, feel himself so far responsible for their actions, and he is accordingly empowered by the laws, both human and divine, to enforce obedience. And as a parent is thus, to a certain degree, accountable to God for the conduct of his children; so are guardians or teachers to the parents who employ them, it being a delegated trust, voluntarily undertaken. And it is voluntary too, on the part of the parents, for they enter the marriage state upon this express condition.

Filial Affection.

Filial affection is founded upon gratitude. Children feel grateful for the tender care (direct or indirect) bestowed upon them by their parents during their infancy and youth.

Fraternal Affection.

Fraternal affection is friendship established by the ties of blood and early habit.

Strict, Severe, Relaxed, Indulgent.

Persons in authority are disposed to be, more or less, strict

and severe, or relaxed and indulgent, justly or unjustly, judiciously or injudiciously.

Obedient, Dutiful, Disobedient, Unruly, Refractory.

And those they command are inclined to be, more or less, obedient, or disobedient, unruly, refractory, &c. and their disobedience is more or less blameable, according to the nature and extent of the duties or actions exacted of them.

CHAPTER VIII.

Desire of Happiness.—Desire of Reward and Fear of Punishment.—Conscience.—Reason, Faith, Enthusiasm, Extasy.—True or Abstract Virtue and Vice, or Moral Right and Wrong.—Arbitrary Virtue and Vice, or Moral Right and Wrong.—Good and Evil.—Moral Good and Evil.—Reward and Punishment.—Prejudice, Superstition.—Toleration, Bigotry.—Credulity, Scepticism.

Desire of Happiness both in our Present and Future state of existence, or to obtain Good and to avoid Evil.

HUMAN Happiness is defined to be, The enjoyment of the greatest degree of Good, with the least mixture of Evil. All men, in fact, abstractedly desire such happiness, but they are more or less diverted from the steady pursuit of it, according to the force or weakness of their judgment, and the degree of discipline to which they commonly subject their inclinations: a man may, for instance, either not have sagacity to discover his proper line of conduct, or want resolution to obey the dictates of his reason.

The earnest desire of true happiness induces us carefully to consider in what manner we ought to act, in order to obtain any future good, or to avoid any future evil, and to be willing to sacrifice present advantages or pleasures accordingly; in other words, habitually to prefer the restraints required of us by virtue, to the freedom permitted us by vice. Men pursue happiness in innumerable ways; some by the excessive indulgence of their ambition, or vanity, or desire of pleasure, or of wealth, or of independence, &c. but wisdom, we presume, advises the reasonable gratification of our several directing dis-

positions to the degree as nearly as possible, that our capacity, character, and situation, may seem likely, eventually to render most advantageous to us. A labourer, for example, may be laudably ambitious of excelling in his trade; proud of his good name, dexterity, and consequent influence with his employer; vain of having his family, his house, and himself, appear clean and neat; he may desire the pleasure of enjoying many rustic amusements with his neighbours; ease in various ways; wholesome changes of labour and repose; occasional novelties; he may be curious to know by what means the land would be most successfully tilled, or cattle reared; he may desire independence of all charity, and to quit any harsh or unreasonably dissatisfied or unjust master; he may desire power or promotion within his sphere of life; wealth to command, not only the necessities, but some of the comforts of life; and employment to obtain subsistence, and to beguile time. Thus, we imagine, man cannot be long happy, but by the occasional indulgence of these several propensities, and that were it possible entirely to subdue any of them, he would be a less excellent creature than he is, and less fitted for a joint tenant of this sublunary world. Man will find his happiness too, in duly regulating all his primary dispositions, for whatever be his rank or pursuit in life, he will find abundant occasions for the exercise of his patience, courage, forbearance, &c.

The desire of Happiness in a future state of existence, is the bright beacon that fixes the eye the more steadily, the greater the difficulties that present themselves in our voyage towards it.

The Desire of Reward and Fear of Punishment.

The desire of Reward and fear of Punishment seems to have been universally implanted in us, in order to induce us to take heed generally, of the consequences of what we are

about to do, for were we regardless of them, we should be always determined to action by the prevailing inclination of the moment. This excitement is calculated to urge us to the practice of virtue at any sacrifice, and to restrain us from the pursuit of vice, however alluring; to cause us to make various provisions for the future, and to guard against many evils, apparent and concealed, likely and possible to happen; likewise to enable us to live in community; for without hope of reward or fear of punishment from men, we should commonly prove a lawless, ungovernable race of beings.

Rewards and punishments are either *natural* or *instituted*, the first are the necessary consequences of actions, the latter determined by law, custom, or caprice. The provident are commonly rewarded by escaping many evils to which the improvident idly expose themselves. If we offend the customs of a country, we subject ourselves to be censured and shunned; and if we violate the established laws, a supposed suitable punishment awaits us.

The fear of punishment, doubtless, operates more powerfully in general upon the human mind than the hope of reward, and rulers often use this argument to govern men rather with the sword than with the sceptre; they take not into the account, however, that uneasiness it is, that causes men to become restless, adventurous, and desperate, and fit instruments to be obtained for the worst purposes.

“ 1st Murderer. I am one, my liege,
Whom the vile blows and buffets of the world
Have so incens’d, that I am reckless what
I do to spite the world.

2d Murderer. And I another,
So weary with disasters, tugg’d with fortune,
That I would set my life on any chance
To mend it, or be rid on’t.”

Conscience.

“ He that has light within his own clear breast
 May sit i' th' center, and enjoy bright day ;
 But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts
 Benighted walks under the mid-day sun—
 Himself is his own dungeon.”——*Milton.*

“ What is conscience? Is it, as has been thought, an internal monitor implanted in us by the Supreme Being, and dictating to us on all occasions what is right or wrong? Or is it merely our own judgment of the moral rectitude or turpitude of our own actions? I take the word with Mr. Locke in the latter, as in the only intelligible sense. Now who sees not, that our judgments of virtue and vice, right and wrong, are not always formed from an enlightened and dispassionate use of our reason in the investigation of truth? They are more generally formed from the nature of the religion we profess; from the quality of the civil government under which we live; from the general manners of the age, or the particular manners of the persons with whom we associate; from the education we have had in our youth; from the books we have read at a more advanced period, and from other accidental causes. Who sees not that, on this account, conscience may be conformable or repugnant to the law of nature—may be certain or doubtful? and that it can be no criterion of moral rectitude even when it is certain, because the certainty of an opinion is no proof of its being a right opinion? A man may be certainly persuaded of an error in reasoning, or of an untruth in matters of fact. It is a maxim of every law, human and divine, that a man ought never to act in opposition to his conscience; but it will not from thence follow that he will, in obeying the dictates of his conscience, on all occasions act right.”——*Watson's Apology for the Bible.*

God having ordained that the perception of things should

excite in us not only present pleasure and pain, but also that it should produce effects of a more permanent nature, opinions, which are peculiar modes of thinking, and which modes most commonly regulate our actions, establish themselves in our minds with more and less force and steadiness, and we likewise adopt, with more or less tenacity, many of the notions we find current in the world. The character of a man's opinions seems to be, as Dr. Watson says, generally determined by the strength and activity of his understanding, by his peculiar temperament, by the objects he becomes familiar with, by the sort of entertainment he gives them, and by a variety of other circumstances that influence him throughout life; and this alone will explain how it comes to pass, that the very same action which is esteemed virtue in one country, is sometimes considered to be actually vice in another. Moreover, as our opinions change upon moral matters, so does our conscience effect a suitable change in our conduct. It often happens, for instance, that he who has long indulged himself without scruple in the enjoyment of many worldly pleasures, is brought, either by the experience of their vanity, or by misfortune, or by the persuasions of others, to believe them criminal, and consequently to abandon them more or less abruptly and strictly. Courtiers have thus voluntarily quitted the brilliant saloons of Versailles, in order to entomb themselves within the gloomy walls of La Trappe. Prejudice and superstition strangely warp the human mind, and seemingly there is no absurdity man is not capable of practising from conscientious motives. Some men continually torment themselves, and some as continually torment others, in the very monstrous belief of its proving acceptable to the Father of all Mercies. But though reason is, as experience assures us, apt to be biassed in such a vast variety of ways, in its determination of *what is morally right*, yet is it in every man, from his childhood, fitted to apprise him, that it is his duty to act according to *his sense*

of right, whatever it may be, and this sense of right is what we call Conscience.

Conscience, however, like most other moral terms, comprehends many distinct notions, all which or nearly, it is necessary to take into the account, if we would have an adequate and determined idea of it.

It supposes the belief of the existence of an eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent Being governing the universe by immutable laws, (for perfection can need no change). It supposes man created with intelligence, sensibility, and volition, and left a free agent. Intelligent, to apprehend more or less correctly by his own sagacity, or by the instructions of others, or by revelation, that God is, and that he has endowed him with faculties for the use of which he will hereafter call him to account: sensibility, to subject him to the impressions of pleasure and pain, and consequently to temptations, since where there is no temptation there can be no merit in forbearance: volition, to determine him to seek whatever seemeth good to him; and a free agent, in order to render him responsible for his actions. It supposes that, attaching the idea of moral right to those actions he believes the most conformable to the intentions of his Maker, he calls them virtues, and that the opposite to these he concludes to be morally wrong, and denominates them vices, and men virtuous or vicious according to their conduct. It supposes that he is satisfied with himself whenever he does, or means to do right, though evil come of it; but is dissatisfied with himself whenever he does, or means to do wrong, though good as unexpectedly follow. It supposes that we believe ourselves entirely dependent upon the Ruler of all things, and that he will reward the virtuous and punish the vicious suitably to both their visible and invisible actions, and to his own consummate justice and mercy, and which actions can be nicely scrutinized only by that Eye that

unceasingly penetrates all space. It supposes, that the idea of perfect justice excites confidence and tranquillity in the virtuous, but terror in the vicious, and that the belief of infinite mercy restores peace to the truly penitent. Such we apprehend to be, pretty nearly, the nature of that very complex idea we call conscience.

The shaking off the restraints, or the stilling of the voice of conscience, are figurative terms, denoting the endeavour we make to lose the remembrance, of our being subject to an omniscient and omnipotent Power—or could we forget our offences the effect would be the same—could we but,

“ Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And, with some sweet oblivious antidote,
Cleanse the foul bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart.”

conscience would cease from troubling us.

In short, all men, we suppose, have their notions of moral right and wrong, determined by the opinions they severally entertain, which opinions we find, however, they are liable to change at any period of their lives, and to be swayed by them accordingly. That their opinions entirely regulate the decisions of their conscience, and that conscience influences all men essentially alike, whatever be their peculiar notions of God, or of virtue and vice. Dr. Watson's conclusion appears therefore perfectly just, that most certainly no man ought to act in opposition to his conscience, but that his peculiar notions of right may in themselves be very wrong, and most contrary to both natural and revealed religion. |

The acquiring false notions of virtue and vice it is, that causes men often earnestly to pursue that which is in itself wrong, from the strongest persuasion of its being right, and the world has been most cruelly and variously afflicted by such mistakes, as well as by the wilful injuries, bad men have done it. But a well exercised judgment cannot but determine us most

strictly to conform our actions to the pure doctrines of Christianity, and thus to reject opinions likely to warp our conscience, to the exclusion of truths, the adoption of which is of the utmost possible importance to our own, and in many cases to the general happiness of multitudes. It clearly appears therefore; that conscience is not implanted in us for the purpose of directing us in forming our opinions of virtue and vice, that being the proper office of reason; but only to rate us whenever we swerve from the practice of those notions we may severally entertain of moral right; it goads us to do that which *we believe* we ought to do, and warns us to leave undone those things which we suppose we ought not to do.

“ It is a peculiar excellency of human nature which seemeth more to distinguish man from any inferior rank of creatures than bare reason itself, that he can reflect upon all that is done within him, can discern the tendencies of his soul, is acquainted with his own purposes : some shadows of other rational operations are discoverable in beasts, but no good reason or experience can, I suppose, make it probable, that they partake of this reflexive faculty; that they do ever regard or remark upon their own imaginations; they seem always to march directly forward with a blind impetuosity toward some object that pleases them, without attending to the fancy that guides them, or the appetite which excites them. But man being designed by his Maker, disposed by the frame of his nature, and obliged by a law imposed on him not to follow the casual impulses from exterior objects, nor the base conduct of his imagination, nor the sway of his natural propensities, but to regulate as well the internal workings of his soul, as his external actions, according to certain laws or rules prescribed him—to settle his thoughts upon due objects, to bend his inclinations into a right frame, to restrain his affections within due bounds; to rectify his judgment of things, to ground his purposes on honest reasons, and direct them into lawful

matters—it is needful that he should have this power of discerning whatever moveth or passeth within him; what he thinks upon, whither he inclines, how he judgeth, whence he is affected, wherefore he doth resolve. Without this power, he could not be a moral agent, not able to perform any duty, not properly subject to any law, not liable to render an account of his doings. Did he not perceive his own thoughts, how could he dispel them when they are bad or vain? Might he not observe his own inclinations, how could he strive to keep them in check or to reform them, when they draw to unlawful practices? Were he not sensible of his affections, how could he endeavour to reduce or compare them, when they become exorbitant or tumultuous? Were he not conscious of his own opinions, how could he weigh and examine them, how could he conform his actions to them, or practise according to the dictates of his conscience? It is therefore, plainly needful that man should be endued with this power, since without it he can neither perform the duty required of him, nor enjoy the benefits he is capacified and designed for: the intention of our Maker in conferring it upon us is therefore evident, our duty consists in its right use, our advantage ariseth from the constant and careful exercise of this excellent faculty.”

“ This is then our duty, recommended by the wise man, to be continually, with extreme diligence, looking inward upon ourselves, observing what thoughts spring up within us, what imaginations find most welcome harbour in our breasts, what objects most affect us with delight or displeasure; what it is we love and readily embrace, what we distaste and presently reject; what prejudices do possess our minds; wherefore we propose to ourselves certain undertakings; conversing with ourselves, that we should, as it were, discourse in this manner, What is it that I think upon, are my thoughts serious, seasonable, and pure? Whither do I propend, are my inclina-

tions compliant to God's law and good reason? what judgments do I make of things; are my apprehensions clear, solid, sure, built upon no corrupt prejudice? what doth most easily stir me, and how is my heart moved; are my affections calm and orderly, and well-placed? what plots do I contrive, what projects am I driving on; are my designs good, are my intentions upright and sincere? let me thoroughly inquire into these points, let me be fully satisfied in them. Thus should we continually be doing."

"All men are very curious and inquisitive after knowledge, the being endued therewith, passeth for a goodly ornament, a rich possession, a matter of great satisfaction, and much solid advantage. Men are commonly ashamed of nothing so much as of ignorance; but if any knowledge meriteth esteem for its worth and usefulness, this next to that concerning Almighty God, may surely best pretend thereto; if any ignorance deserveth blame, this certainly is most liable thereto: to be studious in contemplating natural effects, and the causes whence they proceed; to be versed in the writings and stories of other men's doings, to be pragmatical observers of what is said or done without us (that which perchance may little concern, little profit us to know) and in the meanwhile to be strangers at home, to overlook what passeth in our own breasts, to be ignorant of our most near and proper concernments, is a folly, if any, to be derided, or rather greatly to be pitied, as the source of many weighty inconveniences to us."

"A man by serious inspection into his own heart, shall discern how many fond, impure, and ugly thoughts do swarm within him; how averse his inclinations are from good, and how prone to evil; how much his affections are misplaced and distempered, (while he vehemently delights in the possession, and absurdly frets for the want of trifles, having small content in the fruition, and but slender displeasure for the absence of the greatest goods; while empty hopes exalt him,

and idle fears deject him; while other various passions, like so many tempests, drive and toss him all about) who shall observe, how clouds of darkness, error, and doubt, do hover upon the face of his soul, so that he quickly taketh up opinions, and soon layeth them down, and often turneth from one mistake to another; how unsettled his resolutions are, especially in the pursuance of the most desirable good, and what corrupt mixtures cleave to his best purposes; who taketh notice how backward he is unto, and how cold in devotions toward God, how little sensible of his goodness, or fearful of his displeasure; how little also it is that he desireth, or delighteth in the good, that he pitieth, and grieveth at the evil of his neighbour; he that doth, I say, frequently, and with heedfulness regard these imperfections and obliquities in his own heart, how can he be much taken with himself?"

"Socrates is reported to have much admired the verse in Homer, affirming, that in it the sum of all wisdom is comprised, the sense and drift of it being this, (as he took it,) Seek and study what good or bad is at home within thy house; see how all goes on in thy breast, employ thy chief inquiry upon the affairs of thy soul, there confining thy curiosity and care."

"This practice will particularly fence us against immoderate displeasure, occasionable by men's hard opinions, or rash censures passed upon us, for he that by inquiry into himself, perceives so many defects in himself, will not so easily, nor so greatly be offended, if some of them (or some like to them) be objected to him, since he finds himself truly liable to many more and greater. Epictetus, his advice is, when you are told any man speaks ill of you, that you should not endeavour to exculpate yourself, but answer only, that he was ignorant of many other faults of yours, or he would not have mentioned those only. To be disposed without dissembling, or self-delusion, to follow this counsel, would prove a man very intimate with himself, and well prepared to endure happily and hand-

somely, encounters of this kind, which every man shall be sure to meet with."

"This practice will likewise defend us, not only from the irritation consequent to harsh censure, but also from the mistakes and miscarriages, to which the more favourable opinions of men, or their flattering expressions (those luscious poisons,) may expose us. The common nature of men inclines them to be credulous when they are commended, or receive any signification of esteem from others. Every ear is tickled with the sweet music of applause. But we are not to rely upon others, their imperfect and ill-grounded judgment, so much as upon our own more certain knowledge concerning ourselves. *Take no man's word before thine own sense, in what concerns thine own case and character*, is an advice deserving our regard and practice. For that man, who in questions of this kind, is able to be a skilful and indifferent umpire between himself and others; who is neither elevated nor depressed in mind by external weights, but keepeth himself equally poised in a just balance by his own well-informed Conscience; whose heart is neither exasperated with the bitterest gall of reproach, nor his head intoxicated with the sweetest potion of flattery, has a degree of virtue, arguing a most strong and healthful constitution of soul."—*Barrow*.

Repentance, Compunction, Contrition, Remorse, Atonement, Expiation.

Some men the more easily yield to their untoward inclinations, because they do not consider the probable extent of the evil consequences of doing so. Others wilfully abandon themselves to their most inordinate desires, preferring (at the moment) to encounter all risks, rather than suffer the present uneasiness of restraining them. They enjoy, for a time, the feast they have thus provided for themselves; but the day of reckoning arrives, and with it other feelings and other opinions

succeed. Either worldly disappointments, or bodily sufferings, or the experience of the vanity and vexation of a sinful life, awakens the fear of future punishments, and torments them with the sharp pangs of remorse. They recollect the advantages they have wasted, and groan under the evils they have wantonly incurred. Suffering more or less acutely from having formerly indulged their irregular propensities, they now feel disposed, not only to resist them, but earnestly desire to expiate their sins, and this desire becoming paramount to all others, they voluntarily seek the most severe mortifications both mental and bodily. They wound their pride by the acknowledgment of their faults, they appropriate their wealth to relieve the necessities of the indigent, and they who before would not deny their body any ease or luxury that human art could contrive to flatter the senses, now scourge it with repeated cruel stripes, and refuse to satisfy the cravings of its most imperious appetites. It is by such means, they hope to balance their moral accounts on this side the grave, and to pass to their future destination in company with those, who have little to reproach themselves with. The satisfaction that is felt upon the adjusting of all affairs of conscience, whether between man and man, or between man and his Creator, must, of course, be always proportionate to his belief of having more or less duly filled up the measure of Atonement, and thus so far Expiated his faults.

Reason, Faith.

“ Reason, as contra-distinguished to Faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas, as it has got by the use of its natural faculties.”

“ Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deduction of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraor-

dinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to man, we call Revelation."

"Reason is *natural* revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries, communicated by God *immediately*, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God."

"Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth, our mind, by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith and above reason."

Enthusiasm, Extasy.

"We see that in all ages men, in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves, has raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance to his favour than is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the Deity, and frequent communications from the divine Spirit, and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or direction from Heaven and must be obeyed; it is a commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it. This I take to be properly, Enthusiasm."

Extasy, implies a state of mind in which it is absorbed in the contemplation of ideas, that excite the highest degree of emotion in the soul, from whatever cause proceeding.

True or Abstract Virtue and Vice, or Moral Right and Wrong.

Man, from his earliest infancy, betrays intelligence, sensibility, and volition. He distinguishes kindness from harshness,

justice from injustice, reasonable from capricious interference, &c. he feels pleased and satisfied with the one, and displeased and dissatisfied with the other, and these opposite feelings excite in him the will or desire, to express his gratitude in the one case, and his resentment in the other. Such, it is evident, are the workings of nature in him, and consequently, he as necessarily entertains these notions and feelings, and acts accordingly, as he breathes or moves, and therefore cannot be considered either virtuous or vicious, until his reason arrive at such a degree of maturity, as to qualify him to distinguish and judge of the consequences of his actions. Being then able to trace effects to their proper causes, he is induced to consider in what manner, his general conduct is likely to influence his happiness, and he soon perceives that some of his actions tend to procure him good, others evil, of various sorts and degrees; and this discovery leads him, more or less carefully to examine, how far he can consider himself justified in yielding to his various propensities. Having adopted certain opinions respecting the advantages or disadvantages consequent upon the indulgence or restraint of his wishes, he subsequently, upon the experience of good or evil, feels conscious that he merits the ease or pleasure he enjoys, or deserves the uneasiness or pain he suffers, or that he possesses comforts he cannot justly claim as his due, or suffers annoyances not imputable to his own vice or folly. We find children very early capable of comprehending the reasonableness of subjecting themselves to moral discipline; but knowing how often we ourselves swerve from our best resolutions, we make proportionable allowances for the unsteadiness of youth.

God having endowed us with reason and judgment, wherewith to profit by experience, in order to determine what various modes of conduct are likely, upon the whole, to secure to us the greatest degree of eventual good, and to protect us from the greatest degree of eventual evil, we call these various

modes, Virtues. Thus one mode of conduct is the practice of what we call justice, another of fidelity, another of charity, &c. and by adopting the opposites to these, we, of course, become unjust, unfaithful, and uncharitable, and all such we denominate Vices. To give to every one strictly his due, is justice; to bestow with kindness upon the needy a reasonable proportion of one's wealth, to sympathize with the afflicted, and to forbear evil speaking, seems to be charity; and to do most strictly as we would be done by, when entrusted with the concerns of others, is we suppose fidelity. These terms so applied, express the notions men have entertained of virtue or moral right, since the days of Joseph and his brethren to the present hour, and which are therefore called True Virtue, or Moral Right, in the Abstract.

But in what sense men may severally interpret, the strictly doing justice, the being charitable, or faithful, is quite another question. No one can deny that justice is the giving to each man strictly his due, yet few would perhaps agree upon the point, of what that due strictly was. True or Abstract Virtue and Vice, or Moral Right and Wrong, therefore, we apprehend to be, those notions men in general entertain, that certain modes of conduct are as conformable to the intentions of their Maker, as others are contrary to them; and having derived these notions from the active exercise of their reason, continually directed by experience, and both reason and experience being of an immutable nature, we find Solomon, Socrates, and Cicero, to have all agreed in what True Virtue consists.

Arbitrary Virtue and Vice, or Moral Right and Wrong.

“All names being imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections being but conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different meanings of them. Since, though the nature of what we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of

different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions, and therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of *words*, which, besides their proper signification, have a signification also of the character, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of Virtues and Vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another munificence, magnanimity, &c."—*Hobbes*.

Arbitrary Virtue and Vice, or Moral Right and Wrong, are the *peculiar* notions men entertain upon those subjects, and which are derived either from the exercise of their own reason; or from revelation; or from the blind adoption of the opinions of others: and how various these peculiar notions are, may in some degree be imagined by those well acquainted with the different established religions, and dissenters from them.

Peculiar notions of virtue and vice indeed, we believe, to be nearly as numerous as the opinions entertained by each individual, upon each principal point of morality, that is to say, two men would not often be found precisely to agree, upon what it was right to do, in a case of any difficulty.

The Saviour of the world not only very repeatedly expressed his commands to us to practise justice, temperance, charity, &c. but he enforced them in the strongest manner, by giving us in his own conduct, the most perfect patterns of the several virtues he inculcated; yet necessarily, he still left it to our own judgment, to determine by what means we can hope most successfully to imitate his many bright examples, *i. e.* how far we are called upon by our peculiar circumstances, to do good to our neighbour, and in what way we can most effectually benefit him. Experience is the compass, and Reason the pilot, that must steer us through so many shoals of false opinions, every where abounding in the vast ocean of human life, and safely land us where we may find *True* Virtue, which can

alone eventually secure not only our individual, but our national prosperity and glory.

“Virtue is not a mushroom, that springeth up of itself in one night, when we are asleep, or regard it not; but a delicate plant, that groweth slowly and tenderly, needing much pains to cultivate it, much care to guard it, much time to mature it in our untoward soil, in this world’s unkindly climate: happiness is a thing too precious to be purchased at an easy rate; Heaven is too high to be come at without much climbing; the crown of bliss is a prize too noble to be won without a long and a tough conflict. Neither is Vice a spirit that will be conjured down by a charm, or with a presto driven away; it is not an adversary that can be knocked down at a blow, or dispatched with a stab. Whoever shall pretend at any time easily with a celerity, by a kind of *legerdemain*, or by any mysterious knack, a man may be settled in virtue, or converted from vice, common experience will abundantly confute him; which sheweth, that a habit cannot (setting miracles aside) otherwise be produced or destroyed, than by a constant exercise of acts suitable or opposite thereto. He who by temper is peevish or choleric, cannot without mastering that temper, become patient or meek; he who from vain opinions is proud, cannot without subduing those opinions prove humble; he who by force of habit is intemperate, cannot without weaning himself from that habit, come to be commonly sober, &c.”

“It is a common practice of men, that are engaged in bad courses, which their own conscience discerneth and disapproveth, to adjourn the reformation of their lives to a farther time, so indulging themselves in the present commission of sin, with the purpose and promise to themselves hereafter to repent and take up. Few resolve to persist finally in an evil way, or despair of being one day reclaimed, but immediately and effectually to set upon it, many deem unseasonable or needless; it will,

they presume, be soon enough to begin to-morrow or next day, a month or a year hence, when they shall find more commodious opportunity; or shall prove better disposed thereto: but we may consider, that no future time which we can fix upon, will be more convenient than the present is, for our reformation. Let us pitch on what time we please, we shall be as unwilling and as unfit to begin as we are now; we shall find in ourselves the same indispositions, the same averseness, or the same listlessness toward it as now. There will occur the like hardships to deter us, and the like pleasures to allure us from our duty; objects will then be as present, and will strike as smartly upon our senses; and the same pretences for delay will intrude themselves; so that we shall be as apt then as now to prorogue the business. We shall say then, to-morrow I will mend, but when that morrow cometh, it will be still to-morrow; and so the morrow will prove endless. If like the simple rustic, (who stood by the river side waiting till it had done running; that so he might pass dry foot over the channel) we do conceive that the sources of sin (bad inclinations within, and strong temptations abroad) will of themselves be spent or fail, we shall find ourselves deluded. If ever we come to take up, we must have a beginning with some difficulty and trouble; we must courageously break through the present with all its enchantments."

"Vice enfeebles our reason, by perverting our will, by corrupting our temper, by debasing our courage, by depraving all our appetites and passions; every day our mind groweth more blind, our will more resty, our spirit more faint, our appetites more fierce, our passions more headstrong and untameable. The power and empire of sin do strangely by degrees encroach, and continually gain ground upon us, till it hath quite overcome and enthralled us; first, we learn to bear it, then we come to like it, by and by we contract a friendship with it, then we dote upon it, and at last, we become enslaved to it in

a bondage, which we shall hardly be able, or find ourselves willing, to shake off."

"Natural modesty, while it prevails, is a curb from doing ill. Men in their first deflexions from virtue are bashful and shy; out of regard to other men's opinion, and tenderness of their own honour, they are afraid or ashamed to transgress plain rules of duty, but in process this disposition weareth out; by little and little they arrive to that character of the degenerate Jews, whom the prophets call *impudent children*, having *a brow of brass, and faces harder than a rock*; so that they commit sin with open face, and in broad day, without any mask, without a blush; they despise their own reputation, and defy all censure of others; they outface and outbrave the world, till at length, with prodigious insolence, they come to boast of wickedness and *glory in their shame*, as an instance of high courage, and special gallantry."

"Conscience is a check to beginners in sin, reclaiming them from it, and rating them for it; but this in long standers becometh useless, either failing to discharge its office, or essaying it to no purpose, having often been slighted, it will be weary of chiding; or, if it be not wholly dumb, we shall be deaf to its reproof; as those who live by cataracts or downfalls of water, are by continual noise so deafened, as not to hear or mind it; so shall we in time become insensible, not regarding the loudest peals and rattlings of the monitor within us."

"Now, when any person is come to this pass, it must be highly difficult to reduce him. To retrieve a lost modesty, to quicken a jaded conscience, to supple a callous heart, to resettle a baffled reason, to rear a dejected courage; to recover a soul miserably benumbed and broken, to its former vigour and integrity, can be no easy matter."

"The diseases of our soul no less than those of our body, when once they are inveterate, they are become more incur-

able; the longer we forbear to apply due remedy, the more difficult their removal will prove; if we let them proceed, we must, ere we can be rid of them, undergo a course of physic very tedious and offensive to us; many a rough purge, many a sore phlebotomy, many an irksome sweat we must endure."

"We should do well therefore most seriously to regard the Apostle's monition; *exhort one another to day, while it is called to day, lest any of you be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin.* Besides, we are mortal and frail, and thence any designs of future reformation may be clipt off, or intercepted by death, which is always creeping toward us, and may for all we can tell be very near at hand. You say you will repent to-morrow, but are you sure you shall have to-morrow to repent in. Have you an hour in your hand, or one minute at your disposal? Have you a lease to shew for any term of life? Can you claim or reckon upon the least portion of time without His leave, who bestoweth life, and ordereth all things as he pleaseth? Rash man, *boast not thyself of to-morrow, for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth.*"

"Epicurus himself said well, that *no man is either immature or over ripe in regard to his soul's health*, we can never set upon it too soon, we should never think it too late to begin; to live well is always the best thing we can do, and therefore we should at any time endeavour it, there are common reasons for all ages, there are special reasons for each age, which most strongly and most clearly do urge it; it is most seasonable for young men, it is most necessary for old men, it is most advisable for all men."—*Barrow.*

Good and Evil.

"Things are good and evil, only in reference to pleasure and pain. We call that Good, which is apt to cause or encrease pleasure, or diminish pain in us: or else, *to procure or*

preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that Evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good."

Moral Good and Evil.

"Moral good and evil is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn upon us by the will and power of the law-maker, and this good or evil, or pleasure and pain, attending our observance, or breach of the law, is that we call reward and punishment."

Reward and Punishment.

"Of moral rules or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seems to be three sorts, with their three different enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For, since it would be absurd to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, or to punish the deviation from his rule, by some good or evil, that was not the natural product and consequence of the action itself, for that would operate of itself without a law. This perhaps is the nature of all law."

"The laws to which men generally refer their actions in order to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, seem to me to be these three: 1. The Divine law. 2. The Civil law. 3. The law of Opinion or Reputation if we may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, they judge whether their actions are Sins or Duties; by the second, whether they

are Criminal or Innocent; by the third, whether they are Virtuous or Vicious."

"First. By the Divine law, I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether communicated to them by the light of nature, or promulgated by the voice of revelation; and that he has given such a rule, whereby men should govern themselves, there is no one, I think, so brutish as to deny. He has left us free agents, given us faculties to distinguish right from wrong, and has power to enforce his law by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life. This law then is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude; and men, by comparing their actions to it, judge whether as duties or sins, they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty."

"Secondly. The Civil law, or the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is another law to which men refer their actions, to ascertain whether they are criminal or no. This law no one overlooks; the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it. The force of the commonwealth is engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods, from him who disobeys them."

"Thirdly. The law of Opinion or Reputation. Virtue and vice are names supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong, and as far as they are really so applied, they so far are co-incident with the divine law before mentioned. But, whatever is pretended, yet it is visible, that these names virtue and vice, in the particular instances of their applications, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit."

Nor is it to be thought strange, that men every where should

give the name of virtue to those actions, which amongst them, are judged praise-worthy; and call that vice, which they count blameable: since otherwise, they would condemn themselves, should they think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation, or any thing wrong which they let pass without censure. Thus, the measure of what is every where called and esteemed virtue and vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a secret and tacit consent, establishes itself in the several societies, tribes and clubs of men, in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, and fashions, of that place. For, though men uniting into politic societies have resigned to the public the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they still retain the power of approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst and converse with; and by this approbation and dislike, establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice."

"That this is the common measure of virtue and vice will appear to any one who considers, that though that passes for vice in one country which is counted a virtue, or at least not vice in another, yet every where virtue and praise, vice and blame go together, virtue is every where that which is thought praiseworthy; and that which has the allowance of public esteem, is called virtue. Virtue and praise are indeed so united, that they are often called by the same name."

"Men, without renouncing all sense and reason, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side, that really deserved it not. Nay, even those men whose practice is otherwise, fail not to give their approbation right, few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn in others, at least, deviations from the rule of right: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, *the true boundaries of the*

law of nature, which ought to be the measure of virtue and vice, are pretty well preserved; the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute, whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, &c."—*Phil.* iv. 8.

"If any one shall imagine I have forgotten my own notion of a law, when I make the law whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing but the consent of private men, who have not authority enough to frame a law, especially wanting that which is so necessary and essential to a law, a power to enforce it; he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men, to suit their actions to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, seem little skilled in the nature or history of mankind; a great part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely by the law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the divine or civil laws. The penalties which attend the breach of God's laws, numbers of men seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many whilst they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. As to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of censure, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to; and he must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular club. Solitude many men have sought and been reconciled to, but no one who has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society upon such terms. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance, and he must be made of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and dislike from his companions."

“ These three then, first the law of God, secondly, the law of politic societies, thirdly, the law of fashion or private censure, are those to which men variously compare their actions; and it is by their conformity to one of these laws, that they take their measures, when they would judge of the moral rectitude of their actions, and denominate them good and bad. Thus, by what standard soever we frame in our minds, the ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice*, the supposed rectitude or obliquity of our deeds consists in their agreement or disagreement with those patterns, prescribed by some law, which law will impose suitable Rewards and Punishments.”

All communities of men, of course, frame the laws of their commonwealth, and adopt such peculiar private opinions of moral right and wrong, as are somewhat conformable with their belief, of what may be the law of God. The Mussulman and the Christian, for instance, entertain not a few very opposite notions respecting the intentions of their Creator; the one supposing he is commanded to live in charity with all men, the other that he recommends himself to divine favour, by extirpating the followers of Christ. The Mahommedan and the English laws too, will be found to differ as widely as the rules of morality that regulate private commendation and censure, amongst the individuals of the two nations.

Prejudice, Superstition.

Prejudices appear to us to be opinions not tenable by the laws of reason. Just opinions may have been either adopted from others, or derived from the proper exercise of our several faculties. Liberal minds sometimes fondly cherish the most ridiculous prejudices, but then they are tolerant towards those who do not at all concur with them in opinion; whereas bigots would fain confine the thoughts of all men within as narrow limits as they do their own. The attachments we bear to our

family, friends, country, place of residence, &c. do not, we think, come properly under the class Prejudices. The more attentively we observe nature in general, the more readily we part with our prejudices, and yet continue to cling as closely as ever to the objects of our domestic comforts, often perhaps more so. The preference we feel towards them, is principally, we suspect, the effect of habit, that inestimable friend, as well as formidable foe to human happiness.

It is a prejudice to suppose, that the sun moves round the world, that the Pope can grant indulgences, and innumerable opinions little less irrational.

By leaving the mind open to conviction, we may discover many advantages others, whether countrymen or foreigners, have over us, by their management of those resources, both nature and art have so bountifully supplied us with, and by introducing these if suitable, where we have influence enough to prevail, and being ever ready to communicate our knowledge of them when required to do so, we might not only remove many hurtful prejudices, but even greatly strengthen the domestic attachments, by causing a great augmentation of various sorts of comforts in families of the most moderate fortune.

“And when we divest ourselves of our Prejudices, we are in the way to acquire a solid judgment of things in general, we can see with our own eyes, and guide ourselves by our own reason, not being led blindfold about, or depending precariously on the conduct of others in matters of highest concern to us. We are also exempted from giddy credulity, from wavering levity, from fond admiration of persons and things, being able to distinguish things, to settle our judgments about them, and to get an intimate acquaintance with them, assuring to us their true nature and worth. We are likewise thereby rescued from over-weaning self-conceitedness.”—*Barrow*.

“The Prejudiced are apt to converse but with one sort of men, to read but one sort of books, to come in hearing but of one sort of notions; the truth is, they canton out to themselves a little Goshen in the intellectual world, where light shines, and as they conclude, day blesses them; but the rest of the vast expansum, they give up to night and darkness, and so avoid coming near it. They confine themselves to some little creek, not venturing out into the great ocean of knowledge, to survey the riches that nature has stored other parts with, no less genuine, no less solid, no less useful, than what is to be found within their own little spot.”

“To those who are willing to get rid of this great hindrance of knowledge, I shall offer this one mark, whereby prejudice may be known, He that is strongly attached to any opinion, must suppose that his persuasion is built upon good grounds, and that his *assent* is no greater, than what the evidence of the truth he holds forces him to. Now if what he holds be as he gives out, well fenced with evidence, why should he be shy to have it tried, whether it be proof or not. If he refuse to hear what is offered against it, he declares thereby, that it is not the attainment of *truth* that he desires, but the quiet enjoyment of the *opinion* he is fond of.”

Prejudice takes the name of Superstition, when it is in any way connected with the Deity, religion, angelic or infernal spirits, or deceased persons, and is commonly accompanied with a greater or less degree of awe.

The belief entertained of the suspension of Mahomet's coffin between heaven and hell, &c. and numberless religious ceremonies belonging to paganism, for instance, we call superstitions; and we call them so, because we believe them to be contrary to the spirit of the Divine government of the world.

Fanaticism.

The superstitious are apt to be, more or less, fanatical,

i. e. to dream of inspirations or revelations from some spirit, or from God himself.

Toleration, Bigotry.

The Tolerant, either from principle or indifference, do not commonly estimate men by their religious or political opinions. Too well aware of the fallibility of their own judgment, they feel little disposed to quarrel with others about modes of faith.

Whereas the Bigotted, not only most tenaciously adhere to their own opinions, however lightly adopted, but are apt to think very harshly of such as entertain any doctrines contrary to their own tenets. This often renders them unjust and merciless towards their fellow-creatures, and has given rise to the most cruel persecutions recorded in history.

Credulity, Scepticism.

The Credulous readily receive the testimony and opinions of others, without inquiring upon what authority they rest their assurances, and are thus liable to adopt numberless erroneous notions.

The Sceptick, on the other hand, is so ridiculous, as to refuse his assent to any degree of probability, though we have a knowledge of many things, and some of them the most essential to our well-being, fully as satisfactory as demonstration itself.

The rational believer takes the medium between these two absurd extremes, he examines the foundations of his several opinions, and rests satisfied with the various degrees of knowledge attainable by us, with our present very limited capacities.

“ The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of life, he would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but

what has the certainty of *true* knowledge. He who will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he who will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed; will do little else than sit still and perish."

"Therefore, as God has set some things in broad day-light, as he has given us some certain knowledge, though comparatively limited, and possibly as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of, in order to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state; so in the greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only twilight, as I may say, or Probability, but suitable, I presume, to that state of probation he has been pleased to place us in here."

CHAPTER IX.

Volition, Desire, Wish.—Liberty.—Willing, Unwilling.—Free Agency.—Fatality.—Insurmountable and Arbitrary Necessity.—Desire of Ease.—Desire of Ease the principal motive to action.—Substance.—Matter, Spirit.—Real Existence.—The existence of a God.—Piety.

Volition, Desire, Wish.

WE return to this subject, in order to examine it with the attention it well deserves, and must crave the reader's pardon for the repetition of a few words.

Volition, as we said before, seems to be an affection of the soul or mind, *consequent* upon understanding and sensibility. Having understanding to discern the differences between things, and sensibility to render us susceptible of pleasure and pain, and love and hatred, we must necessarily have volition to prefer the one to the other, and to seek the one rather than the other, or remain mere machines to be operated upon, without being moved to operate upon any thing whatsoever.

The consideration of man as a free-agent, will lead us to attempt proving, that volition, will, desire, and wish, are one and the same affection of the mind, and that we are absolutely determined to all our voluntary actions by the predominant desire of the moment.

We say, we will, or desire, or wish, to move or remain at rest, &c. but the consciousness of human weakness, seems to have led men, very judiciously, to appropriate desire and

wish more particularly to express the *will* to do if we *could*; supposing, however, our power unlimited, these words might, with perfect propriety, be used synonymously with the more imperative term, Will.

Liberty.

The optional power the mind has to cause or prevent action (either thinking or motion) in the man, suggests to us the idea of Liberty; so far, therefore, as we have the undisputed command of our several faculties, so far we consider ourselves free. Without liberty, volition were but a vain endowment, a cruel mockery.

Willing, Unwilling.

The expression, "acting Unwillingly," seems to denote the acting contrary to the Will, (the opposite to volition) but a careful examination of the manner in which this expression is commonly applied, will serve perhaps, to prove to us more forcibly than any other, how invariably the *will* determines the man to action.

One man may, by various means, make another suffer bodily pain, and also deprive him of his liberty, but cannot by the application of any degree of force whatsoever, absolutely compel him to action. He, therefore, that would move us to make use of our operative faculties, must, if he would urge us to comply with his wishes, endeavour to excite in us a desire to obtain some good in his power to grant us, or to avoid some evil, equally at his option to inflict upon us. Consequently, when we say a man acts Unwillingly, or by compulsion, we speak of him as being under the influence of *fear*, under the fear of losing some advantage he covets, or wishes to retain; or of suffering some pain or loss he dreads, and determines if possible to ward off. Should he, however, prove indifferent to the deprivation of any good, or to the endurance

of any evil, he may be more or less easily deprived of his liberty or of his life; but no human contrivance could possibly succeed in making him use his operative faculties; that is a power which rests only with Him who created man a free agent and a responsible being.

We are said willingly to eat, study, travel, labour, &c. when we do so from choice, without being under any immediate apprehension of the consequence of omission. Fear makes us sometimes act spontaneously or willingly, when we wish, for instance, to escape from a pressing danger; but if we be driven to a choice of evils, we hesitate until we can determine which appears to us the most to be apprehended, or which we should most desire to avoid, *e. g.* the amputation of a limb or death may be the alternatives, in which case we are said unwillingly to submit to amputation, though the fact is, we most earnestly desire or will it, in order to escape a speedy death. Most certainly we do not willingly lose our limb, but we are yet more reluctant to part with life. Thus we suppose *Will* and *Desire* to be one and the same affection of the mind.

Mr. Locke entertained a contrary opinion, but *if* he be in an error, he was led into it by losing sight of what had most particularly attracted his observation, "That man is in this world distracted by various desires, and seeks to gratify the most pressing of those judged at the time attainable." Yet he says, "Will and Desire must not be confounded; he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind, when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly shews, that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire, which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny may

oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish not to prevail on him. In this place it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man, who by a violent fit of gout in his limbs, finds a dizziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain there is desire to be rid of it), though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove the pain; *wherefore it is evident, that Desiring and Willing are two distinct acts of the mind.*"

But we will here closely examine the probable workings of the human mind under such and similar circumstances. A. desires B. to solicit a pension for him; B. must have a motive to comply with his request, either the wish to oblige or the desire of a pecuniary reward, &c. If the money be promised for merely making the application, it is very possible B. may not be desirous of prevailing, but should success be made the condition of its being paid, he *will* then desire to ask as earnestly as if the pension were for himself. And is it not by bribery many a man is brought to do a foul deed, he would not otherwise stain his hands with?

" 1st Villain. How aost thou feel thyself now?

2d Vil. Some certain dregs of conscience are yet within me.

1st Vil. Remember the reward when the deed's done.

2d Vil. Come, he dies—I had forgot the reward.

1st Vil. Where's thy conscience now?

2d Vil. O, in the Duke of Gloucester's purse.

1st Vil. When he opens his purse to give us our reward thy conscience flies out."

The gouty man most assuredly desires ease, but, if he desire life yet more, he will and desires to reject any remedy proposed, that he suspects may eventually endanger his existence;

but, should he desire ease at all risks, he will in that case eagerly demand relief.

Again, A. is promised a pardon on condition that he betray his accomplice; and he may thus be induced unwillingly to speak, *i. e.* provided his paramount desire be to save his own life, the fear of being executed it is that will cause him to speak. But should he be afterwards reproached for betraying his friend, we shall then find him perhaps becoming his own executioner, very unwillingly it is certain, but still he will destroy himself, if the fear of living to be the scorn and outcast of his former associates prove stronger than his love of life. He prefers death to dragging on what *he considers* a miserable existence deprived of their countenance and support. Such inconsistency of conduct is not without example, and we think can be fully accounted for as above; but the generality of men would, under such circumstances, still more desire life or dread death than apprehend any uneasiness they might suffer from exile, or the general desertion of their comrades.

Thus we find that acting *unwillingly* means in fact only that we act under the impression of *fear*, not that we do not act according to our desire, for most certainly we desire to act as we do in all such cases, from the fear of suffering a greater evil, by not submitting to what we consider, *at the moment*, a lesser. Do we pay a visit unwillingly, we fear to give offence; do we study unwillingly, we fear either punishment of some sort, or a state of ignorance; do we perform any of our moral obligations unwillingly, we stand in awe of Divine displeasure or human authority. When we act unwillingly, therefore, we act with hesitation from there being a choice to make; but when we act willingly, we act, on the contrary, spontaneously, and often indeed inconsiderately. Will and desire we therefore conclude to be absolutely synonymous terms.

The thing that most excites our sensibility at the moment

would in fact determine every act of our life, but for our reason, which can alone keep a proper check upon our desires. If honestly consulted, it tells us which of them we may safely or advantageously gratify, and to what degree, and which we ought altogether to subdue; it suggests to us also the probable means of doing it, likewise the seasons to be active, and when to suspend our operations, lest we fail of our object by too great precipitancy or delay. But our reason even cannot prevail with us but by exciting our desires, since if it fail to make us more earnestly desire to obtain the good we have in view, or to avoid the evil it warns us of, than to desire to pursue our present object, we persevere in spite of its admonitions, and thus it happens that our *opinions* and *practice* are so often at variance; all men, for instance, desire health, but how many are there who yet more desire to indulge propensities in some way prejudicial to it, and so turn a deaf ear to the loudest predictions of our noblest faculty.

“ Great strife in my divided breast I find,
A will consenting, yet unwilling mind.”

Our reason invites us to do what is good for us, our desires prompt us to gratify the present inclination.

The struggles in the mind between virtue and vice are no other, in fact, than the struggles for empire between *reason* or *conscience* and *desire*. If reason or conscience sanction the indulgence of our desires there is no hesitation, but when they urge us to resist our inclinations, the less reason or conscience have been accustomed to yield, the greater the resistance they will make, and thus it happens that persons, the least practised in vice, entertain the most scruples upon every proposed deviation from right; but whether a man be reasonable or unreasonable, virtuous or vicious, *his paramount desire of the moment* (it appears to us) *invariably determines him to action*.

Even animals, if they cannot be allured to desire some-

thing we offer to them, or be made to fear some pain we threaten them with, defy our utmost power to compel them to act; and thus one man, it is said, can lead a horse to water (not, however, contrary to his will), but twenty cannot make him drink.

By making the actions of the creature to depend entirely upon the mind, a merciful Providence seems to have given man an unquestionable intimation that he is destined to rule not by force, but by kindness, since kindness strengthens as much as harshness weakens the power he has communicated to him over all the animal creation. Kindness engages the whole creature, mind and body, in our service, whereas harshness often causes it to avoid or escape, when possible, from our presence, or to give us a sensible proof of its resentment.

Free-agency.

From the consideration of the power man has to think or not to think with perseverance upon any particular subject, to move or not to move any part of the body, is derived the idea we have of free-agency, which concerns man's responsibility to God, and man with relation to his Creator we call a free-agent. All animals have liberty and instinct—man, free-agency and reason.

Fatality.

The irrevocable decrees of heaven, with respect to man's destiny is termed Fatality; it is opposed to free-agency, and expresses its non-existence, for example,—man, if he live, is fated to grow old, and finally to die.


Insurmountable and Arbitrary Necessity.

Necessity is opposed to liberty, and denotes the absence of it. But there are two distinct kinds of necessity, the one insurmountable, the other arbitrary. The interference is equally imperious in both cases for the time being, but the insurmountable necessity is sometimes synonymous with fatality, whereas the arbitrary, as the word implies, we find to be often of very uncertain operation. A man, for example, if he would long continue his existence, must absolutely and of necessity nourish his body, and sleep, such is the law of nature; but he may be placed under the force of necessity by human agency, and thus be made either conditionally or unconditionally to suffer inconvenience, pain, or death. This sort of necessity however may be of longer or shorter duration, because it depends upon the will and pleasure of a mortal, ever prone to change his purposes, and liable to innumerable accidents, *e.g.* he whom his ruler dooms to perpetual imprisonment may, by the lenity, or caprice, or removal, or by the death of that ruler, find himself released from it, which proves the duration of this sort of necessity to be truly arbitrary.

Man can place almost every kind of animal under the force of necessity; he can place it, for instance, under the necessity of remaining in confinement; he can likewise approach or separate certain physical bodies, and thus infinitely check or vary many of their operations, but their operations being determined by fixed laws, they must of necessity produce certain effects.

Voluntary, Involuntary.

In those cases, in which the exercise both of the mental and corporeal powers are sometimes optional, sometimes independent of the will, we use the terms Voluntary and Involuntary. Every act done according to the determination of the will is said to be voluntary; all acts that are independent of



the will, involuntary; such, for instance, as yawning, winking of the eyes, and many other movements of the body as well as thoughts of the mind.

Man cannot be responsible for his involuntary acts, he having no free-agency therein, but for all those that are voluntary he must apprehend himself accountable to his Maker.

Compulsion, Restraint.

When the beginning or continuation of any action is required contrary to the will, it is called Compulsion; and the preventing or checking any action, Restraint: and these are the two principal modifications of necessity, both insurmountable and arbitrary. Nature compels and restrains us upon many occasions. Man can easily restrain; but, as we have before said, though he can compel all animals to remain in confinement, or to suffer pain or death, yet he cannot compel them to act, unless he succeed in exciting their fears of his power, to make them suffer for their resistance.

So far as we have an option, so far we are at liberty, as we said before; but where no option is left us, there we are immediately under the force of necessity; but sometimes we are placed only under the necessity of making a choice; we are compelled, for instance, finally to die, but we have the option of hastening our death or not: in like manner a man may inhabit a country or not, but, by inhabiting it, he will be compelled to submit to its laws, or be restrained from repeatedly violating them. Thus when we speak of civil and religious liberty, we mean the degree of liberty allowed to man by the civil and ecclesiastical laws, which, in different countries and in different periods, impose a greater or less degree of compulsion and restraint upon the subject; but we shall find that human power is, *without an exception*, as a vain shadow, when it would compel that man to act who braves torture and death.

To Act Mechanically.

To act mechanically is to act without being *conscious* of the direction or concurrence of the will, though doubtless the will consents as the same person who inattentively does, or agrees to do a thing of little or no importance, would doubtless immediately have his attention roused by the demand of a large sum of money, or his daughter in marriage, &c. But sometimes the mind is so forcibly engaged by a book, or an interesting subject of contemplation, as to allow the body to suffer considerable distress for want of a timely change of posture. There are probably few persons who have not experienced the truth of both these observations.

Desire of Ease, or Relief from Present Pain.

All men desire ease, not only in proportion to their sufferings, but also according to their character and present state of mind and body; for some persons are at all times much more impatient under pain than others; and the same persons more or less so at different times. This impatience often causes them to desire immediate relief, even at the very probable risk of incurring yet greater evils; and thus it happens likewise that a man often will not deny himself a pleasure he covets, or submit to continue an effort which is irksome to him, though it be to purchase considerable future advantages. The desire of pleasure is the desire of experiencing a lively enjoyment of some sort; the desire of ease, the desire of relief from pain. The man who desires pleasure may be equally satisfied with the amusement of reading, as of listening to music, &c. but he who suffers is not to be soothed but by the positive alleviation of the pain that at the moment distresses him. The desire of ease, as it is the most universal and frequent feeling we have, so is it

that which most forcibly demands the regulation of our reason, since the desire of ease might induce us to take a medicine eventually fatal to us, to relinquish an employment which would obtain us independence, to seek a pleasure destructive to our future health and peace, &c.

The consideration of this subject seems therefore particularly connected with education and government, because it is not in our nature, seemingly, long quietly to support that state of uneasiness we believe practicable to avoid; consequently, whatever laws or discipline are calculated continually, or even frequently, to irritate the human mind must necessarily be very contrary to a willing, steady, and cheerful obedience.

The following distinction, we imagine, may be made between the desire of Ease and the desire of Happiness; that the one induces us to regulate our actions by our *feelings*, the other by our *reason*. Mr. Locke has treated this subject with his wonted sagacity and perspicuity.

Desire of Ease the principal Motive to Action.

Upon considering the general conduct of human life we shall find, "That we are far more frequently and more powerfully stimulated to action by actual suffering or the apprehension of pain, than by the allurements of pleasure; whence it is, that though the motive for continuing in the same state of action is commonly the present satisfaction in it, yet the motive to change most commonly arises from Uneasiness."

"All men desire happiness. Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not—it is what, "eye hath not seen, ear not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions, made by several instances of delight and joy, on the one side, and of torment and sorrow on the other; and which, for brevity's sake, we shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain;

there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as of the body: "with him is fulness of joy and pleasure evermore;" or, to speak correctly, they are all of the mind, though some have their rise in the mind from thought, others in the body from sensation."

"Happiness then, in its fullest extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain as is necessary to content. Now because pleasure and pain are, in different degrees, concomitant with our perception of the various objects by which we are surrounded, whatever object has an aptness to produce pleasure in us, is that we call Good, and whatever is apt to produce pain, we call Evil, for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and misery. It is moreover to be observed, that though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure be in itself good, and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil, yet it often happens that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because, when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. So that, if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison; for the cause of every diminution of pain, as well as every increase of pleasure has the nature of good, and *vice versa*."

"Good and evil, absent as well as present, work upon the mind; but that which immediately determines us, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good, either negative, as repose to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness that induces the successive voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall endeavour to shew, both from experience and the reason of the thing."

“ Though happiness be the universal aim, yet the pursuit of it is as various as the constitution, habits, and age, of the persons seeking it, and thus each man being moved by his prevalent desires, his faculties will be directed to the attainment of those things only, he considers at that time to make a necessary part of his individual happiness. All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's desires who looks not on it, to form a part of that happiness where-with he in his present thought can satisfy himself. Happiness under this view every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it ; other things acknowledged to be good he can look upon without desire, pass by, and be content without. There is no one perhaps so senseless as to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge, and for the pleasures of sense they have too many followers to let it be questioned, whether men are taken with them or no. Now let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasure, another in the delight of knowledge, though each of them cannot but confess there is great pleasure in what the other pursues, yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not excited, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys, and so he is not determined to the pursuit of it. But as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst make him uneasy, he whose desire was never moved by any allurements of good cheer, delicious wines, &c. is, by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome food comes in his way; and, on the other side, the epicure buckles to study when shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress, shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of knowledge.”

“ Let a drunkard find that his health decays, his estate wastes, discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attend him in the course he follows, still

the returns of uneasiness at missing his companions and the habitual thirst after his cups, drives him at the usual time to the tavern, though he at the same time admits, that the pleasures of health and plenty are far preferable to the tickling of his palate with a glass of wine, or the idle chat of a soaking club. His perseverance in vice is not for want of considering the greater good, which, in the intervals of his drinking hours, he will make resolutions to pursue; but, on the return of his uneasiness, at the want of his accustomed delight, the greater acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness determines him to the wonted action, and thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion."

"How many are to be found who, though they have had lively representations made to them of the unspeakable joys of heaven, and of which they acknowledge it not only possible, but even probable, that the virtuous will partake, yet still allow the prevailing uneasinesses of their desires, let loose, after the enjoyments of this life, to take their turns in diverting them from the attainment of eternal happiness. If therefore the greater good in view the most powerfully excited our desires, this infinitely greatest good once proposed, could not but seize the mind, and hold it steady to the contemplation of it."

"Now though even the everlasting incomprehensible good itself cannot stedfastly hold the mind, yet any very great and prevailing uneasiness having once seized it, lets it not go, whence we may be convinced what it is, that determines us to action. Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love, or the impatient emotion of revenge, keeps the mind intent, and any desire thus strongly excited never allows the understanding to lay by the object, but directs all the thoughts of the mind and the powers of the body, uninterruptedly, to the removal of the prevailing uneasiness; and whether this be not so every one may observe in himself."

“ It is evident then, that the greater visible good does not always raise men’s desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged to have; and were it otherwise, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable, there being infinite degrees of happiness not attainable by us. All uneasiness being removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present to content men, and some few degrees of pleasure in a succession of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness wherewith they can be tolerably satisfied. If this were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions to which we are so often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives, which remissness could by no means consist with a constant desire of the greatest apparent good. The ordinary necessities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneasinesses of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weariness, with labour and sleepiness, &c. all in their constant returns. To which if, besides accidental harms, we add those fantastical ones after honour, power, riches, &c. that habits acquired by fashion, example, and education, have settled in us, we shall find that a very small part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good; for no sooner is one action despatched, which by the determination of our desire we were bent upon, than another uneasiness is ready at hand to set us again on work. Few people need go far from home to be convinced of this truth.”

“ But there being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting, and ready to determine us to action, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should prevail, and so it does for the most part, but not always: for the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the satisfaction of any of its desires, it is free to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the free-agency man has,

and from the not making a proper use of it, comes all the variety of mistakes, errors, and faults so apparent in the course of his life. Upon the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, so that our understanding may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed, give its judgment, depends the right direction of our conduct to true happiness."

"As a man therefore may suspend the act of his choice till he has examined, whether it be likely to be attended with consequences calculated to promote his welfare, or to bring evil upon him, we may see how it comes to pass that he may justly incur punishment, though it be certain that, in the first instance, he desires, and must unavoidably desire, that which then occupies his mind; and though he be determined, even by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not, if he by a too hasty decision has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil. If he vitiate his palate, he must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follow from it. The eternal law and nature of things will not be altered to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If, by the neglect or abuse of the freedom he had to examine, what would really and truly make for his happiness, and with experience for his guide he is misled, the miscarriage must, and ought to be imputed to his own election. He had a power to suspend his determination; and this power was given him that he might examine and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not deceived; and he could never judge that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great concernment to himself."

"But to account more particularly for the misery that men often bring upon themselves, notwithstanding that they in earnest pursue happiness, we must consider how things come by our desires to be represented to us under deceitful appearances, and thus induce wrong judgments in us."

"Not only present pleasures and pains, but likewise the

consideration of the consequences they are likely to bring upon us at a distant day, are apt to move a creature that has foresight; therefore things as they draw after them pleasure or pain, are also considered as good and evil, *e. g.* a thing may excite a temporary pleasurable sensation, and yet bring death; or a painful one, yet preserve life, &c. The wrong judgment which misleads us, and makes us often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons made. The wrong judgment I am here speaking of, is not what one man may think of the determination of another, but what every man himself must confess to be wrong. Since I suppose it certain, that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of the most durable pleasures, with the least mixture of pain."

"Present pleasure and pain the mind can easily appreciate; for that which is the greatest pleasure, or the greater pain is really just as it is felt. But, though present pleasure and pain shew their differences and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake, yet, when we compare present pleasure or pain with future (which comparison is usually made previous to our most important determinations) we often make wrong judgments of them, by taking our measures of them as they appear to us at a distance. Objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote; and so it is with pleasures and pains, the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus, most men like spendthrift heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand, better than a great deal to come; and so for small matter in possession, part with great ones in reversion. But, that this is a wrong judgment every one must allow, let his pleasure consist in whatever it will: since that which is future will certainly come to be present if he live; and then, having the same advantage of nearness, will shew itself in its full dimensions, and convince him

of his mistake, who judged of it, by a wrong mode of measuring. Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied the very moment a man takes off his glass, with that sick stomach and aching head, which in some men are sure to follow not many hours after: no one, I think, whatever pleasure he had in his cups, would on these conditions let wine touch his lips; which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time."

"It seems to me to be owing to the weak and limited constitutions of our minds, that we cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, and scarcely any pleasure while pain possesses us; the present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, seems fully to occupy us, and scarce to leave us any thought of things not present: or, if among our pleasures, there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance, yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain, that a very little of it will often make us lose sight of absent good; a little bitter mingled in our cup leaves no relish of the sweet. Hence comes our readiness to make any sacrifice so we be rid of the present evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because under the present pain, we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness. Men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this; the pain that any one actually feels, is still of all others the worst; and it is with anguish he cries out, "Any rather than this, nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer." Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed or scarce equal the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us. The abstinence from a pleasure which immediately offers itself, may be a pain too, nay, oftentimes a very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; and thus it frequently forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces, by making us lose sight of the future."

"Add to this that absent good, or which is the same thing,

future pleasure, especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with, seldom is able to counterbalance any uneasiness that is present. For its greatness being no more than what shall be really felt when enjoyed, men are apt enough to depreciate it, in order to make it give place to the gratification of any present desire, and to conclude with themselves, that when it comes to trial, it may possibly not answer the report or opinion that generally passes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themselves have tasted of with great relish at one time, has proved insipid or nauseous at another, and therefore they see nothing in it for which they should forego a present enjoyment."

"Of things which are apt to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge amiss several ways. First, when we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them, as in truth there does. Secondly, when we judge, that though the consequences be of moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out, or else by some means be avoided, as by industry, address, change, repentance, &c. That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to shew in every particular, if I would examine them at large singly; but, I shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less, before a due examination be made, proportionate to the weightiness of the matter, and the importance it is to us not to mistake. This I think every one must confess, especially if he consider the usual causes of this wrong judgment, which are either ignorance or inadvertency."

"Ignorance—He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable of, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss."

"Inadvertency—When a man overlooks even that which he does know."

"This is commonly the effect of carelessness, which mis-

leads our judgment as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lie. If, then, either side be cast up in haste, and several of the sums which should have gone into the reckoning, be overlooked and left out; this precipitancy causes as wrong judgment as can arise from perfect ignorance. This is most commonly occasioned by the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain, heightened by our feeble passionate nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reason was given to us, and the use of it is, to search and see, and then to judge. Without free-agency the understanding would be to no purpose; and, without understanding free-agency, (if it could be) would signify nothing. If a man perceives what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miserable, without being able to move himself one step towards or from it, what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better than if he were driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind? Whether a man be moved by a blind impulse from without, or from within, is little odds. The first, therefore, and principal exercise of freedom, is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and deliberately take a view of the consequences of what we are going to do, so that we mistake not imaginary for true and solid Happiness; in the constant and careful pursuit of which lies the highest perfection of intellectual nature."

"But, whatever false notions and shameful neglect of what is in their power, may put men out of their way to happiness, and distract them, as we see, into so different courses of life; this yet is certain, that morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider: and he that will not be so far a rational creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and

misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of his laws, are of weight enough to determine the choice, against whatever pleasure or pain this life can shew, when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he do not conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which it is very possible may overtake the guilty, or at best the terrible, uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently so, though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure; which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession, nay, all things rightly considered, have, I think, the worst part here. But, when infinite happiness is put in one scale, against infinite misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistake, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would chuse to come within a possibility of infinite misery, which, if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation come to pass. If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistake, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistake, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment, that does not presently see to which side in this

case the preference is to be given? I have forborne to mention any thing of the certainty or probability of a future state, designing here only to shew the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes upon his own principles, laid down how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at least possible."

Substance or Substratum.

Such a strange variety of opinions prevail respecting the Deity, Real existence, and the nature both of Spirit and of Matter, that we are tempted in this place to present our reader with a very concise abridgment of Mr. Locke's confession of faith, (if we may so call it) upon these several points.

But, we must first endeavour to explain to those who may not have read his Essay, what he would express by the word Substance or Substratum; otherwise his meaning may not be intelligible to them. Mr. Locke was of opinion, that there is a substance or substratum (but whose essence is unknown to us) which is the very *essentia* or being of the several sorts of material bodies existing, and that it is the cause of the union of certain qualities in them. For instance, we cannot tell what makes the *essential*, though we can the *apparent* differences, between the substance of a man, of a diamond, of fire, of water, &c. We clearly perceive these are of different shapes, colours, densities, opaque, or transparent, &c. and also, that they have different powers inherent in them. But, is it possible to discover their essential differences, as we do those of all artificial things? Can we, for instance, distinguish the difference between the essence of a bird and of a fish, as we can between that of a candle and of a hat? The one being to afford shelter solely for the head, the other light to the eyes. Whatsoever therefore be the abstract nature of substance in gene-

ral, all the ideas we have of particular sorts of substances, are nothing more than several combinations of simple ideas co-existing in such or such a substratum, the cause of their union, and what makes the whole subsist of itself. For he has the most perfect idea of any of the particular sorts of substances, who is best acquainted with its qualities and powers."

It was also supposed by Mr. Locke, that there is a Spiritual substance which serves in like manner to unite certain intellectual powers, and consequently that thinking is the *action*, and not the *essence* of the soul.

Spirit, Matter.

"We have as clear a perception and notion of Immaterial as of Material substances, for putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of causing or quieting corporeal motion joined to substance, or a substratum, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an Immaterial Spirit; and, by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved joined with substance, of which likewise we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of Matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other; the idea of thinking and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas, as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved, for our idea of substance is equally obscure in both; it is in both cases, but a supposed substratum, which supports those ideas we called accidents. The want of reflexion it is, that makes us apt to think our senses shew us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the Corporeal and the Spiritual; for whilst I know by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me, that sees and hears.

This I must be convinced cannot be the action of base, insensible matter, nor ever could be."

"The ideas of existence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make *mobility* belong to spirit; for, to suppose it separated from the body in death, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, seems to me impossible."

"Motion cannot be attributed to God, not because he is an Immaterial, but because he is an Infinite Spirit."

Real Existence.

I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being: he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince non-entity that it were something. If any one pretend to be so sceptical as to deny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger, or some other pain convince him of the contrary."

"If any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm, that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream; and therefore will question all things, or our knowledge of any thing, I must desire him to consider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter, that a waking man should answer him; however, if he please, he may dream that I make him this answer, that the certainty of things existing *in rerum naturâ*, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can at-

tain to, but as our condition needs, and no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And, if our dreamer likes to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, he may by putting his hand into it, perhaps be awakened into a greater certainty than he could wish. He most assuredly never could be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too, but this pain he cannot, when the burn is well, bring upon himself again by the mere force of imagination. So that this evidence is as strong as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, *i. e.* happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment either of knowing or being."

" Oh ! who can hold a fire in his hand,
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus ?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite,
By bare imagination of a feast ?
Or wallow naked in December's snow,
By thinking on fantastic Summer's heat ?"

Existence of a God.

" If any one should be found so senseless and presumptuous as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, yet the product of mere ignorance and chance, and that the rest of the universe was created by blind hap-hazard ; I shall leave with him this very rational and emphatical rebuke of *Tully*, i. 11, *de Leg.* to be considered at his leisure." " What can be more arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think, that he has a mind and understanding in him, and yet in all the universe beside, that there is no such thing ? Or that those things which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all ?"

“It is overvaluing ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities, and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. It is making our comprehension infinite, or God finite, when we limit what he can do, to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the operations of the eternal, infinite Being, who made and governs all things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.”—*Locke*.

Piety.

“It is we see common in nature for all animals to be readily acquainted with their parents, to run after them, to expect from them supply of wants, succour in straits, refuge and defence in dangers, insomuch, that we may easily discern to what parent any creature belongs; and since there appears the like instinct and capacity innate in man, and indeed, of all earthly creatures, in him alone, to entertain nearly similar feelings towards God; some philosophers have thought good from this property to define him, “A creature capable of religion,” capable to bear in his mind, I say, awe and respect of his Maker; to supplicate him in all his straits, (and most when other helps and hopes fail him) to lift up his heart and voice toward Heaven for assistance; why then, may we not hence infer, that man is in special manner the offspring of God?”

“The very power of framing conceptions, although vastly imperfect and inadequate concerning God, is in itself a faculty, so very spiritual and sublime, that it argues something divine in man’s soul. *That like is known by its like*, was an axiom amongst ancient philosophers; and *that spiritual things are spiritually discerned*, is a rule of a better master in wisdom than they; and beasts surely, because not endued with reason,

have no conceptions concerning man's nature, and the matters proper to him (according to what rules, by what methods, to what purpose, he doth act), so in likelihood, we should not be able to apprehend and discourse about things appertaining to God, his nature, the methods and reasons of his proceedings, the notions of eternal truth, the indispensable laws of right, the natural differences of good and evil, with such like high objects of thought, except our souls had in them some sparks of divine understanding; some cognation with, and communication from Heaven."

"The wisest and most considerate men in several times, only by reflecting upon their own minds, and observing in them what was most lovely and excellent, most pure and strait, have fallen upon and conspired in notions concerning God, very suitable to those which we believe taught us by revelation, although contrary to the general prejudices of their education, and to popular conceits: many admirable passages to this purpose we may find dropt from the mouth of Socrates, and the pen of Plato, in Cicero, in Epictetus, yea, in the least credulous or fanciful of men, Aristotle himself. Whence plainly enough we may collect, how legible characters of the divinity are written upon our souls; how easily we may know God, if we be not ignorant of ourselves; that we need not go far to fetch arguments to prove that God *is*, nor to find lessons to learn *what* he is; since we always carry both about us, or rather within us; since our souls could indeed come from no other than such a Being. Let men suppose themselves a mere corporeal machine, and thus vilify and disparage their nature as they please, yet those noble perfections of our soul speak its extraction from a higher stock, it plainly discovers its original to be from a cause itself understanding and knowing freely, resenting things (if I may so speak) and moving of itself, but in an infinitely more excellent manner and degree."

“ Piety tieth all relations more fastly and strongly, assureth and augmenteth all endearments, enforceth and establisheth all obligations by the firm bands of conscience, set aside which, no engagement can hold sure against temptations of interest or pleasure. Piety removeth oppression, violence, faction, disorders, and murmurings, out of the State : schisms and scandals, out of the Church ; pride and haughtiness, sloth and luxury, detraction and sycophancy, out of the Court ; corruption and partiality, out of Judicature ; clamours and tumults, out of the Streets ; brawlings, grudges, and jealousies, out of Families ; extortion and cozenage, out of Trades ; strifes, emulations, slanderous backbitings, bitter and foul language, out of Conversation ; in all places, in all societies, it produceth, it advanceth, it establisheth, order, peace, safety, prosperity, all that is good, all that is lovely or handsome, all that is convenient or pleasant, for human society and common life. It is that which *exalteth a nation, and establisheth a throne*, saith the great politician Solomon, and when *the Righteous are in authority, the people rejoice.*”—Barrow.

Devotion.

“ All persons who would not lead a loose and flattering life, but design with good assurance and advantage, to prosecute an orderly course of action, are wont to distribute their time into several parcels ; assigning some part thereof to the necessary refection of their bodies, some to the convenient relaxation of their minds, some to the dispatch of their ordinary affairs, some also to familiar conversation, and interchanging good offices with their friends ; considering that otherwise they shall be uncertain and *unstable in all their ways*. And in this distribution of time, Devotion surely should not lack its share ! it rather justly claimeth the choicest portion to be allotted thereto ; as being incomparably the noblest part of our duty, and mainest concernment of our lives. Every day

we do recover and receive a new life from God; every morning we do commence business, or revive it; from our bed of rest and security we then issue forth, exposing ourselves to the cares and toils, to the dangers, troubles, and temptations of the world: then especially, therefore, it is reasonable, that we should sacrifice thanks to the gracious Preserver of our life, and the Restorer of its supports and comforts; that we should crave his direction and help in the pursuit of our honest undertakings; that to his protection from sin and mischief we should recommend ourselves and our affairs; that by offering up to him the first-fruits of our diurnal labours, we should consecrate and consign them all to his blessing; then as we are wont to salute all the world, so then chiefly with humble obeisance we should accost Him, who is ever present with us, and continually watchful over us. Then also peculiarly devotion is most seasonable, because then our minds being less prepossessed and pestered with other cares, our fancies being lively and gay, our memories fresh and prompt, our spirits copious and brisk, we are better disposed for it."

"Every night also reason calleth for these duties, requiring that we should close our business, and wind up all our cares in devotion; that we should then bless God for his gracious preservation of us, from the hazards and the sins to which we stood obnoxious; that we should implore his mercy for the manifold neglects and transgressions of our duty, which through the day past we have incurred; that our minds being then so tired with study and care, our spirits so wasted with labour and toil, that we cannot any longer sustain ourselves, but do, of our own accord, sink down in a posture of death; we should, as dying men, resign our soul into God's hand, depositing ourselves and our concerns into his custody, *who alone doth never sleep nor slumber*, praying that he would guard us from all the dangers and disturbances incident to us in that state of forgetfulness, and *interregnum* of our reason,

that he would grant us a happy resurrection in safety and health, with a good and cheerful mind, enabling us thereafter comfortably to enjoy ourselves, and delightfully to serve him."

"At the middle distance between those two extremes we ought also to interpose somewhat of devotion. For as then, usually our spirits being, somewhat shattered and spent, do need a recruit, enabling us to pass through the residue of the day with its incumbent business: so then it would do well, and may be requisite, in a meal of devotion, to refresh our souls with spiritual sustenance, drawn from the never-failing storehouse of Divine grace, which may so fortify us, that with due vigour and alacrity, we may perform the ensuing duties to God's honour, and our own comfort."

"These are times which it is necessary, or very expedient, that all men even persons of highest rank and greatest employment should observe. These even of old were the practices of religious persons, not expressly prescribed by God's law, but assumed by themselves; good reason suggesting them to the first practisers, and the consenting example of pious men afterwards enforcing them."

"When we have received any singular blessing or notable favours from God, when prosperous success hath attended our honest enterprizes, when we have been happily rescued from imminent dangers, when we have been supported in difficulties, or relieved in wants and straits; then is it seasonable to render sacrifices of thanksgiving and praise to the God of victory, help, and mercy, to admire and celebrate Him, who is our *strength and our deliverer*, our *faithful refuge in trouble*, our fortress, and *the rock of our salvation*. To omit this piece of devotion then, is vile ingratitude, or stupid negligence and sloth."

"When any rare object, or remarkable occurrence, doth upon this theatre of the world present itself to our view; in surveying the glorious works of nature, or the strange events

of Providence, then is a proper occasion suggested, to send up hymns of praise to the power, the wisdom, the goodness, of the world's great Creator and Governor."

"When we undertake any business of special moment and difficulty; then it is expedient (wisdom prompting it) to sue for God's aid, to commit our affairs into his hand, to recommend our endeavours to the blessing of Him, by whose guidance all things are ordered, without whose concurrence nothing can be effected, upon whose disposal all success dependeth."

"When we fall into doubts or darkneses (in the course either of our spiritual or secular affairs) not knowing what course to steer, or which way to turn ourselves; (a case which to so blind and silly creatures as we are, must often happen) then doth the time bid us to consult the great Oracle of truth, *the mighty Counsellor, the Father of lights*, seeking resolution and satisfaction, intelligence and wisdom from him."

"When any storm of danger blustereth about us, perilously threatening, or furiously assailing us with mischief, (so that hardly by our own strength or wit we can hope to evade it) then with the wings of ardent devotion we should fly unto God for shelter and for relief."

"When we do lie under any irksome trouble, or sore distress, (of want, pain, disgrace) then for succour and support, for ease and comfort, we should have recourse *to the Father of pities, and to the God of all consolation.*"

"When any strong temptation doth invade us, with which by our own strength we cannot grapple, but are like to sink and falter under it; then is it opportune and needful, that we should apply to God for a supply of spiritual forces, and the succour of his Almighty grace."

"When also (from ignorance, or mistake, from inadvertency, negligence, or rashness, from weakness, from wantonness, from presumption) we have transgressed our duty, and incurred sinful guilt; then, (for avoiding consequent danger

and vengeance, for unloading our consciences of the burden and discomfort thereof) with humble confession in our mouths, and serious contrition in our hearts, we should apply ourselves to the God of mercy, deprecating his wrath, and imploring pardon from him, remembering that, *He that covereth his sins shall not prosper : but he that confesseth and forsaketh them shall have mercy.*"

" And though we cannot ever be framing or venting long prayers with our lips, yet as bodily respiration, without intermission or impediment, doth concur with all our actions ; so may that breathing of soul, which preserveth our spiritual life, and ventilateth that holy flame within us, well conspire with all other occupations. For Devotion is of a nature so spiritual, so subtle and penetrant, that no matter can exclude or obstruct it. We can never be so fully possessed by any employment, but that divers vacuities of time do intercur, wherein our thoughts and affections will be diverted to other matters. As a covetous man, whatever beside he is doing, will be carking about his bags and treasures ; an ambitious man devising about his plots and projects ; a voluptuous man have his mind in his dishes ; a studious man musing on his notions ; so every man, according to his particular inclination, will lard his business, and besprinkle all his actions with cares and wishes, tending to the enjoyment of what he most esteemeth and affecteth ; in like manner then, a good christian may, through all his undertakings, wind in devout reflections and pious motions of soul, toward the chief object of his mind and affection. Most businesses have wide gaps, all have some chinks, at which devotion may slip in. Be we never so urgently set, or closely intent upon any work, (be we feeding, be we travelling, be we trading, be we studying,) nothing yet can forbid, but that we may together wedge in a thought concerning God's goodness, but that we may reflect on our sins, and spend a penitential sigh on them. As worldly cares and desires do often intrude

and creep into our devotions, distracting and defiling them; so may spiritual thoughts and holy affections insinuate themselves into, and hallow our secular transactions."—*Barrow*.

Innocent, Culpable, Guilty.

Men are innocent or guilty in innumerable ways and degrees, and innocent in one or more respects, while guilty in others, either in their thoughts or actions.

Virtuous, Good, Worthy, Blameless, Vicious, Bad, Worthless, Blameable.

And are thus accounted upon the whole, more or less, virtuous or vicious, &c.

Incorrigible, Reprobate.

Some vicious persons are incorrigible, reprobates, having no desire, or at *least*, resolution to reform their lives.

Correct, Incorrect.

We are disposed to be more or less correct, or incorrect, in all our proceedings, *i. e.* to act either with more or less uprightness or propriety.

Honesty, Uprightness, Probity, Integrity, Sincerity.

Those only can pretend to honesty, probity, &c. who in every way act conscientiously towards all men.

Just, Unjust.

The just give to every man what *they believe* to be strictly his due.

Frank, Ingenuous, Candid, Artless, Disingenuous, Artful, Deceitful.

We are, by nature or principle, more or less disposed to be ingenuous, candid, &c. or otherwise.

Magnanimity, Heroism.

A single act of magnanimity or heroism, marks only that the mind is for the moment under the influence of some very strong desire, which may determine and enable a man to undertake the most hazardous enterprizes, to encounter the most appalling dangers, or to suffer the most agonizing pain with undaunted courage; but experience proves, that many are capable of making a wonderful effort at times, who are, however, often greatly deficient in steadiness of virtue.

True Greatness of Mind.

True greatness of mind implies *habitual* self-command, the hardest task human nature can accomplish. The union of powerful mental faculties, with true greatness of mind, constitutes the perfection of man; whereas, whoever possesses distinguished talents, and yet is much wanting in self-control, least merits admiration, since with superior powers, he is unable to conquer himself, though perhaps, with the assistance of the multitude, he may have subjected nations to his dominion.

Generous, Ungenerous.

The generous are inclined to favour, protect, and defend others in their need; the ungenerous to desert, and sometimes even to attack them. The generous are also commonly disposed to interpret men's words and actions favourably; the ungenerous, the contrary.

Liberal, Illiberal.

A Liberal mind has a generous turn of thinking upon most subjects; it may be fettered by narrow prejudices, but is incapable of any mean or base intention. The Illiberal are apt to impute unworthy motives to others, or to act unhand-somely towards them.

Honourable, Dishonourable.

The honourable are disposed to act not only with integrity, but with a certain degree of liberality towards all men; being in any doubtful cases, determined to sacrifice rather more than can reasonably be required of them, lest they fall short of it, such is "the soul of Honour."

Fidelity.

The faithful are strictly true to the trust reposed in them.

Tale-bearer, Tell-tale.

Some persons are more or less disposed to communicate to others what they hear said, or see done, with the intent of causing some mischief or annoyance between men, or from a bad habit.

Lying.

Lying is the subterfuge of one under the operation of fear, or aiming to do mischief, or wishing to impose upon, or to amuse his companions in some idle way or other.

To Equivocate, Prevaricate.

To equivocate or prevaricate, marks a mind not having courage either to acknowledge the truth, or to utter a falsehood.

Perjury.

Some men take a false oath for a more or less wicked purpose, others to ward off punishment, &c.

To Invite, Tempt.

We invite or tempt others to partake of, or to do something we think likely to cause them pleasure, and this either with a good or bad intention, or inconsiderately.

*To Seduce, Delude, Entice, Allure, Decoy, Entrap, Enveigle,
Ensnare.*

Men seduce, delude, &c. others with a more or less treacherous design.

“ Oh ! what may man within him hide,
Though angel on the outward side.”

To Conspire, to Plot.

Others herd together for purposes of mischief.

To Sham, Counterfeit.

Some sham or counterfeit appearances that may answer some sinister end.

Spy, Informer.

In order to be a spy or informer, perhaps, for the purpose of entrapping and betraying men, such may most truly be called the devil's imps.

To Bribe, Corrupt.

Many are disposed to bribe that they may the more easily accomplish their own wishes, by obtaining the agency of others ; or they corrupt men by their bad counsel or example, sometimes purposely, sometimes idly.

To Suborn.

Suborning is the maximum of human obliquity.

To Swear, Blaspheme.

Numbers have an idle habit of swearing, some blaspheme from losing all fear of God.

To Cheat, to Defraud.

There are numbers continually on the watch, to defraud the unsuspecting and unguarded.

To Pilfer, Thieve, Rob.

There are infinite degrees of vice betrayed by men addicted to pilfering and thieving.

Breach of Faith, Treachery.

Men betray a trust reposed in them, either by appropriating some part of the property of others to their own use, or by acting in other ways unjustly towards those who are committed to their charge; such men are guilty of breach of faith, and treachery, and there are degrees of this crime, that are as black as any in the catalogue of human depravity. The treacherous often assume also the fairest appearances when they entertain the foulest intentions.

Cruelty.

Some men are heedlessly, and some intentionally cruel. There are infinite degrees of it, but the highest degree stamps a man with the character of a demon.

Murder, Assassination.

He who has a propensity to shed blood without provocation, or some proposed advantage to himself, is blood-thirsty, or rather a fit subject for the strait-waistcoat. Murderers have their several degrees of guilt.

But an Assassin must, without exception, be an object of horror and detestation to every one who has not lost all sense both of religion and honour.

CHAPTER X.

Of Speech.—Desire of Praise and Fear of Blame.

Of Speech.

THE extent of Speech must needs be vast, since it is nearly commensurate to thought itself, which it ever closely traceth, widely ranging through all the immense variety of objects; so that men almost as often speak incogitantly, as they think silently. Speech is indeed the rudder that steereth human affairs, the spring that setteth the wheels of action on going; the hands work, the feet walk, all the members, and all the senses, act by its direction and impulse; yea, most thoughts are begotten, and most affections stirred up thereby; it is itself most of our employment, and even what we do beside it, is guided and moved by it. It is the profession and trade of many, it is the practice of all men, to be in a manner continually talking. The chief and most considerable sort of men manage all their concernments merely by words; by them princes rule their subjects, generals command their armies, senators deliberate and debate about the great matters of state: by them advocates plead causes, and judges decide them; divines perform their offices, and ministers their instructions; merchants strike up their bargains, and drive on all their traffic. Whatever almost great or small is done in the court, or in the hall, in the church, or at the exchange, in the school, or in the shop, it is the tongue mostly that doeth it: it is the force of this little machine that turneth all the human world about. It

is indeed the use of this strange organ, which rendereth human life beyond the simple life of other creatures, so exceedingly various and compounded; which creates such a multiplicity of business, and which transacts it; by it we communicate our secret conceptions, transfusing them into others; therewith we instruct and advise one another: by its means we consult about what is to be done, contest about right, dispute about truth; the whole business of conversation, of commerce, of government, and administration of justice, of learning, and of religion, is managed thereby; yea, it stoppeth the gaps of time, and filleth up the wide intervals of business, our recreations and divertisements (the which do constitute a great portion of our life) mainly consisting therein; so that, in comparison thereof, the execution of what we determine, and all other action do take up small room; and even all that, usually dependeth upon foregoing speech, which persuadeth, or counsel-leth, or commandeth it. Thus Speech is almost universally concerned either immediately as the matter, or by consequence, as the source of our several actions.

Loquacity, Garrulity, Taciturnity.

Some persons are more or less disposed to loquacity, others to taciturnity.

The Desire of Praise and Fear of Blame.

The desire of Praise and Fear of Blame, seems to have been made part of our nature, in order that we might be subjected, as it were, to the control of all men, though placed far above the multitude either by birth, fortune, rank, talents, &c. The desire of reward and fear of punishment concerns our moral retribution both in this world and the next, and the necessary consequences of our actions in general, the desire of praise and fear of blame, the obtaining of applause, and the escaping

of censure from men. Praise and blame, however, are of themselves, as Mr. Locke observes, no weak instruments of reward and punishment.

“ He that filches from me my good name,
 Robs me of that, which not enriches him,
But makes me poor indeed.”

Without this excitement, therefore, we should be less uneasy under the sense of our imperfections; but the desire of praise and fear of blame, is most closely connected with our social affections, since it is not possible to covet the friendship of any one, without wishing to possess his esteem and regard; nor, consequently, without feeling some apprehensions of becoming the object of his contempt and dislike. And as we are commonly yet more desirous to escape uneasiness, than to obtain pleasure, so are we often satisfied without praise, provided we escape blame.

When the desire of praise makes us endeavour to deserve it, it has only its due influence upon our minds, but if we become eager to hear it frequently repeated, we may feel assured we are in a similar danger as a dram-drinker, who requires the intoxicating draught to be made stronger and stronger, until quite besotted, he is neither desirous nor able, to distinguish right from wrong.

Celebrity, Fame, Renown.

“ Being sensible of his mortal and transitory condition, man yet seeks to live for ever in his name and memory, labours to perform memorable actions, rears lasting monuments of his art and knowledge, of his wealth and power, of his bounty and munificence, by all means studying and striving to commend himself to the regard of posterity; thus affecting a sort of likeness unto God, even a kind of immortality and eternity.”—*Barrow.*

The desire of Fame often has its original jointly in the de-

sire of good and the desire of praise, but no less frequently solely in the desire of praise, for many who most covet celebrity, think least of the account they have to carry with them, into the region of eternal truth; whereas, those who are most anxious to discharge all their moral obligations, are seldom so apt to be elated with worldly applause. Praise however, when judiciously bestowed, tends to encourage every one in the pursuit of excellence, to foster our most kindly affections, and to invite us to continue the benefactors, as well as the agreeable companions of our fellow creatures; but otherwise, it serves only to render us selfish, to make us desire to fill the world with the echo of our name at any price, also to blind us to our own defects, whence the inordinate desire of praise has given birth to vices we term flattery, sycophancy, &c.

Approbation, Disapprobation, Agreeable, Disagreeable.

Approbation is an emotion of the mind, excited by the pleasure we derive from the perception of certain objects, and from our knowledge or supposition of their merits; thus we may approve of the beauty of a portrait, or of the skill with which it is executed. Disapprobation arises, on the contrary, from the annoyance we suffer, in perceiving what is disagreeable to us, or which we either judiciously or injudiciously consider, as being more or less devoid of merit; we may disapprove, for instance, of the voice of a singer, and of his want of taste or correctness.

We commonly make use of the expressions, agreeable and disagreeable, when we speak of the effect things naturally of themselves produce upon the mind, and of approbation and disapprobation, when they have been fashioned or arranged in some way or other, by the industry of man; for instance, we say the fragrance of a rose is agreeable or delightful to us, but that we approve of the tree being planted in the garden; and

we may delight in the tickling of our palate, and yet highly disapprove of our own intemperance. We either approve or disapprove of all moral actions whatsoever.

To Esteem, Respect, Reverence, Venerate, Adore, to feel Contempt, to Despise, Scorn.

As approbation springs from our love of excellence, so esteem and respect originate in our approbation ; we approve of the thing done, and esteem and respect more or less the person doing it. Our respect in cases of extraordinary virtue amounts to reverence, veneration ; and veneration, when we contemplate infinite Perfection, rises of course to adoration.

As evil deeds excite our disapprobation, so do the practisers of them our contempt ; and we despise or hold bad men in scorn or derision, according as their sins may appear to us more or less flagrant, and their follies more or less extravagant.

Men of an idle or trifling turn of mind also, are apt to excite our contempt.

Admiration.

Admiration is the result of our approval of certain things, exciting in us the idea either of moral or physical beauty, of great power, dexterity, ingenuity, space, magnitude, &c. and our admiration in its excess, amounts to surprise, wonder, amazement. We say, for instance, such a thing is surprisingly, wonderfully, amazingly, marvellously beautiful, or ingenious, or sublime, &c. incomparable, unequalled, matchless, inimitable, are terms expressive of the highest degree of admiration ; and all such words imply, that the mind considers any thing with relation to what it has before perceived of the same kind.

Coaxing, Wheedling, Cringing, Fawning.

We are all of us disposed more or less to coax. To coax

is an artifice natural to man. Infants delight to caress, and to be caressed; and what they cannot readily obtain, they endeavour to win by stratagem. To coax is an innocent stratagem, for he who is prevailed upon is fully aware of the end and aim of such manœuvring, and yields to what he cannot resist, to the pleasure of granting what has been so agreeably won from him. But wheedling, cringing, and fawning, are cunning contrivances of the crafty and designing—a sort of dumb hypocrisy.

Commendation.

Praise well merited we call commendation, otherwise flattery.

Flatterer, Parasite, Sycophant.

The term Flatterer seems to be properly applied to all who express a greater degree of admiration for any one, than *they believe* to be justly due to him, on account either of his mental or personal accomplishments, of his conduct, beauty, health, taste, possessions, &c.

Delicate and indirect flattery, as far as it is made use of, merely to keep people in greater good humour both with themselves and others, is perhaps necessary to soften the asperities of our nature, but beyond this point, we find it to be the fruitful parent of evil, and as such, has been largely commented upon by writers of all ages and nations.

“ Flattery is the nurse of crimes.”

Parasites barter flattery for good cheer, or for some other thing that they covet. Any one who has not penetration to discover the difference, between the well bred gentleman and the fulsome parasite, has a sickly appetite for compliments, which, if he would indulge, he must be content to pay the price of.

“ If we should commend any man for good qualities, or good deeds; this is honest: if we should encourage him in

good undertakings; this is charitable: but to applaud his defects, to bolster him in ill practices; this is flattery and treachery."—*Barrow*.

A Sycophant recommends himself to those, with whom he would curry favour, by repeating or inventing slanders against persons he believes disliked or envied by his hearers, or because he is aware he shall be listened to with an anxiety, proportionate to the malignancy of his reports. Envious minds are most apt to encourage sycophants, for instead of being roused to a noble emulation by examples of virtue, they seem to delight in the discovery, that others are disturbed by as base passions as themselves. The sycophant and his listener are worthy of each other.

To Cajole.

The artful are disposed to cajole those, by whose follies or ignorance they hope to profit.

Hypocrisy, Simulation, Dissimulation.

Hypocrisy is the adopting the air and language of any character foreign to our own, and with an intent to deceive. Simulation seems to be synonymous with it.

Dissimulation, the concealing our opinions or real character, or both, from those whom we wish to conciliate, because we suspect they would not like, or be well affected towards us, were they acquainted with them.

The hypocrite simulates a character, but men may dissimulate in order to avoid shocking the opinions or prejudices of those with whom they associate, or upon whom they are any way dependant. But dissimulation always perhaps implies some degree of artifice, something more than what prudence or good-breeding require, for the word Dissembler is never used in a good sense. The dissembler we suppose takes more or less pains to persuade others *he is not* what he appears to be;

the hypocrite, that *he is* what he suspects will recommend him to favour.

“ Clarence, whom I indeed have cast in darkness,
 I do beweepe to many simple gulls,
 And tell them 'tis the Queen and her allies,
 That stir the king against the Duke my brother.
 Now they believe it, and withal whet me
 To be reveng'd on Rivers, Dorset, Grey.
 But, then I sigh, and with a piece of scripture
 Tell them, that God bids us do good for evil.
 And thus I clothe my naked villany,
 With odd old ends stoln forth of holy writ,
 And seem a saint, when most I play the devil.”

Gossiping, Censoriousness, Scandal, Detraction.

“ If we consider all the frivolous and petulant discourse, the impertinent chattings, the rash censures, the spiteful detractions which are so rife in the world, and so much poison all communication, we shall find the main root of them to be a want of industry in men, or of diligent attendance on their own matters, which would leave them little desire or leisure to search into, or comment upon other men's actions and concerns.”—*Barrow*.

The term Censoriousness seems to imply a notable desire of finding fault with, or condemning the conduct of others. “ Detraction respecteth especially worthy persons, good qualities, and laudable actions, the reputation of which it aimeth to impair or destroy.” Scandal, the giving circulation to evil reports : Gossiping, the hearing and detailing whatever public or private occurrences may serve to gratify idle curiosity, or to furnish conversation for a vacant hour, but this without a malicious intent. But, with respect both to public and private events and actions, we often hear the same person pronounce judgments utterly inconsistent with his own previous decisions in similar cases, occurring at the very same moment, and which inconsistency we easily trace either to

self-interest or prejudice, or ill will. The censure is often most evidently directed against the sinner not the sin; for men point their finger with scorn at some hapless wretch, who perhaps merits as much pity as blame; while a person high in office may remain like king David, ignorant of the enormity of his transgressions, until a prophet shall arise and proclaim to him, "Thou also hast done the like deed," ay, and done it possibly not only with far weaker temptations, but with many aggravating circumstances.

We are very apt likewise to condemn one party, before we have had either time or opportunity to hear the other side of the question; but the culpable are commonly the least scrupulous, and the most eager to shift the blame off their own shoulders; whereas, the innocent often find they cannot exculpate themselves, without attaching an indelible stigma upon some near connexion or friend of theirs, and therefore quietly submit to remain under obloquy; our rash judgments consequently very frequently injure such, as could prove themselves eminently entitled to our regard and respect. The fear of incurring the vengeance of a superior, also seals the lips of many a slandered dependant, who dares not reveal the secret provocations he has received, and which more than counterbalance perhaps the advantages publicly heaped upon him. Whenever therefore, the tale of scandal reaches our ears, let it excite very lively doubts in our mind, whether appearances be not equally deceitful on this, as we have found them on many other occasions; and both reason and charity forbid our pronouncing a harsh or positive censure against any part of a man's conduct, until we have first obtained unquestionable proofs of his delinquency.

Slander.

"Slander is the uttering false (or equivalent to false, morally false,) speech against our neighbour, in prejudice to his fame, his safety, his welfare, or concernment in any kind, out of

malignity, vanity, rashness, ill-nature, or bad design. But it seemeth most fully intelligible by observing the several kinds and degrees thereof, as also by reflecting on the divers ways and manners of practising it."

1. "The grossest kind of slander is that which, in the Decalogue is called, *bearing false testimony against our neighbour*; that is, flatly charging him with facts which he is no wise guilty of, as in the case when men were suborned to say, *Naboth did blaspheme God and the king*. This kind is in the highest way (that is, in judicial proceedings), is more rare, and of all men, they who are detected to practise it, are held most vile and infamous, as being plainly the most pernicious and perilous instruments of injustice, the most desperate enemies of all men's right and safety that can be. This palpably is the supreme pitch of calumny, incapable of any qualification or excuse. Hell cannot go beyond this—the cursed fiend himself cannot worse employ his wit than in minting wrongful falsehoods."

2. "Another kind is, affixing scandalous names, injurious epithets, and odious characters upon persons which they deserve not; as when the apostles were charged of being pestilent, turbulent, factious, and seditious fellows. This sort is very common, and thence in ordinary repute not so bad, yet in just estimation, perhaps, at least equal to the former, as doing to our neighbour more heavy and more irreparable wrong; for it imposeth on him really more blame, and that such which he can hardly shake off, because the charge signifieth a habit of evil, and includeth many acts; these being general and indefinite, can scarce be disproved. He, for instance, that calleth a sober man, drunkard, doth impute to him many acts of such intemperance (some really past, others probably future), and no particular time or place being specified, how can a man clear himself of that imputation, especially with those who are not thoroughly acquainted with his conversation? So he

that calleth a man unjust, proud, hypocritical, doth load him with very grievous faults, which it is sometimes not possible that the most innocent person should discharge himself from."

3. " Like to that kind is the following—aspersing a man's actions with harsh censures and foul terms, importing that they proceed from ill principles, or tend to bad ends, so as it doth not and cannot appear. Thus when we say of him that is prudently frugal, that he is niggardly; of him that is cheerful and free in his conversation, that he is vain and loose; of him that is conspicuous and brisk in virtuous practice, that it is ambition or ostentation which impels him. Whoever, I say, pronounceth concerning his neighbour's intentions otherwise than as they are evidently expressed by words, or signified by overt actions, is a slanderer. All words are ambiguous and capable of different senses (some fair, some more foul); all actions have two handles, one that candour and charity will, another that disingenuity and spite may lay hold on; and in such cases to misapprehend is a calumnious procedure, arguing malignant disposition and mischievous design."

4. " Another sort of this practice is, partial and lame representation of men's discourse or their practice, suppressing some part of the truth in them, or concealing some circumstances about them, which might serve to explain, to excuse, or to extenuate them. In such a manner easily, without uttering any logical untruth, one may yet grievously calumniate. Thus, suppose that a man speaketh a thing upon supposition, or with exception, or in way of objection, or merely for disputation sake, in order to the discussion or clearing of truth; he that should report him asserting it absolutely, unlimitedly, positively, and peremptorily, as his own settled judgment, would notoriously calumniate. If one should be inveigled by fraud, or driven by violence, or slip by chance into a bad place or bad company, he that should so represent the gross of that accident, as to breed an opinion that, out of disposition and

design that person did put himself there, doth slanderously abuse him. The reporter in such cases must not think to defend himself by pretending that he spake nothing false, for such propositions, however true in logic, may justly be deemed lies in morality. There are slanderous truths as well as slanderous falsehoods—when truth is uttered with a deceitful heart and to a base end, it becomes a lie.”

5. “ Calumnious tongues pervert the judgments of men to think ill of the most innocent, and meanly of the worthiest actions. Even commendation itself is often used calumniously, with intent to breed dislike and ill-will toward a person commended in envious or jealous ears; or so as to give passage to dispraises, and render the accusations following more credible; ’tis an artifice commonly observed to be much in use there where the finest tricks of supplanting are practised with greatest effect, so that there is no greater pestilent enemy than a malevolent praiser. All these kinds of dealing, as they issue from the principles of slander and perform its work, so they deservedly bear the guilt thereof.”

6. “ A like kind is that of oblique and covert reflections; when a man doth not directly or expressly charge his neighbour with faults, but yet so speaketh that he is understood, or reasonably presumed to do it. This is a very cunning and mischievous way of slandering, for therein the skulking calumniator keepeth a reserve for himself, and cutteth off from the person concerned the means of defence. If he goeth to clear himself from the matter of such aspersions, what need, saith this insidious speaker, of that?—Must I needs mean you?—Did I name you?—Why then do you assume it to yourself?—Do you not prejudge yourself guilty?—I did not, but your own conscience, it seemeth, doth accuse you. You are jealous and suspicious as persons otherwise or guilty used to be. So meaneth this serpent out of the hedge, securely and with certainty to bite his neighbour, and is in that

respect, if possible, more base and more hurtful than the most base and positive slanderer."

7. "Another kind is that of magnifying and aggravating people's faults; raising any small miscarriage into a heinous crime, any slender defect into an odious vice, and any common infirmity into a strange enormity, magnifying a small mote in the eye of our neighbour into a huge beam. It is not only slander to pick a hole where there is none, but to make that wider which is, so that it appeareth more ugly and cannot so easily be mended; for charity is wont to extenuate faults, justice doth never exaggerate them."

8. "A no less base slander is, the imputing to our neighbour's practice, judgment, or profession, evil consequences (apt to render him odious or despicable), which have no dependence on, or connexion with them. There do in every age occur disorders and mishaps springing from various complications of causes, working some of them in a more open and discernible, others in a more secret and subtile way. Those who are so disposed, are ready peremptorily to charge them upon whomever they dislike or dissent from, although without any apparent cause, or upon most frivolous and senseless pretences, yea, when reason sheweth the quite contrary, and they who are so charged are in the just esteem of all men, the least obnoxious to such accusations. So usually the best friends of mankind, those who most heartily wish the peace and prosperity of the world, and most earnestly to their power strive to promote them, have all the disturbances and disasters happening, charged on them by those fiery vixens who (in pursuance of their base designs, or gratification of their wild passions,) really do themselves embroil things, and raise miserable combustions in the world. So it is also that they, who have the conscience to do mischief, will have the confidence also to disavow the blame, and the iniquity to lay the burthen of it on those who are most innocent; so liable are the best

and most innocent sort of men to be calumniously accused in this manner."

9. " Another practice (worthily bearing the guilt of slander) is, being aiding and accessory thereto. He that by crafty significations of ill-will doth prompt the slanderer to vent his poison; he that by a willing audience and credulous approbation expresseth a delightful complacency therein, as he is a partner in the fact, so he is a sharer in the guilt. There are not only slanderous throats but slanderous ears also; not only wicked inventions, which engender and brood lies, but wicked assents, which hatch and foster them. It is such friends and patrons of them who are the causes that they are so rife, who set ill-natured, base, and designing people upon devising, searching after, and picking up malicious and idle stories. Were it not for such customers, the trade of calumniating would fall; many pursue it out of servility and flattery, to tickle the ears, to soothe the humour, to gratify the malignant disposition or ill-will of others, but who would, upon the least discouragement, give over the practice. If therefore, we would exempt ourselves from all guilt of slander, we must not only abstain from venting it, but forbear to regard or countenance it; yea, if we thoroughly would be clear of it we must shew an aversion from hearing it, an unwillingness to believe it, an indignation against it. If we would stop our ears we should stop the slanderer's mouth; if we would *resist the calumniator, he would fly from us*; if we would reprove him, we should repel him; for as *the north wind driveth away rain, so (the wise man telleth us) doth an angry countenance a back-biting tongue.*"

" He that breweth lies may have more wit and skill, but the broacher sheweth the like malice and wickedness. In this there is no great difference between the arch-devil that frameth scandalous reports, and the little imps that run about and disperse them."

“ The tongue is a sharp and parlous weapon, which we are bound to keep up in the sheath, or never to draw forth but advisedly and upon just occasion—it must ever be wielded with caution and care: to brandish it wantonly, to lay about with it blindly and furiously, to slash and smite therewith any that happeth to come in our way, doth argue malice or madness.”

“ Since our faculty of speech (wherein we do excel all other creatures) was given us, as in the first place to praise and glorify our Maker, so in the next to benefit and help our neighbour, as an instrument of mutual succour and delectation, of friendly commerce and pleasant converse together, for instructing and advising, comforting and cheering one another, it is an unnatural perverting, and an irrational abuse thereof, to employ it to the damage, disgrace, vexation, or wrong in any kind, of our brother; better indeed had we been as brutes, without its use, than we are, if so worse than brutishly we abuse it.”

“ As good nature and ingenuous disposition incline men to observe, like, and commend, what appeareth best in their neighbour; so malignity of temper and heart prompteth them to espy and catch at the worst; one, as a bee, gathereth honey out of any herb; the other, as a spider, sucketh poison out of the sweetest flower.”—*Barrow*.

Satirical, Sarcastic.

The satirical are apt to ridicule the mistakes, awkwardnesses, faults, errors, and crimes, of men, either from an earnest desire of warning others, or merely to indulge their satirical humour, or to gratify their spleen.

To Reflect, Consider, Deliberate, Ponder.

We are more or less disposed to reflect, &c. with good or bad intentions, upon any thing whatsoever, upon what we shall

do or say, and upon what has been said or done, or proposed, either by ourselves or others.

To Design, Contrive, Plan, Scheme.

Also to design, or contrive, or plan, any measures or things, in a variety of ways, suitable to our own wants or desires, or to the wishes or wants of others, and either for a good or bad purpose.

To Consult, to take Advice, Counsel, &c.

Most men are disposed, more or less, to consult those they deem likely to advise them judiciously, or to suggest the means of more readily accomplishing their designs of whatever tendency they be. "We are all short-sighted, and consequently can seldom perceive every thing that has a connexion with the subject we would consider. From this defect I think no man is free, and therefore it is no wonder that, from our partial views, we are apt to make false conclusions. This might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts how useful it is to talk and consult with others, even such as come short of him in capacity, quickness, and penetration; for since no one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different, as I may say, positions to it, it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notions of things which have escaped him, and which his reason would make use of, if they came into his mind."

To Advise, Counsel, Recommend, Caution, Admonish, Warn.

We are disposed, more or less, to offer or to intrude our advice, counsel, &c. upon others, with either a good or bad intention, or impertinently.

Officious, Meddling, Interfering.

Some persons are disposed, more or less officiously, to meddle or interfere with the concerns of others in various ways. "Every man having burthen enough on his shoulders, imposed by God and nature, it is vain to take on him more load, by engaging himself in the affairs of others; he will thence be forced, either to shake off his own business, or be oppressed with more than he can bear. It is indeed hence observable, and it must needs happen, that those who officiously meddle with other men's concerns are wont to neglect their own; they that are much abroad can seldom be at home; they that know others most are least acquainted with themselves. Whence it is scarce possible that a 'pragmatical man should be a good man; that is, such a one as honestly and carefully performeth the manifold duties incumbent on him." But a man may upon proper occasions shew both great judgment and much humanity, by timely interposing his good offices between contending parties.

Positive, Dogmatical.

Many persons are apt to be positive, dogmatical, as if they would absolutely impose their opinions upon the rest of the world.

Dictatorial.

Others are inclined to be more or less dictatorial, often to assume an authority to which they are not entitled.

To Reprimand, Reprove, Chide, Scold.

We reprimand more or less judiciously, or capriciously those subjected to our authority, or who have offended or injured us.

To Reproach, Upbraid.

And to reproach or upbraid those we imagine have any way wronged us, or disgraced or injured themselves or others.

To Expostulate.

We expostulate with such as we think likely to listen to reason, or to be diverted from any imprudent or evil act, or from doing any thing contrary to our wishes.

To Persuade.

And endeavour to persuade those we wish to comply with our request, orders, &c. whether for their's or some other person's advantage, or for our own.

To Argue, Dispute.

Men are disposed to argue and dispute upon any subject with more or less ingenuousness and warmth, from the desire of either communicating or obtaining information, or to persuade to good, or from vanity: also more or less craftily, either from a spirit of contradiction, or to entice to evil.

To Debate.

Also to debate any subject, in order to obtain the advantages often to be derived from the united experience of others.

To Contradict.

Some persons are disposed to contradict from mere perverseness.

To Enlighten.

The well-disposed are pleased to think they have it in their power to assist others in solving their doubts, and satisfying their minds, by attempting the exposition of truth.

To Embarrass, Confuse, Perplex.

But in doing so they sometimes only confuse and perplex them. Men also often, more or less embarrass others for evil purposes.

To Ask, Request, Petition, Solicit, Importune, Intreat, Implore, Supplicate.

We are disposed to enforce our requests with more or less earnestness or importunity, according to the degree of uneasiness we suffer, from not readily obtaining what we desire to have.

To Acknowledge, Avow, Confess.

Men more or less readily acknowledge and confess their mistakes, errors, faults, and crimes.

Captious, Contentious, Quarrelsome, Cavilling, Wrangling.

Many persons have a bad habit of contending, wrangling, &c. others are maliciously disposed to it.

To Affront, Insult.

Some seek occasions to affront or insult others ; some do it unavoidably, some wantonly, and others heedlessly.

To Flout, Gibe, Jeer, Deride, Scoff.

There are men so base as to deride and scoff not only the unworthy, but also the unfortunate.

To Mock.

Some mock or imitate the words and actions or appearance of others, with the express intention of causing them pain.

To Abuse, Taunt, Revile.

There are persons who, when angry, give full reins to their tongue, and utter the most opprobrious epithets their language furnishes them with.

CHAPTER XI.

Ambition.—Desire of Pleasure.—Desire of Independence.—Desire of Power.—Desire of Wealth.

The Desire of Superiority, or Ambition.

AMBITION is the desire of excelling some one or more of our fellow-creatures, whether it be in doing good or in doing evil. It seems to have been implanted in us, in order to direct our views towards the attainment of perfection in all things, but the option of good or evil has necessarily been left to us in this, as in the other directing dispositions, otherwise we should be alike devoid both of virtue and of vice.

The objects of ambition are as numerous as the pursuits of man. Men often aim to govern more rationally, or more despotically, than their contemporaries or predecessors, of being more famed in arms or in council, or in any one or more of the arts or sciences, of being more luxurious or simple, more intemperate or austere, &c. in short, upon all occasions in which they aspire to rise above the point others have reached, they are moved by Ambition. He who strives to distance his competitors in any useful and laudable undertaking, makes the right use of that desire of excellence, which is one of his noblest propensities, and when so directed, we call it the *true*, in contra-distinction to *false* ambition or vainglory, a glory that invariably terminates, as is reasonably to be expected, in vanity and vexation of spirit. True glory consists in doing

the greatest practicable degree of good, with the least possible mixture of evil.

Desire of Pleasure.

We appear to have been indulgently gifted with the desire of Pleasure, in order to qualify us for the more lively enjoyment of our existence, by disposing us to seek agreeably to fill up many of the dull vacuities of life. Without it, we should still be capable of receiving pleasure by the ordinary operations of things upon our several senses, but the desire of pleasure leads us to contrive the renewal of those perceptions we find grateful to us, and to vary them according to our fancies.

It often urges us to climb the lofty hill, to court the balmy air, to gaze on beautiful prospects, to pluck fragrant flowers, to listen to the warbling of birds, to indulge the flights of imagination, to seek the society of the learned, the eloquent, the sprightly, the accomplished, the young, the beautiful, the graceful, &c. To travel in foreign countries, to examine works of art, &c. Nature has in truth, provided us so vast a fund of innocent, nay absolutely salutary pleasures, they being most of them so when enjoyed with moderation, that she has left us no excuse for abusing her gifts.

A man of pleasure is one, who seeks continually to excite and to gratify his appetites or senses, without taking into account the future consequences of such indulgences; in other words, his desire of pleasure is paramount to his desire of good. The Ambitious, on the contrary, live as it were, always for the future, voluntarily submitting to present toil and privations, in order to accomplish some favourite object. Ambition raised Marc Antony to his high command in the Roman Republic, the desire of pleasure delivered him over an abject slave to the famed Cleopatra.

The history and biography of all ages furnish proofs that

the mind of every man eminent for wisdom, was chiefly regulated by the desire of good, and that the disturbers of mankind have, on the contrary, no less evidently been the sport of their own inordinate ambition, desire of pleasure, &c.

Louis the Fourteenth was alternately the slave of his ambition, his vanity, and of his desire of pleasure; but he finally, it is said, both perceived and acknowledged his errors, and expressed his most earnest wish, that his posterity might steadily maintain peace, and thus permanently relieve the then deeply suffering nation. But his successor no way profited by the experience and recorded admonitions of his grandfather. In Louis the Fifteenth, on the contrary, we behold a most striking example of the horrible excesses into which the unbridled desire of pleasure, and unbounded prodigality, precipitates man. Too many of his contemporaries lived to witness the cruel catastrophe, that overwhelmed the virtuous Louis the Sixteenth, a catastrophe the voluptuous monarch had most wantonly prepared for himself, but he did not however escape it unpunished, for outraged nature herself resented his gross violation of all decency.

The desire of good caused the amiable Henry the Fourth, earnestly to aim at promoting the welfare of his subjects, unhappily, however, his desire of pleasure, for want of due control, cast a shade over his character; whereas, the desire of good absolutely swayed the mind of the great Alfred. He proved himself truly the father of his people, enlightening them by his precepts, and stimulating them by his exemplary conduct; and the fervent spirit of independence he infused into the inhabitants of this distinguished Island, at that dark and remote period, still remains to guard his principal and matchless institution, to immortalize his name, and to endear it not only to every friend of Britain, but of humanity.

Emulation.

Emulation seems to be synonymous with *laudable* ambition;

for when we excite emulation amongst children, what is it, but ambition that we stir in them? And, in doing so, we cannot too carefully guard against provoking their envy and jealousy. But the propensity in human nature to delight in superiority, may however be rendered highly useful both to the teacher and the pupil, if great care be taken to keep it within due bounds, and to attach only a proper degree of importance severally to each advantage, that may be derived from nature, or acquired by care and study. And the teacher, while he excites emulation, ought, in order to check presumption, to take frequent occasion to remind his successful pupil, that every one gifted with distinguished talents, is justly expected proportionately to excel his competitors; and that it is to be ascertained, if he have not more cause for humiliation than pride, upon comparing his acquirements with his superior powers and opportunities of improving himself. Besides, if he excel them in one respect, they may possibly have some advantage over him in another.

Competition, Rivalry.

We are disposed to be competitors or rivals for any advantage whatsoever, whether real or supposed.

Elated.

And to be more or less elated with our success.

Of Vainglory.

When a regard to the opinion or desire of the esteem of men, is the main principle from which their actions do proceed, or the chief end which they propound to themselves, instead of conscience, of duty, love, and reverence of God, hope of the rewards promised, and a sober regard to their true good, this is Vainglory. Also, when they delight in praise for mean or indifferent things, as for secular dignity, power,

wealth, strength, beauty, wit, learning, eloquence, &c. for there are many (saith the Psalmist) that boast themselves in the multitude of their riches, but honor should be affected only for true virtue, and really good works.

When men covet praise unreasonably, not being content with that measure of good reputation, which naturally doth arise from a virtuous and blameless life. As all other goods, so this should be desired moderately. When they are unwilling to part with the esteem of men upon any account, but rather will desert their duty, than endure disgrace; prizing the opinion of men before the favour and approbation of God. When they pursue it irregularly, are cunning and politic to procure it, hunt for it in oblique ways, lay gins, traps, and baits for it; such are ostentation of things commendable, fair speeches, kind looks, and gestures, &c. devoid of sincerity; these, and similar ways ambitious and popular men do use. This practice upon many accounts is vain and culpable, and produceth great inconveniences. It is vain because uncertain. How easily are the judgments of men altered! how fickle are their conceits! The wind of Heaven is not more fleeting and variable. In a trice the case is turned with them, they admire and scorn, they approve and condemn, they applaud and reproach, they court and persecute the same man, as their fancy is casually moved, or as fortune doth favour a person. Histories are full of instances of persons, who have been now the favourites of the people, presently the objects of their hatred and obloquy. It is vain because unsatisfactory. How can a man be satisfied with the opinions of bad judges, who esteem a man without good grounds, commonly for things not deserving regard, who cannot discern those things which really deserve commendation, good principles and honest intention? those God only can know, these wise and good men only can well guess at; it is vain, therefore, much to prize any judgment but that of God, and of wise

men, which are but few. *Praise becometh not the mouth of a fool?*

“How also can a man rationally be pleased with the commendation of others, who is sensible of his so great defects, and conscious to himself of so many miscarriages? which considering, he should be ashamed to receive, he should in himself blush to own any praise. It is ugly and unseemly to men, they despise nothing more than the acting out of this principle. It misbecometh a man to perform things for so pitiful a reward, or to look upon it as a valuable recompence for his performances, there being considerations so vastly greater to induce and encourage him, the satisfaction of conscience, the pleasing God and procuring his favour, the obtaining of eternal happiness.”

“It is observable that the word *הלל* signifieth to praise or applaud, and also to infatuate or make mad.”—*Barrow*.

Abstemiousness, Temperance, Intemperance.

The terms Temperance and Intemperance are applied to the degree of use we make of any of our faculties, or of any thing that riches can procure us, either to satisfy our natural wants, or to gratify any of our senses, in any manner whatsoever.

Economy and extravagance to the expenditure of our wealth, in proportion to the interest or principal of it.

Abstemiousness is the not using our faculties, or one or more things, to the degree that is compatible with health and virtue. Temperance, the using them to the degree that is compatible with both. Excess, the using them to a degree that is prejudicial to both.

Upon consulting general experience we shall learn, that both the healthy and the sickly are to be found indifferently amongst the abstemious, the temperate, and the intemperate. But we must recollect, that men are so differently constituted,

and their constitutions so variously strengthened or weakened by education and circumstances, that some are far better able to resist the effects of bad habits than others, and that it yet remains to be ascertained, whether those who have apparently continued to suffer the least from their excesses, might not have enjoyed more perfect health, both of mind and body, and had their life protracted many years, if they would have subjected their several appetites and inclinations, to the rules prescribed by Temperance.

“ What dext’rous thousands just within the goal,
Of wild debauch, direct their nightly course !
Perhaps no sickly qualms bedim their days,
No morning admonitions shock the head ;
But ah ! what woes remain ! life rolls apace
And that incurable disease old age,
In youthful bodies more severely felt,
More sternly active, shakes the blasted prime,
Except kind nature by some hasty blow,
Prevent the ling’ring fates ; for know whate’er
Beyond its natural fervour hurries on
The sanguine tide, whether the *frequent bowl*,
High-seasoned fare, or *exercise to toil*
Protracted, spurs to its last stage tir’d life,
And sows the temples with untimely snows.”—*Armstrong*.

The sickly may be found amongst the temperate, because our constitution and state of health depend, as we have just observed, upon a combination of circumstances, and not upon any one exclusively ; moreover, temperance will perhaps be found to have saved the weak, as often as excess has been known to have destroyed the strong. Were it practicable to make a census of the numbers that have fallen victims prematurely to intemperance, and could the evils they have in the mean time respectively endured be discovered, even the most eager votaries to pleasure might perhaps be startled, and pause a moment to consider, whether the longest possible continued

succession of the most lively enjoyments, were worth purchasing at so fearful a price.

“ War its thousands slays,
Peace its ten thousands. In the embattl'd plains,
Tho' death exults and claps his raven wings,
Yet reigns he not ev'n there so absolute,
So merciless, as in yon frantic scenes
Of midnight revel, and tumultuous mirth ;
Where in th' intoxicating draught conceal'd,
Or couch'd beneath the glance of lawless love,
He snares the simple youth, who nought suspecting,
Means to be blest, but finds himself undone ;
Torn immature from life's meridian joys
A prey to vice, intemp'rance, and disease.”—*Porteus*.

We class monks, hermits, cynics, &c. together, as professing at least, extreme Abstinence. But general experience seems to prove their principles quite contrary to our nature, since they are neither happier nor more virtuous than the rest of mankind, notwithstanding the many and extraordinary painful sacrifices their doctrines often require of them.

“ Some sunk to beasts find pleasure end in pain,
Some swell'd to Gods confess ev'n Virtue vain.”—*Pope*.

“ 'Tis the great art of life to manage well
The restless mind : for ever on pursuit of
Knowledge bent, it starves the grosser pow'rs ;
Quite unemploy'd, against its own repose
It turns its fatal edge, and sharper pangs
Than what the body feels, embitter life.
Chiefly where Solitude, sad nurse of care !
To sickly musings gives the pensive mind :
There Madness enters, and the dim-ey'd fiend,
Sour Melancholy, night and day provokes
Her own eternal wound ; the sun grows pale ;
A mournful visionary light o'erspreads
The cheerful face of nature ; earth becomes
A dreary desert, and Heav'n frowns above ;
Then various shapes of curs'd illusion rise,

Whate'er the wretched fears, creating fear
 Forms out of nothing, and with monsters teem
 Unknown in hell. The prostrate soul beneath
 A load of huge imagination heaves,
 And all the horror that the murderer feels,
 With anxious flutterings, wake the guiltless breast.

* * * * *

And some for love, and some for jealousy,
 For grim religion some, and some for pride,
 Have lost their reason."—*Armstrong*.

If we examine the conduct of the rich in general, at all periods of time, and in all countries, in monarchies and in republics, amongst the laity and amongst the clergy, we perceive the reverse of this picture, men in the more or less eager pursuit of every variety of pleasure. We find they expended, and do continue to expend their wealth principally, in building palaces, in furnishing them sumptuously, in collecting statues, pictures, rarities, &c. in dressing splendidly, in hiring numerous servants and retainers, in giving banquets, in employing musicians, singers, dancers, in assembling the gay, witty, and well-bred, in obtaining rank, power, fame, &c. and that they have done and still do these things, without incurring reproach, unless they, directly or indirectly, have been guilty of injustice, or committed vile excesses. Yet many of those who require the most various and expensive amusements, themselves often act, as if they would deny the poor the enjoyment of even such recreations as are suitable to their condition. But nature, with more justice, has rendered all extremes, whether of continual labour or dissipation, want or gluttony, injurious to us. Too much leisure tends to make us hypochondriacal, or to corrupt us; too little to exhaust us: want renders us gloomy and ferocious, gluttony stupid and unfeeling.

"Gross riot treasures up a wealthy fund
 Of plagues, but more unmedicable ills
 Attend the lean extreme; for physic knows

How to disburden the too tumid veins,
 Ev'n how to ripen the half-labour'd blood ;
 But to unlock the elemental tubes
 Collaps'd and shrunk with long inanity,
 And with balsamic nutriment repair
 The dried and worn out habit, were to bid
 Old age grow green, and wear a second spring."

Armstrong.

Temperance, or rather abstinence in all things, is but too often imposed upon the needy, but the affluent, in the midst of their abundance, may with advantage recollect, that "the strength of the mightiest is given him to help the weakest, and wealth to the richest to supply the poorest."—*Barrow.*

The evil effects of Abstinence seem to assure us, that man errs in refusing to enjoy with moderation, the many pleasures that present themselves to his acceptance: the pernicious consequences of Intemperance, warn us we are not born to monopolize the fruits of the earth; and the advantages secured to us in the long run, by the observance of Temperance, point out to us the happy medium that nature prescribes to the mortal, most favoured in the possession of both health and wealth.

Self-Denial.

Experience teaches us, that to maintain a sound mind in a sound body, we must early and steadily practise a wholesome degree of self-denial, most particularly the rich, they being so continually exposed to numerous and strong temptations to exceed the golden rule; but he that commonly keeps within it, is the most effectually prepared, either to enjoy a prosperous, or patiently to encounter an adverse fate.

Moderate, Immoderate.

We are disposed to use all things with a greater or less degree of moderation.

Luxurious, Voluptuous, Austere.

Consequently to be more or less luxurious or austere.

Gambling.

“ Ah ! quit a *place* where strong temptations try,
And since 'tis hard to combat, learn to fly.”

Ruin and self-destruction have, as is too well known, quickly terminated the career of very many of the votaries to this appalling vice.

Whatever mode of education is best adapted to establish habits of industry and virtue in young people, and to afford them that wholesome variety of exercises and amusements, suitable to their very lively and active imagination, must doubtless prove the most effectual security against the baneful attractions of the gaming-table. Mismanagement is, on the contrary, likely to occasion the indolent to fall an easy prey to sharpers, who are ever on the look-out to inveigle the inexperienced, while the ardent and impatient seldom wait to be invited to do either good or evil.

There does not appear to be any propensity whatsoever more difficult to keep within due bounds, and this perhaps is owing to its fully occupying the mind, at the expense of a very trifling exertion, and to its continually and highly exciting the attention, by the *immediate* prospect of loss or gain. We can thus easily explain why young men, who cannot be roused to the earnest pursuit of any profession or trade, by which they might hope eventually to acquire an honourable independence, will yet be found too ready to devote themselves unweariedly to play. It must, of course, also require a no less extraordinary effort to subdue a confirmed habit of this vice, for the dreadful vacuity occasioned by the loss of the easy employment, and of the accustomed very powerful stimulus, reduces men's minds at first to a state of almost insupportable irritation, and as the present uneasiness is apt to prevail, few have the cou-

rage to make a timely retreat from such a bewitching allure-
ment.

Drunkeness.

We here find another vice that strikingly proves the neces-
sity of constant attention to our habits of life, lest they gradually
master us, and that we, without farther struggle, finally sur-
render ourselves to their potent influence. In adversity some-

“ Too weakly indolent to strive with pain,
And *bravely by resisting conquer fate* ;
Try Circe's arts, and in the tempting bowl
Of poison'd nectar, sweet oblivion swill.
Struck by the powerful charm, the gloom dissolves
In empty air, Elysium opens round,
A pleasing phrenzy buoys the lighten'd soul,
And sanguine hopes dispel your fleeting care ;
And what was difficult, and what was dire,
Yields to your prowess and superior stars :
The happiest you of all that ere were mad,
Or are, or shall be, could this folly last.
But soon your Heav'n is gone ; a heavier gloom
Shuts o'er your head : your cares return
With tenfold rage. An anxious stomach well
May be endur'd, so may the throbbing head ;
But such a dim delirium, such a dream
Involves you, such a dastardly despair
Unmans your soul, as madd'ning Pentheus felt
When baited round Cithæron's cruel sides,
He saw two suns, and double Thebes ascend.
Besides it wounds you sore to recollect
What follies in your loose, unguarded hour
Escap'd. For one irrevocable word
Perhaps that meant no harm, you lose a friend,
Or in the rage of wine, your hasty hand
Performs a deed to haunt you to your grave :
Add, that your means, your health, your parts decay,
Your friends avoid you ; brutishly transform'd
They hardly know you ; or if one remains
To wish you well, he wishes you in Heav'n.
Despis'd, unwept you fall, who might have left,

A sacred, cherish'd, sadly pleasing name ;
 A name still to be utter'd with a sigh.
 Your last ungraceful scene, has quite effac'd
 All sense and memory of your former worth."—*Armstrong.*

Desire of Independence or of Liberty.

All men desire Independence or Liberty. Independence implies the possession of the liberty God has given us to use our several operative faculties, according to the determination of our will. Such is the independence we enjoy in a state of nature, as it is called. National independence we find to be the degree of liberty permitted by the established laws of any country, to the citizens respectively ruled by them, and thus each government is termed more or less free, in proportion to the nature and number of restrictions imposed upon the subject.

Nature seems to have implanted this desire of liberty, or freedom, or independence, or whatsoever else we please to name it, in the breast of man, in order to urge him to act at the impulse of his own mind, to animate him to labour for his own subsistence, and to spurn the thought of thriving without a suitable return, by the sweat of another man's brow, or to depend upon his charity. It renders him averse, also, unseasonably to tax the time and patience of his associates, by imposing upon them the task of amusing him. Both experience and reason very early warn him, that the unbridled indulgence of his several propensities, would infallibly entail upon him various evils, either immediate or remote ; and he is therefore spontaneously induced, to impose a certain degree of restraint upon himself, *i. e.* in fact, to abridge his own liberty. But if he covet social pleasures, and the innumerable comforts and conveniences arising from the joint labours of a community, he discovers that he must necessarily relinquish a yet larger

portion of it, lest he interfere with the well-being of his countrymen, and who cannot, nor will not, remain associated with him upon any other terms. But,

————— “ All constraint,
Except what wisdom lays on evil men
Is *Evil*: it hurts the faculties, impedes
Their progress in the road of science; blinds
The eye-sight of Discovery, and begets
In those that suffer it, a sordid mind,
Bestial, a meagre intellect, unfit
To be the tenant of man's noble form.”—*Couper*.

Abject, Servile.

The abject and servile are wanting in that noble spirit of independence that exalts man in his own estimation, while it dignifies him in the eyes of even the proudest sons of wealth.

Lawless, Turbulent, Rebellious.

An inordinate desire of independence leads men to become turbulent, lawless, rebellious, in short, to set the most wholesome authority at defiance, or to escape from it. But excessive uneasiness, occasioned by the imposition of severe and unreasonable restraints, will produce the same effect upon persons forming a part, either of a family or community.

To Resist, Oppose.

We are disposed to resist, &c. more or less, any reasonable or unreasonable opposition to our wishes, or any real or supposed injustice, &c.

To Contend.

And to contend, or try our strength, or power, or arguments, against those that oppose, or resist, or attack us in any manner whatsoever.

To Deny, Refuse.

Also to deny or refuse any just or unjust claims, any reasonable or unreasonable demand, indulgence, &c.

To Submit, Yield, Surrender.

The desire of obliging, or a sense of justice, or fear, or a proper want of firmness, &c. may induce us to yield, &c. sooner or later, and more or less entirely, either to entreaties, commands, or threats, &c.

To Grant, Concede, Comply with.

We are disposed to grant the wishes, and to comply, &c. with the demands of others according to circumstances.

Desire of Power and of Wealth.

The desire of Power seems to be the desire of having the option generally to gratify our very various propensities. From our earliest years we perceive that we can obtain or avoid some things and not others; and, when we find ourselves under human restraint or compulsion, we desire to overcome the force that opposes our wishes; thus it is evident our desire of power must necessarily be coeval with our desire to obtain pleasure and to avoid pain. Shortly after, we no less clearly discern that the rich more or less readily command the services of the multitude, and we gradually learn by what means they enjoy such a distinguished privilege. This discovery is of course soon followed by the desire of wealth, as the main instrument of power, (it matters not in what the wealth of any country consists.) The desire of power and of wealth appears to us therefore to be scarcely separable, since, if we desire to indulge our inclinations, we must desire also the power of do-

ing so. In some men, however, the desire of power more or less preponderates, in others that of wealth; but misers even, who make no use of riches, heap together only those things considered wealth, and consequently power, in the country in which they live.

Many men, we presume, are *ambitious* without immediately desiring *power*, in the common acceptance of the word, as there are others who desire power without being directly actuated by ambition. For ambition expresses the desire of not only obtaining a thing, but that the possession of that thing shall absolutely confer a suitable distinction upon the possessor, whereas the desire of power is often merely the desire of acquiring the means, of gratifying the desire of pleasure. A ruler, for instance, may desire to augment his power, expressly that he may surpass all his contemporaries or predecessors, as supreme arbiter of men's lives and fortunes, in order to administer to them either good or evil; or he may desire it to satisfy the insatiable demands of successive mistresses and favourites, who would mercilessly divide with him the spoils of the people. The many famed conquerors are examples of the first, and voluptuous despots of the second.

Men may of course also desire *wealth*, either to favour their ambitious views, or to gratify their sensuality, or their pride, or vanity, or to become "the ministers of bounteous Providence, &c."

Authoritative, Commanding, Imperious.

Many men give their orders in an authoritative tone and manner; some from bad habit, and some from harshness or inordinate pride.

Arbitrary, Despotical, Tyrannical.

The latter are apt to exercise their power in a more or less arbitrary and tyrannical manner.

Lenient, Merciful, Harsh, Rigorous, Unrelenting, Obdurate, Inexorable.

The humane are disposed to be lenient and merciful; others harsh, obdurate, &c. Too many of them

“ So little mercy shew, who need so much.”

To Protect, Defend, Support—To Forsake, Desert, Abandon.

Many are more or less disposed to countenance, protect, and defend, the worthy, defenceless, and persecuted; others, the powerful and wealthy. Some forsake the vicious, and some the unfortunate.

Desire of exclusive Possession of Property.

Self-love concurred, we suppose, with the desire of good, of ease, and of pleasure, to excite in man the desire of exclusive possession of Property, as soon as he perceived others disputing with him the fruits of the earth or the gratification of his social affections; and that he desired this exclusive possession, because it would empower him to continue using any thing in the manner and to the degree he might desire. The first interference thus probably awakened in him an earnest desire of securing his own independence; and his subsequent wish must naturally have been, to obtain wealth as a means to induce others voluntarily to administer both to his wants and pleasures.

Prudent, Extravagant.

Men are severally disposed, more or less, and in different ways, to be—Avaricious, miserly; or Parsimonious, stingy, niggardly, penurious; or Economical, frugal, thrifty; or Liberal; generous, bountiful, munificent; or Extravagant, prodigal, lavish, profuse, wasteful.

Avarice, Parsimony, Economy, Liberality, Prodigality.

Avarice is the desire of accumulating wealth, without any reference to the advantages to be derived from the use of it. A miser seems commonly to have but two propensities, (save his appetites) the one to preserve his existence, the other to hoard his money; but the latter is always paramount, for he will risk his health and even his life by continually mortifying his flesh, rather than diminish his treasures. But some misers have been known to bestow large gifts at the very time they were otherwise saving as rigidly as any of their fraternity; and these are the only occasions, upon which they do not carry on a perpetual warfare against nature and reason.

A Parsimonious disposition does not incline a man to deny himself the necessities of life, but will rather allow him to enjoy many comforts; nay, some luxuries; it generally, however, prevents his administering even to the most urgent wants of the needy. Saving is his ruling passion, and he commonly keeps all others subordinate to it; but there are degrees of it that are not incompatible with other powerful propensities, and we thus discover frequent and severe struggles between them; sometimes ambition, or vanity, or the desire of pleasure obtain the mastery, and sometimes the desire of wealth.

An Economist strictly proportions his expenses to his fortune, and spends more or less liberally within its limits, according to his general character and situation.

The Generous observe a liberal economy, for economy is the very foundation of generosity. Unless a man pay all his just debts, and provide what in reason he ought to do for his nearest connexions, whatever he bestows (common charity excepted) he takes away from those who are better entitled to his money; in fact he gives what does not properly belong to him; he is therefore unjust, not generous: but one that makes *personal* sacrifices in order to assist the

deserving; and to diffuse more widely the blessings God has largely bestowed upon him, is truly generous—a character worthy to be venerated, and to be held up as a bright example of human virtue.

The Prodigal differs not more widely from the avaricious than from the generous, for if the miser takes no account of others, neither does the prodigal, since he will sacrifice as far as he is allowed to do so, the welfare of every one who is any way connected with him to his predominant passion, which is, an inordinate desire of obtaining present pleasure and of avoiding present uneasiness. The only difference we can discover between them is, the manner of appropriating to themselves all they covet. The generous, on the contrary, as we have before said, after satisfying every just claim upon them, lay aside whatever they have yet to spare, in order to relieve their distressed brethren; whereas the prodigal revels without compunction, at the cost of all whom he can prevail upon to listen to his demands. We are particularly induced to make this comparison between the generous and prodigal, because, in despising wholesome frugality, the latter are very apt to rank themselves amongst the most generous of mankind.

It does not seem to enter into the calculation of a prodigal to curtail any of his own enjoyments for the benefit of either his family or his creditors; so far from it, he becomes highly incensed upon any remonstrances being made to him to check his ruinous expenditure, or to refund the sums borrowed; and he is no less indignant if more be refused him, but

“ Neither a borrower nor a lender be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend.”

It is only from the experience of others, that men can be aware of the mischiefs they may occasion by affording pecuniary aid to a prodigal. He borrows money sometimes for the purpose of squandering it, and sometimes with the intention of

more quickly extricating himself from his embarrassments ; but it most frequently happens that habitual self-indulgence proves too powerful against his newly adopted resolutions, and he sinks but the deeper for the assistance tendered him by his mistaken friends. In this case it has no other effect than involving many more persons in his difficulties, and of wonderfully aggravating the misfortunes he entails upon his nearest connexions. They are almost always kept ignorant of every such transaction, until the impatient and alarmed creditor makes application to them for redress ; and thus they find themselves unjustly called upon, not only to relieve the borrower, but also to indemnify the lender, who has perhaps on his part too been highly imprudent in parting with his money upon insufficient security ; but this, however, does not always prevent him from including those in his censures and resentment, who have rather great cause to complain of him. In short, if the prodigal ultimately answer all just demands, still the cruel anxieties and mortifications he has wantonly brought upon others, must ever remain in the balance against him.

“ Prodigality begets contempt for sober and orderly plans of life ; it overthrows all regard to domestic concerns and duties ; it pushes men on to hazardous and visionary schemes of gain, and unfortunately unites the two extremes, of grasping with rapaciousness and of squandering with profusion. Accustomed to move in a round of society and pleasure disproportioned to their condition, they are unable to break through the enchantments of habit, and with their eyes open sink into the gulf which is before them. Poverty enforces dependence, and dependence increases corruption. Necessity first betrays them into mean compliances, next impels them into open crimes, and, beginning with ostentation and extravagance, they end in infamy and guilt. To what cause, so much as to

the want of order in the conduct of one's worldly affairs, can we attribute those scenes of distress which so frequently excite our pity, families that once were flourishing reduced to want, and the melancholy widow and neglected orphan thrown forth friendless upon the world? What cause has been more fruitful in engendering those atrocious crimes, which fill society with disquiet and terror, in training the gamester to fraud, the robber to violence, and even the assassin to blood."—*Blair*.

CHAPTER XII.

Pride.—Vanity.—Desire of Change.—Desire of Novelty.—Curiosity.—Desire of Occupation.

The Consciousness or Belief of Superiority, or Pride.

THE term pride seems to express the satisfaction we feel in the persuasion, that we possess one or more advantages in a greater degree than some particular persons, in our moral character; for instance, in our intellectual faculties, degree of information, manners, &c. and this persuasion stimulates us to maintain our superiority, and to deter us from acting in any manner derogatory to it. It serves likewise to render us careful not to sully by unsuitable conduct, the respectability we derive from our adventitious advantages, such as high birth, rank, wealth, &c. Men too are proud of their bodily strength, beauty, &c.

“In flow’ry youth and beauty’s pride.”

It is common to say, “we are too proud to cringe or fawn for favour,” *i. e.* we scorn to degrade ourselves by mean compliances, in order to obtain any benefit whatsoever. Pride serves also to check the excessive effusions of vanity, for it takes alarm, and is shocked at our being suspected of an anxiety to display our superiority over others, and thus to betray our ignorance of what is due to their self-love, whence indeed the expression, “too proud to be vain.” But pride

without a due mixture of vanity, renders us perhaps more averse than we ought to be, to make those mutual communications from which we derive so many mutual advantages. Persons remarkable for pride are apt to be reserved or morose, those for vanity, communicative, or indiscreet.

Many have fallen victims to the struggles between pride and the desire of pleasure, and thus furnished subjects for the tragic muse,

Humility.

Pride is, as we have just observed, the feeling of satisfaction we have in the belief, that we possess a superiority of some sort. Humility, on the contrary, expresses the consciousness of our deficiencies. When we contemplate the infinite perfections of God, we humble ourselves before him, and acknowledge our utter insignificance, and the immeasurable distance there must ever remain between him and us. In comparing our wisdom or knowledge with the examples we read of, or behold in human nature, we may be persuaded of our inferiority. Inordinate pride inclines us to be presumptuous; extreme humility, timid; thus pride is apt to persuade us we have already reached pre-eminence, and humility to prevent our attempting to approach it; whereas a proper degree of pride inspires us with rational confidence to excel, and a due share of humility serves to convince us we have yet much room for improvement. Such humility, it is evident, arises from our pride being kept within its proper bounds, so as not to blind our reason, which is fitted with the aid of experience to assure us that, even after the most active exercise of our several faculties, during the longest life, we shall still have left undone far more than we have been able to accomplish; and that from our very frailty, we have ever need of the most vigilant control over our several propensities.

Shame.

Shame seems to be consequent to wounded pride; for it implies the state of the mind upon the consciousness or detection of any mean, base, or indecent act, by which one may forfeit one's own, or the esteem of one's friends, or the good opinion of the world, and thus have more or less opprobrium affixed to one's name. It arises also from the consciousness or detection of a deficiency of some sort, either of possession or ability, and which deficiency a man knows or suspects will lessen his importance in the estimation of others, or prove discreditable to him.

Self-conceit.

Self-conceit seems to originate in pride, in the want of a proper degree of humility, which would teach us to appreciate ourselves more justly; but the lively expression of it, we suppose, springs from vanity. "Self-conceit is to '*think highly of one's self beyond what one ought to think.*' This doth consist in several acts or instances. Sometimes we in our imagination assume to ourselves perfections not belonging to us in kind or in degree; we take ourselves to be wise, to be good, when we are not so, at least to be far wiser and better than we are. We commonly presume ourselves to be very considerable, very excellent, very extraordinary persons, even when in truth we are very mean and worthless. We make vain judgments upon the things we do possess, prizing them much beyond their true worth and merit, consequently are disposed to overvalue ourselves for owning them."

"Have we *wit*? how witless are we in prizing it, or ourselves for it, when we employ it to no good, not serving God, not benefiting men, not anywise bettering our own condition with it, when we no otherwise use it than to please ourselves or others, that is, to act the part of fools or buffoons. Have we *learning* or *knowledge*? then are we rare persons, not considering that many a bad, many a wretched person, hath had

much more than we, who hath used it to the abuse of others, to the torment of himself: and at the best, how defective our knowledge is, how mixed with error and darkness, how useless and vain, yea, how pernicious it is, if not sanctified by God's grace and managed to his service? Have we *riches*? then are we brave men, as fine and glorious in our conceit as in our outward attire; although the veriest fools, the basest and most miserable of men, do exceed us therein; although (as Aristotle saith) *most either not use it, or abuse it.* Have we *reputation*? how doth that make us highly to repute ourselves in a slavish imitation of others, yet nothing is less substantial, nothing is less felt, nothing is more easily lost, a bubble is not sooner burst nor a wave sunk, than is the opinion of men altered concerning us. Have we *power*? what doth more raise our minds? yet what is that commonly but a dangerous instrument of mischief to others; and of ruin to ourselves, at least an engagement to care and trouble? What but that hath filled the world with disasters and turned all history into tragedy? Have we *prosperous success in our affairs*? then we boast and triumph in our hearts, not remembering what the wise man saith, *the prosperity of fools destroyeth them*, that the wisest men (as Solomon), the best men (as Hezekiah), have been befooled by it."

"If we reflect either upon the common nature of men, or upon our own constitution, we cannot but find our conceits of our wisdom very absurd. Do we mark how painful the search, and how difficult the comprehension is of any truth; how hardly the most sagacious can descry any thing; how easily the most judicious mistake; how the most learned everlastingly dispute, and the wisest irreconcilably clash about matters seeming most familiar and facile; how often the most wary and steady do shift their opinions; how the wiser a man is, and the more experience he gaineth, the less confident he is in his own judgment; how dim the sight is of the most perspicua-

cious, and how shallow the conceptions of the most profound; how narrow is the horizon of our knowledge, and how immensely the region of our ignorance is extended?"

"Every man may discover in himself peculiar impediments to wisdom; every man in his complexion and in his condition may find things apt to pervert his judgment, and obstruct his acquisition of true knowledge: is his *temper sanguine*? thence becometh he quick, rash, credulous, confident, and peremptory, slippery, and fickle: is he *phlegmatic*? thence is he slow and heavy; diffident, pertinacious and stiff in his conceits; the mind is either soft and limber, so as easily to receive the impressions of falsehood speciously represented; or hard and tough, so that it cannot readily admit instruction in truth, nor correction of error. Wealth distracteth a man, or poverty disturbeth his thoughts; prosperity swelleth his mind up into vain presumptions and satisfactions, or adversity sinketh it down into unreasonable despondencies and dislikes of things; plenty breedeth sloth, want createth trouble, indisposing him to think well; ease doth rust his parts, and business weareth them out; inclination, interest, company, prejudice, do forcibly sway his apprehensions, so that no man can get himself into, or keep himself steady in a perfect balance, requisite for exact judgment of things; no man, therefore, can obtain a degree of wisdom, whereof he may with any reason be conceited: if any man conceiteth himself to be considerably wise, or intelligent, it is a plain sign that he is very ignorant, and understandeth little to any purpose."

"Self-conceit is the strongest bar to the getting wisdom, to the receiving instruction and right information about things, for he that taketh himself to be abundantly knowing, or incomparably wise, will not care to learn, will scorn to be taught. It rendereth a man in doubtful or difficult cases, unwilling to seek, and unapt to take advice; he will not care for, nor admit any counsellor but himself; hence he undertaketh

and easily is deceived, and incurreth disappointment, damage, disasters in his affairs. As it is most incident to weak, inconsiderate, lazy persons, who have not a capacity, or will not yield attention or take pains to get right notions of things, so it doth smother all industry, consideration, and circumspection; for such persons think they need no labour in searching for truth, no care in weighing arguments, no diligence in observing things; *Thus is the sluggard (as Solomon saith,) wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can render a reason.*"

Hence also we persist obstinate and incorrigible in error; for what reason can be efficacious to reclaim him, whose opinion is the greater reason? what argument can be ponderous enough to outweigh his authority? how can he, (the man of wisdom, the penetrating and profound person) yield that he hath erred? how can he part with the satisfaction of being always in the right, or endure the affront of being at any time baffled? Thus it rendereth men peevish and morose, so as to bear nobody that dissenteth from them, nor to like any thing which doth not hit their fancy; to cross their opinion and humour, is to derogate from their wisdom, and being in their apprehension so injured, they find cause to be angry. They are apt to become insolent and imperious in conversation, so as to dictate and impose their conceits upon others. He that is conceited of his own wisdom, will imagine that upon that advantage he hath a right to prescribe to others an obligation to submit, *eo ipso*, he becometh a common master and judge, and they are culpable who will not yield him a credulous ear; who will not stand to his decision."

But "*let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, (saith the prophet) neither let the mighty man glory in his riches, but let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am the Lord, which exercise loving kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth.*"

Arrogance.

“ When a man (puffed up with conceit of his own abilities, or unmeasurably affecting himself) doth assume to himself that which doth not belong to him, (more than in reason and justice is his due, in any kind, more honour, more power, more wisdom, &c.) then is he Arrogant. When he encroacheth on the rights, invadeth the liberties, intrudeth into the offices, intermeddleth with the businesses, imposeth on the judgments of others. When he will be advising, teaching, guiding, checking, controlling others without their leave or liking. When he will unduly be exercising judgment and censure upon the persons, qualities, and actions of his neighbours. The effects of this practice are, dissensions, dissatisfactions, grudges, &c. for men cannot endure such fond and unjust usurpations upon their rights, their liberties, their reputations.”—*Barrow*.

Haughtiness, Superciliousness.

Haughtiness springs from false pride, for true pride makes us desire to be superior to others in courtesy and good-breeding, as in every thing else.

Insolence.

The proud are disposed in different ways and degrees to treat others with insolence, *i. e.* to make them immediately feel their inferiority in birth, rank, wealth, power, &c.

Contumely.

All good men must, necessarily, to a certain degree, despise the vicious, but contumely we understand to express the contempt a superior feels towards an inferior; on account of some adventitious disadvantage, he has “ The rich man’s scorn, the proud man’s contumely.” The contumelious will often court

the vicious great, while they conduct themselves with insolence towards indigent worth.

Impertinence.

Impertinence implies the doing or saying things not called for by circumstances; superiors, for instance, who make use of any unnecessarily harsh expressions, or any opprobrious terms, or who, by their gestures or manners unjustifiably wound the self-love of their inferiors, are impertinent. Inferiors are impertinent, whenever they, without adequate provocation, are wanting in the respect and deference, both in looks and conduct, that are due to their superiors. But superiors are far more apt to fall into this error than inferiors, men being much more inclined to abuse power than to provoke the exercise of it. But a great degree of impertinence takes the name of insult, and as men have been known to pardon injury rather than insult, it is evident dire revenge itself may spring from impertinence, and consequently impertinence eventually prove as fatal to a rich, as to a poor man.

Sauciness, Pertness.

Sauciness and pertness are lively expressions of contempt of authority; it is sometimes perhaps a sort of silly pride of independence, that leads people to set those in power at defiance, in a ridiculous and often very provoking manner.

Desire of appearing to Advantage, or Vanity.

Vanity and Pride are sometimes used synonymously, yet there appears to be a most decided distinction discernible between them, because a man may be proud of his possessions, either intrinsic or extrinsic, without being moved by the desire of making any direct display of his real or supposed superiority: whereas, Vanity finds its gratification solely in the imme-

diate admiration and applause of men. Devoid of vanity, we might desire to be orderly and cleanly, in all our personal and domestic arrangements; but this stimulus, we suspect, serves to render us wonderfully more gay, cheerful, and animated, both at home and abroad, by exciting us to aim at appearing with greater advantage to each other in several ways. Does it not, for instance, induce the rich to expend their wealth more liberally, people of all classes to adorn their persons, the intelligent to display their talents, the accomplished their acquirements, the skilful their dexterity, numbers to shew their cultivated taste, the gentleman his breeding and knowledge of the world; and by these its various operations, do not the poor obtain much of their subsistence, and the rich instruction and delight?

The desire of pleasure and that of ease sometimes co-operate with, and are sometimes diametrically opposed to vanity; a man might desire, for instance, to marry a beautiful woman, and by doing so, his desire both of pleasure and of ease, it is evident, would be gratified, also his vanity flattered; vanity, however, may induce him to put on a tight shoe, while his desire of ease would most certainly demand a larger one. Vanity and avarice have many a hard combat in some minds, and vanity and prudence in yet more; in the one case, the struggle is between vanity and the desire of wealth, in the other the desire of good.

Fantastical.

The ridiculously vain sometimes become fantastical in their dress or manners, &c.

Pompous, Ostentatious.

They are also in various ways and degrees disposed to be pompous, ostentatious, *i. e.* to display to others how wealthy or powerful they are, or at least would appear to be.

Of Talking of One's-self.

“*Talking about One's self*, is an effect and manifest sign of immoderate Self-love,” (of undisciplined vanity). It may seem an insignificant matter, but is of great use to be considered and corrected. *To talk much of One's self*, of one's own qualities, of one's concerns, of one's actions, so as either downrightly to commend one's self, or obliquely to insinuate grounds of commendation; to catch at praise, or however to drive on our own designs and interests thereby, is a foolish and hurtful practice. It is vain, and hath not the effect desired. We thereby seek to recommend ourselves to the opinion of men, but we fail therein, for our words gain no belief. No man is looked upon as a good judge, or a faithful witness in his own case; a good judge and a faithful witness must be indifferent and disinterested; but every man is esteemed to be partial in his opinion concerning himself, to be apt to strain a point of truth and right, in passing testimony or sentence upon himself. Men have a prejudice against what is said as proceeding from a suspected witness; one who is biassed by self-love and bribed by self-interest to impose upon them. *Not he that commendeth himself is approved.*

It is fastidious, as impertinent, insignificant and insipid; spending time and beating their ears to no purpose, since men take it for an injury to suppose them so weak as to be moved by such words, or forced into a good conceit. It is odious and invidious, for they all do love themselves no less than we ourselves, and cannot endure to see those who affect to advance themselves and reign in our opinion. It prompteth them to speak evil of us, to search for faults in order to cool and check us.”

“Of all words, those which express *ourselves* and *our things*, *I*, and *mine*, &c. are the least pleasing to men's ears. It spoileth conversation, for he that loveth to speak of himself, doth least love to hear others speak of themselves, and so is

not attentive. If a man have worthy qualities and do good deeds, let them speak for him, they will of themselves extort commendation, his silence about them, his seeming to neglect them, will enhance their worth in the opinion of men. Prating about them, obtruding them upon others will mar their credit, inducing men to think them done not out of love to virtue, but for a vainglorious design. Thus did Cicero, and thus have many others clouded the glory of their virtuous deeds. Supposing you get the belief and the praise you aim at, to have complacence therein is bad, or dangerous; it is a fond satisfaction, it is a vicious pleasure, it puffeth up, it befooleth. It is against modesty. It argueth the man hath a high opinion of himself; if he believe what he saith, he hath so; if not, why would he persuade others to have it?"

"If we will be speaking of ourselves, it is allowable to speak sincerely and unaffectedly concerning our infirmities and faults, as St. Paul does of himself. There are some cases, however, wherein a man may also commend himself, as in his own defence, to maintain his authority, to urge his example, &c. So doth St. Paul often. He calleth it folly to boast (because generally such it is) yet he doth it for those ends. *Let another praise thee, and not thine own mouth; a stranger, and not thine own lips.*"

Pedantry.

Pedantry arises from a wrong estimation of one's knowledge, and thus we find the truly wise, modest and humble, even though pre-eminent in science.

To Boast, Brag.

The vain are apt to boast of what they have done, or will do, or of what they possess, or of what they wish the world to suppose they possess, or have done, or have it in their power to do.

Desire of Change.

The desire of Change betrays itself on our very entrance into life, and continually operates in us till we die. We desire change of posture, of action, of food, change of all objects affecting the senses, for the eye cannot long remain fixed upon one object, and the mind still less upon one idea. Nature seems to have implanted this desire in us, amongst many other wise purposes, in order timely to arrest us in the midst both of our labours and pleasures, lest we continue either of them to our prejudice; and happy is he, who early acquires the habit of most commonly obeying her gentle admonitions, without waiting until she upbraid him more or less loudly, for unreasonable and repeated procrastination. By doing so, he escapes numerous evils, not only temporary but permanent, for seasonable changes are indispensable to the steady well-being both of the mind and body.

Desire of Novelty.

The desire of change is the desire of not doing or not perceiving a thing of which we are become weary, or the desire of doing or of perceiving something else. But the desire of Novelty, is the desire of doing or perceiving a thing with which we have not of late been familiar, or with which we are entirely unacquainted.

This desire causes us from our earliest years, more or less eagerly to seek new objects, in order to enjoy life with greater zest, and "the charm of Novelty" is an expression, clearly denoting its peculiar, though very short-lived power, of enhancing the pleasures imparted to us by the perception of things themselves. It urges us to extend our acquaintance with nature in every way, often greatly to our advantage, and con-

tinually to aim at a variety of inventions for the purpose of varying our employments both manual and intellectual. Some men, urged by the desire of good, and animated by curiosity, travel expressly to improve some art or science for the benefit of mankind; many are stimulated to it by the desire of independence, or wealth, or both, but not a few probably roam into foreign parts, merely from the desire of novelty. It is a propensity that requires to be strongly curbed, since it is very apt to make us ever longing after yet untasted enjoyments, and if unwisely gratified, disinclines us to pursue steadily our proper avocations in life, or to remain satisfied with the variety of amusements, we can conscientiously command and indulge ourselves in; in short, it causes us to become more or less dissatisfied and wanton.

“Continual experience assures us, it is the nature of all things, pleasant merely to sense or fancy, presently to satiate: no beauty can long please the eye, no melody the ear, no delicacy the palate, no rare thing the imagination, a little time doth waste away, a small use doth wear out the pleasure which at first they afford. Novelty commendeth and ingratiateth them, distance representeth them fair and lovely, the want or absence of them rendereth them desirable, but the presence of them dulles their grace, the possession of them deadeneth the appetite to them.”—*Barrow*.

Domestic, Dissipated.

The domestic seek their pleasures commonly in the society of their family, friends, and neighbours; the dissipated in the ever shifting assemblies of strangers.

Constant, Steady, Inconstant, Unsteady.

We are disposed, in different ways and degrees, to be constant or inconstant to one or more things.

Capricious, Whimsical, Freakish.

Also to be capricious, whimsical, freakish.

Curiosity.

Curiosity seems to be, the general desire we have to penetrate the innumerable mysteries of nature, both in the intellectual and physical worlds. Not satisfied with beholding the visible effects of her very various operations, men aim to discover in what manner she more or less directly causes them. We earnestly endeavour to search out by what means it is we sometimes succeed, and sometimes fail in our several experiments and undertakings: what events have occurred both in public and private life, whence they originated, and in what manner they are connected one with the other. And these various secrets are often so cunningly wrapped up, as to exercise our utmost ingenuity to unfold them. But in making success the price of our labour, nature has enhanced the value of her gifts, for who has not experienced, more or less, the pleasure both of pursuit and of attainment, and, upon attainment, has not been eager to start a new object of pursuit?

“Man hath an insatiable curiosity and greediness of knowledge, he never rests content with, but in a manner despises the notions already acquired, always striving to enlarge and enrich his mind with intellectual treasure. So doth he continually tend somewhat nearer (though yet at an immeasurable distance) to divine Omniscience.”—*Barrow*.

The abuse of curiosity it is that renders it contemptible, whereas, the proper exercise of it serves to fill the mind with knowledge and delight, and tempts it “to take its flight farther than the stars, to extend its thoughts even beyond the utmost expansion of matter, and to make excursions into the incomprehensible inane.”

“Suppose us to have much spare time, and to want occupa-

tion, yet it is not advisable to meddle with the affairs of other men; there are divers other ways more innocent, more safe, more pleasant, more advantageous to divert ourselves, and to satisfy curiosity."

"Nature offereth herself, and her inexhaustible store of appearances to our contemplation; we may without any harm, and with much delight, survey her rich varieties, examine her proceedings, pierce into her secrets. Every kind of animal, of plants, of minerals, of meteors, presenteth matter, wherewith innocently, pleasantly, and profitably, to entertain our minds: there are many noble sciences, by applying our minds to the study whereof, we may not only divert them, but improve and cultivate them: the histories of ages past, or relations concerning foreign countries, wherein the manners of men are described, and their actions reported, may afford us useful pleasure and pastime; thereby we may learn as much, and understand the world as well, as by the most curious inquiry into the present actions of men; there we may observe, we may scan, we may tax the proceedings of whom we please, without any danger or offence: there are extant numberless books, wherein the wisest and most ingenious of men have laid open their hearts, and exposed their most secret cogitations unto us; in pursuing them we may sufficiently busy ourselves, and let our idle hours pass gratefully; we may meddle with ourselves, studying our own dispositions, examining our principles and purposes, reflecting on our thoughts, words, and actions, striving thoroughly to understand ourselves; to do this, we have an unquestionable right, and by it we shall obtain vast benefit, much greater than by puddering in the designs or doings of others."—*Barrow*.

The more subordinate classes of society, when justly and kindly dealt with, commonly find ample occupation in manual labour, and abundant satisfaction in the gratification of their

several social affections, which are unquestionably the sources of our most durable and heartfelt pleasures. Moreover, manual labour, undertaken with cheerfulness, while it wonderfully beguiles the time, leaves the mind in a state easily to be pleased, either with some homely amusement or mere repose. Nature has thus most kindly ordered, that curiosity and the desire of novelty should comparatively be little excited in persons so circumstanced, unless indeed the mind by its superior powers be rendered unusually active.

Inquisitive, Prying.

The inquisitive desire to learn the most minute particulars likely to elucidate any affair that excites their curiosity; and the prying search into every place they suspect likely to contain things, the discovery of which may betray the mystery that so mightily disquiets them.

Desire of Occupation.

Dost thou love life, then do not squander time, for that is what life is made of.—*Franklin*.

The desire of occupation continually stirs all men, more or less, and in several ways, to the use of their many operative faculties. The term Occupation seems to include all our actions, both visible and invisible, during our waking hours, when some of our faculties must necessarily be employed, since we cannot forbear thinking, though we can usually give a certain direction to our thoughts: and as the degree of control we have over ourselves greatly depends on our general habits of life, the manner of filling up our duration altogether, must of course constitute our moral conduct in the sight of God. Thus any labour of the mind, or of the hands, or recreation, or mere reverie, all are what we call occupation; and we are said

to be virtuous or vicious according as we are commonly upon the whole well or ill occupied.

Our occupations we class under three distinct heads—Business, Relaxation, and Pleasure. We call every sort of occupation business, that immediately or remotely tends to improve our intellect, or morals, or worldly affairs, or to confer a benefit upon any individual, or community, or upon mankind in general in any manner whatsoever; likewise the observance of any religious rites enjoined us by our conscience as necessary to our spiritual welfare. Relaxation—whatever is necessary to the wholesome refreshment of our faculties after labour. Pleasure—all actions which have for their object the attainment of agreeable emotions or sensations. By ordaining that frequent relaxation from business and occasional pleasures should be indispensable to our content and permanent well-being, God seems most clearly to have expressed his intention, that we should enjoy our existence at the same time that we render it useful to others; and, by making too long continued relaxation or pleasure, as wearisome, and yet more baneful to us than uninterrupted application to business, he has given us no less unequivocal proofs, that business is as much the proper relief to relaxation and pleasure, as pleasure and relaxation is to business. Besides, the things for which man has the most urgent and continual occasion, imperiously demand regular periodical returns to labour, in order to direct, to arrange, to produce, to manufacture, and to preserve them clean and sound. “Voluntary labour, taken in due place and season, doth save much exertion afterward; and moderate care enables a man commonly to pass his life with ease, comfort, and delight; whereas, idleness frequently doth let slip opportunities and advantages which cannot with ease be retrieved, and letteth things fall into a bad case, out of which they can hardly be recovered.”—*Barrow*.

Industry, Sloth.*

“ To industrious study is to be ascribed the invention and perfection of all those arts, whereby human life is civilized, and the world cultivated with numberless accommodations, ornaments, and beauties. All the comely, the stately, the pleasant and useful works, which we view with delight or enjoy with comfort, industry did contrive them—industry did frame them.”

“ Industry reared those magnificent fabrics and those commodious houses; it formed those goodly pictures and statues; it raised those convenient causeys, those bridges, those aqueducts; it planted those fine gardens with various flowers and fruits; it clothed those pleasant fields with corn and grass; it built those ships whereby we plough the seas, reaping the commodities of foreign regions. It hath subjected all creatures to our command and service, enabling us to subdue the fiercest, to catch the wildest, to render the gentler sort most tractable and useful to us. It taught us from the wool of the sheep, from the hair of the goat, from the labours of the silkworm, to weave our clothes to keep us warm, to make us fine and gay. It helpeth us, from the inmost bowels of the earth, to fetch divers needful tools and utensils.”

“ It collected mankind into cities, and compacted them into orderly societies, and devised wholesome laws, under shelter whereof we enjoy safety and peace, wealth and plenty, mutual succour and defence, sweet conversation, and beneficial communication. It by meditation did invent all those sciences whereby our minds are enriched and ennobled, our manners are refined and polished, our curiosity is satisfied, our life is benefited.”

“ But when Sloth creepeth in, then all things corrupt and decay. Sloth, indeed, doth affect ease and quiet, but by affecting them doth lose them; it hateth labour and trouble, but by hating them doth incur them. Whereas industry be-

* All quotations in this section are taken from Dr. Barrow.

gets ease by procuring good habits and facility of acting things expedient for us to do. By taking pains to-day we shall need the less pains to-morrow; and by continuing the exercise within a while, we shall need no pains at all, but perform the most difficult tasks of duty or of benefit to us with perfect ease, yea, commonly with great pleasure. What sluggish people account hard and irksome (as to rise early, to hold close to study, to business,) will be natural and sweet, as proceeding from another nature, raised in us by use."

"By Industry we understand a steady application of mind, joined with a vigorous exercise of our active faculties, in prosecution of any reasonable, honest, useful design, in order to the accomplishment or attainment of some more or less considerable good, and not merely *action*, for that is incessant in all persons, our mind being a restless thing, never abiding in a total cessation from thought or from design."

"But the mind doth naturally affect variety and liberty, being often apt to loathe familiar objects, and to be weary of any constraint; it is therefore not easily detained in a constant attention to the same thing, and the corporeal instruments of action being strained to a high pitch, or long held in a certain tone, soon feel lassitude somewhat offensive to nature, whence labour or pain is commonly reckoned an ingredient of industry; and upon which account it is, that this virtue deserveth peculiar commendation, it being most laudable to follow the dictates of reason, when so doing is attended with difficulty and trouble. All virtue doth require much industry, and that must necessarily itself be a great virtue, which is the mother, the nurse, the guardian of all virtues whatsoever; yea, which is indeed an ingredient and constitutive part of every virtue; for if virtue were easily obtainable or practicable without a good measure of pains, how could it be virtue? What excellency could it have, what praise could it claim, what reward could it expect?"

“The very nature and essence of virtue doth consist in the most difficult and painful efforts of soul, in the extirpating rooted prejudices and notions from our understanding, in bending a stiff will, and rectifying crooked inclinations; in over-ruling a rebellious temper, in curbing eager and importunate appetites, in taming wild passions, in withstanding violent temptations, in surmounting many difficulties, and sustaining many troubles; in struggling with various unruly lusts within, and encountering many stout enemies abroad, which assault our reason and *war against our soul*. What attention, what circumspection and vigilancy of mind and intention of spirit, what force of resolution, what command and care over ourselves doth it require also, to keep our hearts from vain thoughts and evil desires; to guard our tongue from wanton, unjust, uncharitable discourse; to order our steps uprightly and steadily in all the paths of duty? It is no small task even to know it, wherein it consisteth, and what is demanded of us; but it is a far more painful thing to conform our practice unto its rules and dictates.”

“But to be impertinently busy, doing that which conduceth to no good purpose, is in some respect worse than to forbear all action; for 'tis a positive abuse of our faculties and trifling with God's gifts; 'tis a throwing away labour and care, things valuable in themselves; 'tis often a running out of the way, which is worse than standing still; 'tis a debasing our reason to be solicitous and serious about trifles; and a man will soon be weary of that labour which yieldeth no profit nor beneficial return. How assiduously intent and eager may we observe men to be at sports; how soon will they rise to go forth to them; with what constancy and patience will they toil in them all the day; how long will they sit poring on their games, dispensing with their food and sleep for it. But how much in such cases do men forget what they are doing, that sport should be sport, not work; to divert and relax us, not to em-

ploy and busy us; to take off our minds a little, not wholly to take them up; not to exhaust or tire our spirits, but to refresh and cheer them, that they may return with renewed vigour to grave and useful occupation."

There is another industry, however, worse than that, the devising and compassing of mischief. As no great good, so neither can any great evil be effected without much pains; and if we consider the characters or the practices of those who have been famous mischief-makers, the pests of mankind and disturbers of the world, we shall find them to have been no sluggards. How studiously will they plod, how restlessly will they trudge, what carking and drudgery will they endure in driving on projects of ambition and avarice. How intent are some to over-reach, to circumvent, to supplant their neighbour; how sore pains will some take to seduce, corrupt, and debauch others; how active will some be in sowing strife, in raising factions, in fomenting disorders, in the world."

"These two sorts of vain and bad industry, the prophet Isaiah seemeth to describe in these words—'They hatch cockatrice eggs, and weave the spider's web;' of which expressions one may denote mischievous, the other frivolous diligence."

"A noble heart will disdain to subsist like a drone upon the honey gathered by others' labour, like a vermin to filch its food out of the public granary, or like a shark to prey on the lesser fry; but will rather outdo his private obligations to other men's care and toil, by considerable service and beneficence to the public; for there is no calling of any sort, from the sceptre to the spade, the management whereof with any good success, any credit, any satisfaction, doth not demand much work of the head, or of the hands, or of both. Is a man a governor, or a superior in any capacity, what is he but a public servant doomed to continual labour, hired for the wages of respect and pomp to wait on his people, and he will find that

to wield power innocently, to brandish the sword of justice discreetly and worthily, for the maintenance of right and encouragement of virtue, for the suppression of injury and correction of vice, is a matter of no small skill and slight care; and he that is obliged to purvey for so many, and so to abound in good works, how can he want business? How can he pretend to a writ of ease?"

"No industrious man, however mean his estate, is contemptible, for he is ever looked upon as being in a way of thriving, of working himself out of many straits, and of advancing himself into a better condition; and who can be ignorant, that no wit alone or strength of parts can suffice without great industry to frame any science, to learn any one tongue, to know the history of nature or of Providence?"

The folly that some persons have of priding themselves upon an exemption from labours the most indispensable to our wants, comforts, and even advancement in every art and science, is to be exceeded only by that of fancying superiority attached to the not knowing, or not being able to do many things that are most commonly imposed upon people of inferior rank; for really there is no one so senseless nor so despicable, who cannot pretend to excel in the accomplishments of ignorance and of helplessness. But ought we not rather to remember that "industry is needful to guard us from the temptations and mischiefs to which wealth doth expose us, that it do not prove a treacherous snare, an unwieldy burthen, a destructive poison and plague to us, throwing us into pride and vanity, into luxury, into stupidity, into distracting solicitude, into a base worldly and earthly temper of heart, into a profane oblivion of God and of our own soul."

He who is obliged to toil for his daily bread is often under the necessity of confining his industry strictly to the operations connected with his particular line of business, but a son of fortune "is not staked to one pursuit, he has immense fields

of contemplation, wherein he may everlastingly expatiate with great proficiency and delight; and if the eye be not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing, how much less is the mind satiated with the pleasures of speculating, and observing that immense variety of objects subject to its view."

"Money is a defence of which fortune may bereave us, but wisdom is beyond its attacks, being a treasure seated in a place inaccessible to external impressions; and do we not deserve great blame, displeasure, and disgrace from mankind, if having such opportunities of qualifying ourselves to do good and serve the public, we by our idleness render ourselves worthless and useless. Moreover no man can quite decline business, or disengage himself from duty, without infinite damage and mischief accruing to himself."

"Industry will sweeten all our enjoyments and season them with a grateful relish, for when a man hath done his best toward the despatch of his work, he will then comfortably take his ease and enjoy his pleasure; then his food doth taste savourily, then his divertisements and recreations have a lively gustfulness, then his sleep is very sound and pleasant, according to that of the preacher, *'the sleep of the labouring man is sweet.'* Besides, the very exercise of industry immediately in itself is delightful, and hath an innate satisfaction which tempereth all annoyances, and even ingratiateth the pains going with it. Moreover, those accommodations prove most delightful which our industry hath procured to us, we looking on them with a special tenderness of affection, as on the children of our endeavours, we being sensible at what costs of care and pains we purchased them."

"It is with us as with other things in nature, which by motion are preserved in their native purity and perfection, in their sweetness, in their lustre, rest corrupting, debasing, and defiling them; if the water runneth it holdeth clear, sweet, and fresh; if the air be fanned by winds, it is pure and wholesome,

but from being shut up it groweth thick and putrid; if metals be employed they abide smooth and splendid, but lay them by, and they soon contract rust; if the earth be belaboured with culture it yieldeth corn, but lying neglected, it will be overgrown with brakes and thistles, and the better the soil is, the ranker weeds it will produce: all nature is upheld in its being, order, and state, by constant agitation; every creature is incessantly employed in action conformable to its designed end and use; in like manner the preservation and improvement of our faculties depend on their constant and wholesome exercise."

"Finally, industry doth afford a lasting comfort deposited in the memory and conscience of him that practiseth it. It will ever, upon the reviewing the passages of his life, be sweet to him to behold in them testimonies and monuments of his diligence; it will please him to consider that he hath lived to purpose, that he hath made an advantageous use of his time, that he hath well husbanded the talents committed to him, that he hath accomplished, to a certain degree, the intent of God's bounty, and made some return for his many excellent gifts."—

Barrow.

CHAPTER XIII.

Primary Dispositions.—Consistency, Inconsistency.

Primary Dispositions.

UPON attentively considering the actions of a child, it is seldom difficult to discover, whether it be naturally active or indolent, patient or impatient, courageous or fearful, bold or timid, &c. Also whether it be easily disposed to love and hate, to be angry, resentful, jealous, &c.

Activity, Indolence.

We term those Active, who more or less, earnestly desire to be continually employed, well or ill; Indolent, such as usually appear reluctant to make any exertion, either for the regular discharge of their duties, or for the enjoyment of pleasure. The constitutionally indolent often rest satisfied with quietly idling away their time, but the constitutionally active, if they be not periodically and usefully engaged, are apt to become troublesome and dangerous subjects of the commonwealth, as well as restless and harassing inmates of a family. But it is easy to discern that mental activity is united in some persons with corporeal indolence, and in others *vice versa*; many of the former injure their health by the indulgence of sedentary habits, while the latter but too often utterly neglect the improvement of their understanding. These two descrip-

tions of character, it is self-evident, must so far require diametrically opposite discipline. The great difficulty of managing the active is commonly to prevent their doing what they ought not to do; of the indolent, to induce them to do what they ought to do.

Diligent, Assiduous, Busy, Idle, Dawdling.

The active are commonly disposed to be more or less diligent and assiduous; the indolent, idle and dawdling.

Quick, Hasty, Precipitate, Slow, Dilatory.

The active to be precipitate, &c. the indolent, dilatory.

Alert, Watchful, Vigilant, Unmindful, Negligent.

The active to be vigilant, the indolent, unmindful, &c.

Ennui.

Those persons, it is observed, who make not a rational distribution of their time, are most apt to experience this disagreeable feeling. Ennui expresses, we apprehend, the mind being uneasy in a state of inactivity, though wanting, at the moment, the energy to rouse itself to exertion; for those who are disposed to employ themselves, but are prevented doing so, either by circumstances, or by prohibition, suffer from the restraint, and not from Ennui properly so called. The idle and dissipated very frequently wish to be agreeably occupied without the trouble of making an effort.

Patience, Impatience.

Patience, we believe, expresses a generally unruffled state of mind, under the ordinary and frequent uneasinesses of life. Impatience the reverse of this. Some patient children are too

dull to be easily moved, others again give the fairest promise of fine intellect, united with the most amiable temper and dispositions. Of the Impatient there are, who want perseverance in all they undertake, but some of them, by being early disciplined to control their too great eagerness either for action or possession, or compliance from others, become very active and steady members of society.

Patience seems at first view to include fortitude, they being both of them the enduring with composure, any mental or bodily uneasiness; but we suspect many who are generally patient, sometimes want fortitude to bear excess of pain, and that others, on the contrary, who shew great fortitude upon extraordinary occasions, are not always distinguished for their habitual patience; most probably, however, patience and fortitude are not often found separated.

“The word Patience hath, in common usage, a double meaning, taken from the relation it bears unto two sorts of objects, somewhat different. As it respecteth provocations to anger and revenge by injuries or discourtesies, it signifieth a disposition of mind to endure them with charitable meekness; as it relateth to adversities and crosses, disposed to us by Providence, it importeth a pious undergoing and sustaining them; of the latter it is said; *If when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently; this is acceptable to God.* Of the former; *who when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not.*”

Patience then is that virtue, which qualifyeth us to bear all conditions and all events, by God's disposal incident to us, with such apprehensions and persuasions of mind, such dispositions and affections of heart, such external deportments and practices of life, as God requireth, and good reason directeth. It is abstaining from all irregular and unworthy courses toward the removal, or redress of our crosses; chusing rather to abide quietly under their pressure, than by any unwarrantable

means to relieve or relax ourselves ; contentedly bearing, rather than violently *breaking our yoke*, or *bursting our bonds* ; rather continuing poor, than striving to enrich ourselves by fraud or rapine ; rather lying under contempt, than by sordid or sinful compliances, attempting to gain the favour and respect of men ; rather enduring any inconvenience or distress, than having recourse to any succour, which God disalloweth. It is observing a fair behaviour toward the instruments and abettors of our affliction, those who brought us into it, or those who detain us under it, by keeping off relief, or sparing to yield the succour which we might expect ; the forbearing to express any wrath or displeasure, to exercise any revenge, to retain any grudge, or enmity toward them, but rather for their reproaches, exchanging good words and wishes, for their outrages repaying benefits and good turns, according to that evangelical rule, *Bless them that persecute you.*

“ In fine, patience doth include and produce a general meekness and kindness of affection, together with an enlarged sweetness and pleasantness in conversation and carriage toward all men : implying that how hard soever our case, how sorry or sad our condition is, we are not therefore angry with the world, because we do not thrive or flourish in it ; that we are not dissatisfied or disgusted with the prosperous estate of other men ; that we are not become sullen or froward toward any man, because his fortune excelleth ours, but that rather, we do *rejoice with them that rejoice*, we do find complacency and delight in their good success, we borrow satisfaction and pleasure from their enjoyments. In these and the like acts, the practice of this virtue (a virtue, which all men in this state of inward weakness and outward trouble, shall have much need and frequent occasion to exercise) consisteth, unto which practice, even philosophy, natural reason, and common sense, do suggest many inducements, and the tenor of our holy faith and religion do supply many more and better.”—*Barrow.*

Submission, Resignation.

The patient are commonly disposed to submit or resign themselves to the will of God.

Perseverance.

Also to persevere, in order to accomplish whatever they undertake, even though at first there may appear little probability of success to encourage them to proceed.

Content, Discontent.

Content must of course imply a satisfied—Discontent, a dissatisfied state of mind. A contented person may do his utmost to remove, or to escape from any inconveniences he suffers, or to improve his situation in life, but he will at the same time endeavour altogether cheerfully to bear those adverse circumstances he imagines unavoidable. Some persons are scarcely to be disturbed, while others are almost always fretting against the compliances reasonably required of them, or about the present order of things. We here speak of the habitual tenor of the mind, not of those idle wishes, that occasionally molest the most moderate and easily pleased.

Whatever tends to promote his virtue and health, will serve to dispose the individual to cheerfulness and content, but if he still require other assistance to reconcile him to his destiny, let him

“ Measure lots

With less distinguish'd than himself, that thus

He may with patience bear his mod'rate ills,

And sympathize with others suff'ring more.”—*Cowper.*

But doubtless there are many miserable creatures, who

“ From ev'ry joy the heart can feel excluded

Must arise, worn out and faint with unremitting woe.”

Southey.

If discontent therefore still assail thee,

“ Take physic, Pomp,
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
That thou may'st shake the superflux to them,
And shew the Heav'ns more just.”

“ Contentedness is the virtue which, of all others, doth render this world acceptable, and constituteth a kind of temporal heaven, which he that hath, is thereby *ipso facto*, in good measure happy, whatever other things he may seem to want; which he that wanteth, doth, however otherwise he be furnished, become miserable, and carrieth a kind of hell within him; it cannot therefore, but well deserve our best study about it, and care to get it, in imitation of St. Paul, who *had learned, in whatever state he was, therein to be content.*”

“ The object of contentedness is the present state of things, whatever it be, (whether prosperous or adverse, of eminency or meanness, of abundance or scantiness) wherein by Divine Providence we are set: for it is ordinary and natural for men, who have not exercised themselves in the practice of this duty, to be dissatisfied and disquieted in every state; to be always in want of something, to find defects in every fortune; to fancy they may be in better case, and to be uneasy in the desire of it. If we estimate things wisely, rich men are more liable to discontent than poor men. It is observable that men of highest fortune are apt most easily to resent the smallest things; a little neglect, a slight word, an unpleasing look doth affect them more than reproaches, blows, wrongs, do those of a mean condition. Prosperity is a nice and squeamish thing, and it is hard to find any thing able to please men of a full and thriving estate; whereas a good meal, a small gift, a little gain, or good success of his labour, doth produce in a poor man a very solid pleasure: whence contentedness hath place,

and is needful in every condition, be it in appearance never so prosperous, so plentiful, so pleasant."

"If we be rich, we should get a large and bountiful heart, otherwise our wealth will hang loose about us; the care and trouble in keeping it, the suspicion and fear of losing it, the desire of amplifying it, the unwillingness to spend or use it, will bereave us of all true satisfaction therein, and render it no less unsavoury to us, than unprofitable to others. If poor, we should have a frugal, provident, industrious mind, sparing in desires, willing to take pains, able to digest hardships, otherwise the straitness of our condition will pinch and gall us."

"Are we high in dignity or reputation? we then need a mind well ballasted with sober thoughts, otherwise the wind of vanity will drive us into absurd behaviours, thence will dash us upon disappointments, and consequently plunge us into vexation and discontent. Are we mean and low? we need a meek and humble, a calm and steady spirit; not affecting little respects, or resenting the want of them, apt to pass over, or to bear quietly petty affronts and neglects, not easily to be moved by words signifying contempt or disdain; else (being fretted with such things, which in this ill-natured and hard-hearted world, we may be sure often to meet with) we shall be uneasy in our minds, and impatiently wish a change of our state. Real adversity, poverty, and disgrace, have naturally the strongest influence in disturbing and disordering our minds, Contentedness, therefore, is plainly most needful in such cases, as its proper support or medicine."—*Barrow*.

Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction.

We may derive satisfaction from any circumstance that answers our present wishes; or from the recollection of any which concerns either ourselves or others. It implies content that things are as well, or no worse, than they are. A high

degree of satisfaction takes the name of pleasure, joy, delight; for instance, a man may be satisfied with his success in any undertaking, or be rejoiced, or delighted at it. Dissatisfaction when intense, becomes grief, &c. The terms satisfaction and dissatisfaction are very commonly applied, to express the consciousness of our moral rectitude or obliquity.

Courage, Fearfulness.

Being courageous, is the being constitutionally or habitually prepared to encounter any pain or difficulties whatsoever, and to face any dangers without dismay.

“ Distress and danger should our courage fire,
Move generous thoughts, and brave resolves inspire.”

Fearfulness is the want of courage.

Bravery, Cowardice.

Bravery commonly expresses the habitual courage of a soldier, or his readiness to expose himself upon any warlike emergency. Cowardice is the want of Bravery.

Firm, Resolute, Intrepid, Adventurous, Daring, Rash, Wavering, Irresolute, Apprehensive, Pusillanimous.

The courageous are resolute, intrepid, &c. both to decide and to act; the fearful, apprehensive, pusillanimous, &c.

Presence of Mind.

Presence of mind, implies its retaining the powers of perception, discernment, and judgment, in the hour of danger, and thus being fully prepared to overcome, if possible, any difficulties that may occur. The want of it, on the contrary, expresses that the mind loses itself, and is not present to direct

its fellow-labourer, the body, in their common distress. It seems to be courage operating in an intelligent mind. How far this highly important quality is to be improved by habit, is difficult to guess, but certain it is, we discover very various degrees of it in the most youthful minds.

Fortitude.

Fortitude denotes a steady courage to bear the excess of suffering with composure. Experience assures us there are many who have courage to face danger, and yet want fortitude to bear pain, and *vice versa*.

Boldness, Timidity.

The term Boldness implies a readiness to appear unabashed before our equals and superiors, and which readiness denotes our being free commonly from any lively apprehensions of suffering annoyance from their criticisms, whether heard or suspected. Timidity is a proneness to shrink from such encounters. We find boldness to be compatible with fearfulness, and timidity with courage, for he who can with the utmost boldness present himself in a fashionable assembly, is often the first to turn upon his heels at the hint of danger, while the man of courage will undauntedly risk his life, though he may be too timid perhaps, even to address himself to a stranger without confusion.

Confidence, Assurance, Presumption, Impudence, Effrontery, Audaciousness.

A proper degree of boldness we term confidence, the excess of it, assurance, effrontery, &c.

Modesty, Bashfulness, Shyness, Sheepishness.

A desirable degree of timidity is called modesty, the excess of it, bashfulness, &c.

Intruding.

The bold are disposed, more or less, to be intruding their company, or services, &c. even where they are as little expected as desired.

Confidence, Diffidence.

Confidence in its most comprehensive sense, expresses the continual hope we entertain, that we are equal to doing what might reasonably be expected of us, and in supporting with becoming dignity the annoyances, difficulties, and calamities, to which we may be variously exposed. Diffidence, the continual fear of exposing our inability, or want of courage and fortitude.

Docility, Obstinacy.

Docility is a readiness to yield to the authority and wishes of others: obstinacy, a determined adherence to one's own decision, and often a desire sternly to resist opposition. The docile being commonly easily persuaded, the artful sometimes obtain a very dangerous ascendancy over them; the obstinate will, on the contrary, frequently punish themselves, rather than gratify their opposers; thus the docile are occasionally won over to their own loss, while the obstinate miss some advantages by their pertinacity.

Tractable, Perverse, Froward.

The docile are more or less apt to be tractable, and the obstinate perverse and froward; but frowardness expresses



rather a temporary, than an habitual obstinacy, a momentary determination to gratify one's present whim, rather than to listen to reason.

Reserved, Unreserved.

We call those reserved, who are not so communicative as they might be, with advantage both to themselves and others. The unreserved readily hold intercourse even with strangers. The reserved are many of them apt to prove safer friends or associates, than pleasant companions: some of the unreserved the contrary. We abhor cunning and treachery, (if possible) yet more in the unreserved, than in the reserved, but we sooner forgive indiscretion in the former, because we are more on our guard against it. The unreserved do well to bear in mind the advice of Polonius,

“ Give every man thine ear, but few thy voice,
Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment.”

To be Secret, to Divulge, to Blab.

The reserved are commonly more to be depended upon in matters of secrecy than the unreserved, who are some of them very apt to divulge what has been communicated to them confidentially, and this without the least intention of injuring the parties concerned. The indulgence of such a propensity is, however, strongly to be reprobated; and when it is done with an evil design, we term it treachery.

Decisive, Indecisive.

A decisive character seems to originate either from a readiness at perceiving and judging what is proper to be done under certain circumstances, and the manner of doing it, or from

a blindness to the advantage of considering before we act; and this hastiness may be owing either to weakness of intellect or want of patience; when to the latter, children must be checked, and habitually made to weigh the consequences of what they are about to do. Indecision may arise from an incapacity to discern quickly the ways and means of accomplishing one's object, or to an unreasonable apprehension of judging amiss. Persons of this last description often allow the moment for action to pass. But

“ There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life,
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
————— Being on a full sea,
We must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.”

Attentive, Inattentive.

We cannot but observe in some children an habitual attention to what is passing around them; while others seem as it were to have their senses most frequently closed against the reception of impressions from without; but whether this arises from the extraordinary activity of the powers within, or from a dulness in them to entertain numerous and successive objects, must be determined by the future developement of their minds. Early education has doubtless also great effect upon the individual, by exciting his attention or allowing it unseasonably to slumber. Besides this, profound researches, repeated misfortunes, continued ill-health, and even strict habits of retirement, will likewise serve to render persons more or less apt to be absent, though that may not be their natural bent.

Thoughtful, Contemplative, Meditative.

We are insensibly or voluntarily disposed to be more or less thoughtful, meditative, &c.

To Recollect, Remember, Forget.

And also more or less apt to remember or forget.

Love, Hatred.

Infants, as soon as they are capable of *discernment*, love those from whom they generally obtain what is pleasant to them, and hate such as cause them pain, or affect their senses disagreeably.

Anger—*Mild, Meek, Gentle, Passionate, Fierce.*

Anger expresses the irritation of the mind upon receiving any real or supposed offence or injury. Some persons are fiercely passionate; others altogether gentle; and we see in mankind every shade between these two extremes.

“ But if your wrathful blood is apt to boil,
Or are your nerves too irritably strung,
Wave all dispute; be cautious how you joke;
Keep Lent for ever and forswear the bowl;
For one rash moment sends you to the shades,
Or shatters ev’ry hopeful scheme of life,
And gives to horror all your days to come.
While choler works, good friend, you may be wrong;
Distrust yourself, and sleep before you fight,
’Tis not too late tomorrow to be brave;
If honour bid, tomorrow kill or die.”

“ But calm advice against a raging fit
Avails too little; and it braves the power
Of all that ever taught in prose or song,
To tame the fiend, that sleeps a gentle lamb
But wakes a lion.”——*Armstrong.*

Indignation.

Indignation is anger mixed with contempt. We feel indignant at the abuse of power, whether moral or physical, also at the discovery of any mean or base conduct towards a friend or benefactor, &c.

Vexation.

Vexation seems to denote the union of sorrow and anger, the being disturbed about some circumstances, either past or present, that *betray* one's mismanagement, or inability, or the mismanagement or inability of those one employs, or the occurrence of some untoward accident. Sorrow or anger preponderate according to the subject of annoyance in question. When sorrow on such occasions is not mixed with anger we use the term regret.

Resentment.

Resentment is the consequence of anger, or rather perhaps anger is itself the *immediate* resentment of an offence or injury.

Were man devoid of resentment, the virtuous would be without the strongest, or rather the only effectual defence they have against the frequent machinations of the wicked, and society could not long continue to exist. Men, in community resent the violations of the laws; individuals resent offences committed against themselves—the most forbearing, by withdrawing their confidence from the indiscreet—by closing their doors against the treacherous—by avoiding the presence of the ill-conducted.

Grudge, Spleen, Spite, Malice.

Malice, &c. expresses the resentment of a base mind earnestly desiring to vent its spite in every practicable way con-

sistent with its own safety, and the malicious thus often visit petty offences with repeated and severe injuries.

Revenge.

Revenge is the excess of resentment; a generous mind is incapable of malice, though it sometimes takes revenge of such offences, as it is possible for human nature to forgive, but never to forget.

Irreconcilable, Vindictive, Implacable, Rancorous.

The revengeful are disposed to be more or less irreconcilable, rancorous, &c.

Retaliation, Recrimination.

Retaliation is the requital of an offence, dealing out measure for measure. It is somewhat difficult to prescribe exact limits to the spirit of retaliation between children, because if the quarrelsome and violent be not sometimes made immediately to suffer the same sort of annoyance they wantonly inflict upon others, there is infinite danger of their not only subduing the gentle and peaceable, but also of their acquiring confirmed habits of domineering and cruelty; but, on the other hand, should retaliation be encouraged, or even frequently permitted, it may very possibly foster the direful spirit of revenge. At all events, however, we shall find safety in taking very frequent occasion to commend forbearance, and in reminding them of the divine exhortation, "be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good," and bid them

"For every trifle scorn to take offence."

Forgiveness.

Forgiveness must necessarily imply the ceasing not only to express, but to entertain any resentment for an offence or injury received.

Forbearance.

Forbearance is the withholding the power of retaliation or revenge. It originates either in the desire of good or in fear; in the former case we always forbear to resent an injury when prudence allows us to do so; in the latter, when we dread any possible evil consequences recurring to ourselves from the indulgence of our rancorous feelings.

Reconciliation.

Reconciliation may or may not follow forgiveness. It implies a more or less complete return to former habits of intimacy; but doubtless there are injuries that bar the door to reconciliation, though not to forgiveness.

Apology, Compensation, Reparation, Requit, Restitution.

Regret and penitence render us more or less ready, and often anxious to apologize, or to make compensation, reparation, &c. according to the degree of the offence or injury we have either purposely or unintentionally done another.

Gratitude.

As anger is the consequence of offence or injury, so is gratitude the natural result of a kindness or substantial benefit received. Few creatures are there who are not occasionally grateful, and desirous of making some sort of return for obligations bestowed; but the grateful entertain warm sentiments of regard towards their benefactors, and watch opportunities of expressing it by active services and sedulous attentions.

Jealousy, Envy, Covetousness, Rapaciousness.

The term Jealousy expresses the uneasiness we suffer from the fear of being deprived of the love, esteem, or favour of

another, or from our persuasion of having lost it. Thus we are apt to feel a greater or less degree of irritation upon perceiving or suspecting that the person whose esteem, favour, or love, we think we are best or equally entitled to, or desire to retain, has shewn a marked preference for another; and thus a man may be jealous of his wife, parents and children mutually jealous of each other, a courtier of the king's favour, or a servant of his master's, &c.

Mr. Locke defines Envy to be "an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire that is in the possession of another, and of which we would deprive him."

Yet it appears to us that envy may be either of a more or less liberal or base nature. The feeling we have, for example, towards a successful rival or competitor, if it be not *envy* what name can we give it? The character of it is similar, since we would not only have occupied his place if we could, but must necessarily, from our very nature, regret our lost hopes of obtaining what we consider an enviable object. Envy is an emotion in fact that cannot be entirely a stranger to the breast of a creature constituted and circumstanced like man; but, after disturbing him, it affords him opportunities of shewing striking proofs of the moral beauty of his mind. All must greatly admire the generous sentiments many are capable of subsequently entertaining towards the very instruments not only of their disappointment, but of their mortification. Even intentional injuries are commonly perhaps easier to pardon than such defeats.

A lover is jealous of his mistress but envious of his rival; this jealousy remains as long as she betrays a marked preference for another; but he transfers his envy to any man who is successively distinguished by her, with or without the intention however of taking any unjustifiable measures to supplant him. But when envy excites covetousness, then it appears in all its deformity:—"thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife," saith

the Decalogue. Envy must in such cases, it is evident, be the foundation of the wish to deprive a neighbour of his lawful good; it takes possession of the mind previous, as it were, to the entrance of covetousness into it. Yet covetousness does not necessarily include envy, since a man may be covetous of wealth, beauty, &c. wherever to be obtained, without envying any one in particular. Most of our directing dispositions are apt to excite covetousness, for the ambitious, the proud, the vain, &c. all desire wealth. Excessive covetousness takes the name of rapaciousness, and the rapacious too often prove insatiable in their demands, or extortions from others.

Jealousy seems to have been made part of our nature, in order to impose an additional wholesome restraint upon us; for were we not jealous of the regard both of our friends and of men in general, we should be still more inattentive to their wants and pleasures—still more disposed to indulge our selfish at the expense of our social feelings. Possession serves to lull our fears, jealousy to awaken them, and to render us more alert in steadily fulfilling those kindly offices, that tend greatly to strengthen and confirm our several sorts and degrees of attachment towards each other. The direful effects of exasperated jealousy are but too well known. Revenge united with jealousy prompted Iago exultingly to exclaim,

“ Not poppy nor mandragora,
Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world,
Shall ever med’cine to thee that sweet sleep
That thou own’st yesterday.”

To Long for, to Hanker after.

We long or hanker after a thing we suppose will, or recollect to have afforded us pleasure, and which we sometimes imagine we should particularly relish or enjoy at the present moment; or we hanker after what we are more or less doubt-

ful of being able to obtain, yet are very unwilling to relinquish the hope of possessing it.

Venal, Mercenary.

The venal and mercenary are seldom disposed to render services to others without a pecuniary reward, or something equivalent to it.

To Grudge.

We more or less grudge giving to one we think will not make a proper use of our gift, or because we do not like to part with it. We also grudge taking what we consider useless trouble, or to mispend our time. When we give either our time, pains, or money, contrary to our inclination, we give them from the fear of otherwise displeasing the person in question or some connexion of his, and thus bringing upon ourselves the loss of their affection or goodwill, or from the apprehension of incurring some other evil.

Consistency, Inconsistency.

When we take into consideration the multifarious powers and propensities of man, his original and acquired character, the innumerable objects he is capable of perceiving and of being differently affected by at the different periods of his life, the vast variety of circumstances that are continually occurring to him, and the changes he himself and most things about him are perpetually undergoing, we cannot be at a loss to account for his Inconsistencies, numerous as they are. He in whom the desire of good predominates acts inconsistently when he wilfully or carelessly injures his neighbour, or defrauds his dependents, or gratifies his caprices at the expense of his family, &c. But tender pity for another's suffering is not to be expected from the harsh and cruel; nor a generous act from a miser; nor disinterested candour from a hypocrite, &c.

If we be curious to discover the more or less immediate causes of such and similar anomalies of the human mind, we must endeavour to learn by what unusual impressions any one was at the moment influenced, what desire became the unlooked for "lord of the ascendant," whether it was the desire of pleasure, or of ease, or ambition, or what other that thus unexpectedly assumed the empire of the mind, and caused it to act inconsistently with its wonted impulses.

CHAPTER XIV.

Experience.—Wisdom, Folly.—Prudence, Imprudence.—Cause and Effect.—Design, Chance.—Habit, Custom, Fashion.—Example, Precept.—Ruling Passions.

Experience.

“THE *present* only has a being in nature ; things *past* have a being in the memory only ; but things *to come* have no being at all, the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present, which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience.”—*Hobbes*.

As it is general Experience that ought most commonly to determine the decisions of our reason, we will here examine the nature of it. Man being endowed with both mental and corporeal powers to act, and with desires to impel him to the use of them, and being subjected to be very variously affected by his thoughts as well as sensations, he becomes aware that things operate upon him in different ways, and excite in him several degrees of pleasure and pain, according as they are differently applied.

In thus making the same things sometimes beneficial, sometimes injurious to him, and that in infinite degrees, nature, in order to direct him to an advantageous use of the vast variety presented to his choice, implanted in him a constant desire of

ease, pleasure, and good, and of aversion to uneasiness, pain, and evil. But as some things that produce pleasant sensations do nevertheless cause evil, and *vice versa*, it was farther necessary for him to be cautioned against remote consequences; with perception therefore to apprehend present pleasure and pain, he was gifted with judgment to trace the relations between causes and their effects, and memory to register his observations, and the result of these various operations of the mind, and the exercise of the several senses, is that we call experience. Experience then we find to be a collection of observations made successively by man in his progress through life, and some of which he carefully records, not only for the use of the present, but for the advantage of future generations. The immutability of nature together with experience, it is, that teaches us to anticipate consequences of actions, as far as they are independent of any direct or indirect interference, to beware of fallacious pleasures, and to submit to suffer pain, when considered eventually salutary to us.

So far as men are constituted alike, so far they commonly agree in their notions of things, however widely their language may differ, *e. g.* few if any have the folly to dispute that food is indispensable to life; that the young, if they live, must grow old, &c. But since the effects of the operations of all bodies upon others depend, not only upon their respective natures but present state, so far as each man has something peculiar in his constitution or situation, so far an infinite variety of opinions must necessarily exist; one man, for instance, finds different degrees of heat agreeable at different times, but at all times more or less than another. Whether fire will burn is soon known by putting one's hand into it, but when consequences follow remotely we often question their being the result of certain applications, *e. g.* it may be very doubtful whether the fruit A eat yesterday is the cause of the

pain he suffers to-day; or whether the bad examples given by an ill-conditioned boy in a school, corrupted the others, though there may be the greatest presumption of it.

Universality of assent therefore seems founded upon the immutable habitudes of certain bodies when in certain states, and the more or less general concurrence of men in certain truths we find commonly to depend upon effects following more or less closely their proper causes. Thus there seems every probability, that though all candid men allow temperance is favourable to health, yet that it will be ever and variously disputed, how far our several appetites and fancies may be indulged with safety to our future well-being. That which indeed must ever prevent our coming to any common agreement upon such questions is, that each peculiar intellectual and physical constitution requires some peculiar restraints and gratifications, not only at the different periods, but even under the different circumstances of life; consequently, it hereby clearly appears that man was originally framed, perpetually to be exercising his judgment for the conduct of his understanding, and for the management of his health.

Wisdom, Folly.

Experience, it has been said, is the mother of Wisdom, it most certainly is the teacher of it, since we cannot become wise but by our own, or the experience of others. The being able to discover what measures are most proper to be adopted, in order to accomplish any proposed object, proves the strength of the understanding; and the having also sufficient self-command to obey its dictates, even when they run most counter to our present inclinations, determines the wisdom of our conduct. True wisdom is therefore, the doing what we ought to do, after having duly considered how we can best propor-

tion our means to our ends ; whereas, virtue is the acting according to the suggestions of our conscience, whether they be judicious, or otherwise. Thus a virtuous man may possibly have very little wisdom, either from want of intellect, or from carelessness ; but no other than a virtuous man can be wise in his general conduct, because every departure from virtue is foolishness.

“ When we do any thing good with reluctance, the reluctance passeth away, and the good remains ; when we do any thing evil with pleasure, the pleasure passeth away and the evil remains : if we become then habitually obedient to the dictates of reason, an even temper, peace of mind, and many other present advantages springing from it, the hope of not only escaping many future evils in this world, but of obtaining everlasting life in the next, will, by degrees, make our inclinations join with our reason, and our duty become our delight.”—*Jortin*. For “ the ways of Wisdom are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.”

Wisdom implies a revelation of truth, and a detection of error to us. 'Tis like light, pleasant to behold, casting a bright lustre, and diffusing a benign influence around us ; presenting a goodly prospect of things to our mind's eye, displaying objects in their due shapes, postures, magnitude, and colours ; quickening our spirits, and disposing them to a cheerful activity, dispelling the darkness of ignorance, scattering the mists of doubt, driving away the spectres of delusive fancy, mitigating the cold of sullen melancholy, discovering obstacles, securing progress, and making the passages of life clear, open, and pleasant. We are all naturally endowed with a strong appetite to know, to see, to pursue truth ; and with a bashful abhorrency from being deceived and entangled in mistake. And as success in inquiring after truth affords matter of joy and triumph, so being conscious of error and miscarriage therein, is attended with shame and sorrow.”

“ Wisdom makes all the troubles, griefs, and pains, incident to life, whether casual adversities or natural afflictions, comparatively easy and supportable, by rightly valuing the importance, and moderating the influence of them. It suffers not busy fancy to alter the nature, amplify the degree, or extend the duration of them, by representing them more sad, heavy, and remediless than they truly are. It allows them no force beyond what naturally and necessarily they have, nor contributes nourishment to their increase.”

“ Wisdom hath always a good conscience attending it, that purest delight and richest cordial of the soul, that brazen wall and impregnable fortress, against both external assaults and internal commotions; that continual feast, whereon the mind, destitute of all other repast, with a never languishing appetite, may entertain itself; that faithful witness and impartial judge, whoever accuses, always acquitting the innocent soul; that certain friend, in no strait failing, in no adversity deserting; that sure refuge in all storms of fortune, and persecutions of disgrace.”

“ Wisdom confers a facility, expert readiness, and dexterity in action, which is very pleasant and exceedingly sweetens activity. To do things with difficulty, struggling, and immoderate contention, disheartens a man, quells his courage, blunts the edge of his resolution, renders him sluggish and averse from business, though apprehended never so necessary and of great moment. These obstructions Wisdom removes, facilitating operations, by directing the intention to ends possible and attainable, by suggesting fit means and instruments to work by, by contriving right methods and courses of process, the mind by it being stored with variety of good principles, sure rules, and happy expedients, reposed in the memory, ready upon all occasions to be produced and employed in practice.”

“ Wisdom begets a sound, healthful, and harmonious com-

plexion of soul, disposing us with judgment to distinguish, and with pleasure to relish savory and wholesome things, but to nauseate and reject such as are ungrateful and noxious to us, thereby capacifying us to enjoy pleasantly and innocently all those good things the Divine Goodness hath provided for, and consigned to us; whence to the soul proceeds all that comfort, joy, and vigour, which results to the body from a good constitution and perfect health.”*

“Wisdom acquaints us with ourselves, our own temper and constitution, our propensions and passions, habitudes and capacities, a thing not only of mighty advantage, but of infinite pleasure and content to us. No man less knows a fool than himself; nay, he is more than ignorant, for he constantly errs in the point, taking himself for, and demeaning himself toward another, as the better, wiser, and abler man of the two. But a wise man, by constant observation, and impartial reflection upon himself, grows very familiar with himself, he perceives his own inclinations, which, if bad, he strives to alter and correct; if good, he cherishes and corroborates them: he apprehends the matters he is fitting for and capable to manage, neither too mean and unworthy of him, nor too high nor difficult for him; and those applying his care to, he transacts cheerfully and successfully. So being neither puffed up with vain and overweening opinion, nor dejected with heartless diffidence of himself, neither admiring nor despising, neither irksomely hating, nor fondly loving himself; he continues in good humour, maintains a sure friendship and fair correspondence with himself, and rejoices in the retirement and private conversation with his own thoughts, whence flows a pleasure and satisfaction inexpressible.”

“Wisdom procures and preserves a constant favour and

* Thus wisdom advises us to acquire a preference not only for *good moral habits*, but also a *taste* for other things wholesome and salutary to us.

fair respect of men, purchases a good name, and upholds a reputation in the world, which things are naturally desirable, commodious for life, encouragement to good, and preventive of many inconveniences. The composed frame of mind, uniform and comely demeanour, compliant and inoffensive conversation, fair and punctual dealings, considerate motions, and dexterous addresses of wise men, naturally beget esteem and affection in those that observe them."

"Wisdom instructs us to examine, compare, and rightly to value the objects that court our affections, and challenge our care; and thereby regulates our passions and moderates our endeavours, which begets a pleasant serenity and peaceable tranquillity of mind. For when being deluded with false shows, and relying upon ill-grounded presumptions, we highly esteem, passionately affect, and eagerly pursue things of little worth in themselves, or concernment to us, as we unhand-somely prostitute our affections, and prodigally mispend our time, and vainly lose our labour, so the event not answering our expectation, our minds thereby are confounded, disturbed, and distempered. But when guided by right reason, we conceive great esteem of, and zealously are enamoured with, and vigorously strive to attain things of excellent worth, and weighty consequence, the conscience of having well-placed our affections, and well-employed our pains, and the experience of fruits corresponding to our hopes, fills our mind with the utmost satisfaction.

"Wisdom distinguishes the circumstances, limits the measures, determines the modes, appoints the fit seasons for action; so preserving decorum and order, the parent of peace, and preventing confusion, the mother of disquiet, strife, and iniquity."

"Wisdom discovers our relations, duties, and concernments, in respect of men, with the natural grounds of them, thereby both qualifying and inclining us to the discharge of them,

whence exceeding convenience and content ensues. By it we understand that we proceed from the same primitive stock, are children of the same father, and partake of the same blood with all men; are endowed with like faculties of mind, passions of soul, shape of body, and sense of things: that we have equally implanted in our original constitution, inclinations to love, pity, gratitude, sociableness, quiet, joy, reputation: that we have an indispensable need, and impatient desire of company, assistance, comfort, and relief: that, therefore, it is according to the design of nature, and agreeable to reason, that to those to whom our natural condition by so many bonds of cognation, similitude, and mutual necessitude, hath knit and conjoined us, we should bear a kind of respect and tender affection; should cheerfully concur in undergoing the common burdens, should heartily wish and industriously promote their good, assist them in accomplishing their reasonable desires, thankfully requite the courtesies received from them, congratulate and rejoice with them in their prosperity, comfort them in their distresses, and, as we are able, relieve them, or at least, (for so much we can all do) tenderly compassionate their disappointments, miseries, and sorrows. This renders us kind and courteous neighbours, sweet and grateful companions. It represents unto us the dreadful effects and insupportable mischiefs, arising from breach of faith, contravening the obligations of solemn compacts, infringing public laws, deviating from the received rules of equity, violating promises, and interrupting good correspondence among men, by which consideration it engages us to be good citizens, obedient subjects, just dealers, and faithful friends. It reminds us of the blindness, impotence, and levity, the proneness to mistake and misbehaviour, that human nature necessarily is subject to, deserving rather our commiseration than anger or hatred, which prompts us to bear the infirmities of our brethren, to be gentle in censure, to be insensible of petty affronts, to pardon injuries,

to be patient, exorable, and reconcileable to those, that give us the greatest cause of offence. So that Wisdom is in effect the parent of all moral and political virtues; and how sweet these are in the practice, how comfortable in the consequences, the testimony of continual experience, and the unanimous consent of all wise men sufficiently declare."

"Wisdom prevents discouragement from the possibility of ill success, yea, and makes disappointment itself tolerable. For if either the foresight of a possible miscarriage, should deter us from adventuring on action, or inculpable frustration were insupportable, we should with no heart apply ourselves to any thing; there being no designs in this world, though founded upon the most sound advice, and prosecuted by the most diligent endeavour, which may not be defeated, as depending upon divers causes above our power, and circumstances beyond our prospect. The inconstant opinions, uncertain resolutions, mutable affections, and fallacious pretences of men, upon which the accomplishment of most projects rely, may easily deceive and disappoint us. The imperceptible course of nature exerting itself in sudden tempests, diseases, and unlucky casualties, may surprise us, and possibly put an end to our businesses and lives together. But even when we fail of our purpose, if our intentions were upright, and that we used fit means, and did our best, as no deserved blame, so no considerable damage can arrive to us; for hence we have reason to hope, that the all-wise God reserves a better reward for us, and will sometime recompence not only the good purposes we unhappily pursued, but also the disappointment we patiently endured; which consideration, wherewith wisdom furnishes us, will make the want of success not only tolerable, but even comfortable to us. 'Tis foolish and ill-grounded intentions, and practices not warranted by good reason, that leave men disconsolate upon defeat."

“ But the principal advantage of wisdom is, its acquainting us with the nature and reason of true religion, and affording convictive arguments to persuade to the practice of it, which is accompanied with the most ineffable delight possible. I say the nature of religion, wherein it consists, and what it requires, the mistake of which produceth daily so many mischiefs and inconveniences in the world, and exposes so good a name to so much reproach. It sheweth that it consisteth not in fair professions and glorious pretences, but in real practice; not in a pertinacious adherence to any sect or party, but in a sincere love of goodness and dislike of naughtiness, *wherever discovering itself*; not in vain ostentations and flourishes of outward performances, but in an inward good complexion of mind, exerting itself in works of true devotion and charity; not in harsh censuring and virulently inveighing against others, but in careful amending our own ways. Any one that wisely hath considered the wisdom, goodness, and power of his Creator, cannot imagine that God with a regardless eye, overlooks a presumptuous contempt of his laws; nor can admit unreasonable terrors, nor the entertaining of suspicious conceits of him, as of an imperious master, or implacable tyrant, exacting impossible performances from, or delighting in the fatal miseries of his creatures; nor can suppose him pleased with hypocritical shows, and greatly taken with superficial courtships of ceremonious address; or that he can in anywise favour our fiery zeals, fierce passions, or unjust partialities about matters of opinion; or can do otherwise than detest all factious, harsh, uncharitable, and revengeful proceedings of what nature, or upon what ground soever, or that he can be so inconsistent with himself, as to approve any thing but what is like Himself, that is *righteousness, sincerity, and beneficence*.”

“ Lastly, wisdom purchaseth a future glorious reward, and

secureth perpetual felicity to us, *Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and whoso findeth her, findeth life, and shall obtain favour of the Lord.*—Barrow.

Thus it appears, the more actively and judiciously we exercise our reason, and desire good, the more perfect will be our wisdom.

Folly is the reverse of wisdom. Foolish people engage in undertakings, without reflecting upon the means and capacity they have of obtaining success, or upon the consequences likely to follow from any part of their conduct. Now this may arise from the weakness of their understanding, in which case the evil is without a remedy, unless they will submit themselves to the direction of the wise; but if it be owing to bad habits, they are more or less culpable, according to the various advantages, natural or adventitious, they may have either rejected or abused. The children of folly are the sport of their own caprices, or the artful designs of others.

Prudence, Imprudence.

“No Divinity is wanting where Prudence is.” Thus said a Pagan, but his meaning most evidently was, that prudence is so safe a guide to conduct us through life, that those who are capable and willing to make a reasonable use of experience, have no need of a presiding deity, *immediately* to direct their actions.

There is a great distinction we apprehend, to be made between Wisdom and Prudence. Wisdom aims to secure our happiness, not only in this life, but in the next, whereas prudence seems to imply merely a due attention to worldly interests; a man, for instance, may be inordinately ambitious, proud, vain, &c. and yet very prudent, though very unwise. He limits his expenses within his income, lest he suffer the evils he observes to be commonly attendant upon the want of

this precaution; and he avoids, if possible, giving offence, from the fear of involving himself in quarrels injurious to his reputation, or family, or fortune; in all these points, therefore, the wise and the prudent man will fully concur, but the wise man will do it upon principle, the prudent man upon calculation; the wise man will, moreover, endeavour as carefully to discipline his invisible as his visible actions, while the mere prudent man will feel little other anxiety, than to secure the approbation of mankind.

Imprudence bears as close an alliance with folly, as prudence does with wisdom. The imprudent man enters into business without considering the probability and consequences of failure; or he risks his health or reputation, or fortune, or domestic comforts, without any reasonable motive, by his thoughtless manner of acting or speaking. If he want the sense to form a better judgment, he is to be pitied; otherwise, those who are made timely to smart for their rashness, may, possibly, discover before it be too late, that discretion is a quality not to be despised, however they may be elevated by rank, or fortune, or distinguished by talents.

But in the most common acceptation of the two words, Folly and Imprudence, the first is, perhaps, most commonly applied rather to such as want propriety in their manners, dress, language, and general conduct; the last, to those who are apt to be extravagant, impetuous, &c.

Cause and Effect.

“ We cannot but observe the constant *vicissitudes* of things, and that several particulars, both qualities and substances, *begin to exist*, and that they *receive* this their existence, from the *due application and operation of some other being*. From this observation we get our ideas of Cause and Effect.”—*Locke*.

“Anxiety for the future disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things, because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their advantage.”—*Hobbes*.

Causes are *immediate* or direct, or more or less *remote* or indirect, or *original*. The man who makes a steam-engine, for example, immediately causes its existence; he who orders and pays the cost, indirectly or more remotely causes it; but the inventor is the original cause of it, since, without his invention, it would not have had being. But every particle of matter, however manufactured by man, has been created or caused to exist, by God himself.

We cannot more usefully employ our several faculties, than in endeavouring to learn from experience, the immediate, and in some things, the more or less remote causes that produce the effects, we may wish either to continue, or to modify, or to renew, or to remove, or to destroy; for by such means alone can we reasonably hope to cause effects, likely to obtain us good, or to remove evil from us.

There are two sorts of Causes which we must carefully distinguish, as having very different origins. First, such causes as we suppose to be coeval with the world itself, such as are *unceasingly* producing their suitable effects, both in the moral and physical worlds. The heavenly bodies revolve, the seasons successively return, and each finds nature ever busy in performing her infinitely various operations. Man feels love, hatred, gratitude, revenge, the glow of devotion, the compunctions of remorse, conjugal, parental, fraternal, and filial affection, confidence, suspicion, curiosity, &c. and all according as he is affected by circumstances. The second sort of causes are those depending upon the *will of man*. The former are placed beyond his control, and he can no otherwise interfere with even the effects of them, than by applying them according to their several natures, to the purposes he may

have in view, and this he does in an infinite variety of ways and degrees. Nature brings us good or evil, according to the impulse she immediately receives from the immutable laws by which she is implicitly governed; but man brings us good or evil, according to the use or abuse he makes of those powers, he can direct at his pleasure; the operations of bodies upon one another, for example, may cause the destruction of the prudent with the rash, the innocent with the guilty, &c. whereas Man finds he is free to use, or to forbear to use his strength against one or more of his fellow-creatures. The more closely we investigate how far the various evils we suffer, form a necessary part of the general order of nature, and how far they originate in the weakness or wickedness of man, the more likely we are to succeed in discovering suitable remedies for the latter sort, without wasting our time and labour in endeavouring to correct or remove those, we may, by reasonable experiments, satisfactorily ascertain, to be entailed upon our very being.

The experience we derive from continually observing and recording the spontaneous operations of nature, enable us to judge, at what seasons we can with most advantage plough, sow, reap, sail to different parts of the world, &c. and in what manner to apply the several physical powers, to the making of all artificial things. The same unwearied observations respecting the workings of the human mind, and their consequences, would, doubtless, in like manner, lead us to understand far more correctly than we at present do, the best mode of self-government, and the government of individuals, families, and nations; that is, if we could but divest ourselves of our selfish feelings, and act up to our persuasion of the admirable truth, that we ought honestly and strictly to do as we would be done by.

It is the more necessary to have our attention constantly directed to the noticing of the relations between causes and

their effects, because no cunning contrivances of ours can make certain effects to arise from foreign or inadequate causes, either in the physical or in the moral world, or prevent certain causes from producing their suitable effects. So strictly are we limited, that we can do no more than bring certain things within the influence of each other, but they will operate (though not, perhaps, as we might wish, yet) indubitably, according to the laws of nature. Thus fire will soften wax, harden bricks, ripen fruits, destroy substances, exactly to the degree the quantity applied is calculated to effect; and should it not answer our purpose, we must, if we desire success, increase or decrease the quantity, or modify it differently. In like manner, whatever systems man establishes for the government of individuals, families, and states, the effects those systems produce generally upon the minds of the governed, analogy makes it reasonable to believe, no less minutely and unerringly correspond, upon the whole, with the arrangements he may please to make. Nature, it is, that causes us to love, hate, &c. but man may be the immediate cause of our loving or hating, by presenting suitable objects to our senses, or by treating us kindly or harshly, justly or unjustly, &c. and the love or hatred excited, will be exactly proportioned to the sort of treatment received, and to the character of the person benefited or injured. To doubt of this, is to question whether the immutable laws of nature have not been suspended, in order to thwart or favour our particular plans. But were the laws of nature mutable, how could man calculate with any reasonable degree of probability, upon what would be the effects of those causes, to which he himself might give existence? He would have been the sport of chance, and judgment and prudence mere ideal advantages. But this very extensive power man has, of producing effects by causes of *his own creating*, is the proudest prerogative he can claim over the

rest of the creatures of the earth, and is the very foundation of his moral responsibility.

It was Dr. Barrow's opinion that man is commonly of a noble nature, capable of much knowledge and great virtue; in other words, that governors may cause him to be more or less virtuous or vicious by the force of their example, laws, and administration of them. "While we assert the existence of God, we assert no other thing to be, than such as whereof we can assign a manifest instance or example, as it were, although in an infinitely inferior degree in man; since what can in any degree exist, 'tis not hard to conceive that possible to exist in any degree how high soever: what is in kind possible, is in any perfection of degree possible; yea, what we see in a lower degree somewhere to exist, doth probably elsewhere exist in higher perfection. There is therefore scarce any attribute commonly ascribed to God, the existence whereof we cannot shew possible, yea, very credible proofs, by pointing out some degree or, if you please, some shadow thereof discernible in man. Our souls bear some express resemblances of our idea of Him, I say, especially as at first they were made, *and as by improvement of our capacities they may again become.* For as God being himself invisible, and not subject to any of our senses, discovers himself by manifold effects of wisdom and power; so doth our soul, itself immediately exposed not to our senses, shew itself by many productions of art and industry, wherein she imitates nature and the works of her Creator, although her works indeed in fineness and greatness cannot bear the least comparison with His. As God by his presence and influence doth (saith Aristotle) *contain and keep together the whole frame of things*, so that he withdrawing them, it would fall of itself into corruption and ruin; so doth the soul, by its union and secret energy upon the body, connect the parts of the body and preserve it from dissolution, which presently, upon its being separated from it does follow."

“ As He, in a manner beyond our conception, without any proper extension or composition of parts, doth co-exist with, penetrateth, and passeth through all things, so is she, in a manner also unconceivable, every where present within her bounds, and penetrates all the dimensions of her little world. As He incomprehensibly doth move the whole frame, or any part of nature, so doth she, we cannot tell how, by thinking only and by willing, wield her body and determine any member thereof to motion. As He, not confined by the extension or duration of things, doth at one view behold all things, not only present, but past and future; yea, whenever, wherever, however, possible: so doth she, making wide excursions out of her narrow mansion, in an instant, as it were, or with a marvellous quickness, transcend any fixed bounds of time or place, surveys in her thought the most remote regions, stopping no where, and passing over the world's bounds into spaces void and imaginary; reviews ages long since past, and looks forward into those long after to come; sees things in their causes, and as it were beyond them, even the possibilities of things that never shall be. As He performs always with wisest design to the best end, so doth she often set herself on action with some drift or aim at good apparent to her.”

“ As He himself abides immoveable, impassible, and immutable, so is she, immediately at least, not disturbed, not altered, not affected, by the various motions that surround her; they do not touch her, they cannot stir her; among the many tumults and tempests blustering all about her, she can retain a steady calm and rest. So fair characters are there of the Divine nature engraven upon man's soul; but, alas! in one chief property the lineaments are more faint, and consequently less discernible—goodness I mean; yet there do remain dispersed in the soil of human nature, divers seeds of goodness, of benignity, of ingenuity, *which being cherished, excited, and*

quickened by good culture, do to common experience, throw out flowers very lovely, and yield fruit very pleasant, of virtue and amiableness. We see that the generality of men are prone to approve the laws and rules directing to justice, sincerity, and beneficence; to commend actions suitable unto them; to honour persons practising according unto them; as also to distaste, detest, or despise such men, whose principles or tempers incline them to the practice of injury, fraud, malice, and cruelty; yea even them men generally are apt to dislike, who are so wrapped up in themselves as to be backward to do good to others. Moreover, no man can act according to those rules of justice and goodness without satisfaction of mind; no man can do against them without inward self-condemnation and regret."

"In fine, the *wisest observers* of man's nature have pronounced him to be a creature *gentle and sociable, inclinable to, and fit for conversation, apt to keep good order, to observe rules of justice, to embrace any sort of virtue if well managed, if instructed by good discipline, if guided by good example, if living under the influence of wise laws and virtuous governors*. Fierceness, rudeness, craft, malice, all perverse and intractable, all mischievous and vicious dispositions do grow among men (like weeds in any, even the best soil), and overspread the earth, *from neglect of good education; from ill-conduct, ill-habits, ill-example*; but man's soul hath appetites and capacities, by which, *well guided and ordered*, it soars and climbs continually in its affection and desire towards Divine Perfection."

If such be the nature of man, surely we may reasonably hope that, by the proper use of his several faculties, he may cause effects productive upon the whole of much happiness, not only to himself but to very many others.

Design, Intention, Chance, Accident.

Chance or Accident is opposed to Design or Intention. Having a design is having an intention to cause certain effects; and although we may by our actions, directly or indirectly, cause effects very contrary to our intentions, yet we cannot but be considered the authors of the good or evil that results from the measures we have pursued. Moreover it seems reasonable to believe, that we shall be made responsible hereafter for such evils as have occurred, in consequence of our refusing to consult our own reason, or to listen to the suggestions and warnings of others.

Chance or accident we suppose to imply an effect that occurs without one's having, by any previous arrangements, prepared or provoked it to happen or take place in the manner it does. Thus some one may have a fancy to bequeath his property to another, who has not pursued any measures to obtain it, and the legatee is said to get it by Chance; but peculiar circumstances will have *caused* the legator to dispose of his property otherwise than might reasonably have been expected; some circumstances, for instance, connected with his own character or conduct, or with that of his natural or legal heirs, and thus he Designs or intends to dispose of it in the manner specified. The most cautious meet with a fatal accident when least apprehending danger, having by chance struck a vital part; the rashest escape almost certain destruction, by being caught in their fall down a precipice by a bush perhaps; "Time and chance happeneth to all."

In what manner and upon what occasions it may please God to interfere with human affairs, or how far he leaves us to the ordinary operations of nature, can be known only to Himself. If he govern all things by general laws, the most trifling accidents or chances cannot happen contrary to them without his direct interposition, of this truth we must be fully persuaded, and also that we are under the superintendence of uner-

ring Wisdom. But the ways of Providence being impenetrable to human sagacity, we here crave leave, for brevity's sake, to treat of chance as a casualty, and not as an immediate interference of Heaven.

We may distinguish three sorts of chances: 1. Any person being born at any period of time, and under any particular circumstances. Unless we believe the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, it seems rational to suppose that creatures are born in the regular order of nature, without any respect of persons, and that they will receive their merited reward or punishment, here or hereafter, according as they acquit themselves in the station in which they find themselves placed; the temptations to which they have been exposed, and the force of their powers to resist them, being duly weighed one against the other. A person, for instance, may be born healthy or sickly, with an easy or difficult temper, more or less intelligent, with kindly or perverse dispositions, rich or poor, of virtuous or vicious, harsh or indulgent, judicious or injudicious parents, in freedom or in slavery, in peaceable or in turbulent times, in a dark or in an enlightened age, &c. The ordinary chances we are liable to, in the physical world also, come under this head.

2. We cannot discover, or even guess the causes of the second sort; why any one, for instance, should hold fortunate cards for many deals, during many hours, and with many different packs; and perhaps the very next day, be as invariably unlucky, and so of similar chances; and moreover, some persons are more generally lucky or unlucky than others.

3. The causes of the third sort do not elude our search in the same manner, though they are more or less difficult to be discovered. In these sort of chances we always find the causes, when we succeed in attaining to a knowledge of them, to be quite adequate to their effects. It is recorded of Alexander, the son of Philip, for example, that he marched with his army

from Egypt across the Desert of Lybia to the temple of Jupiter Ammon, and that on his return, he and all his soldiers would have perished with thirst, but for a most seasonable heavy shower of rain, which in falling just in that spot, proved the salvation of the Macedonian hero and his fainting army; and but for this chance, Alexander the Great, as he is styled, would have been pronounced (as Prideaux justly observes) a madman instead of a conqueror. How often does chance seem to favour, or be adverse, to some persons more than others, not only on one occasion, but sometimes during the whole progress of their lives. But every man's destiny being liable to be more or less influenced, directly or indirectly, not only by his own conduct, but by the conduct of every one, with whom he may be any way connected, it cannot in the present order of things happen otherwise. There are numbers whose most praiseworthy efforts are continually counteracted by the folly or wickedness of their associates, and not a few on the contrary, who dash from them every advantage, that intelligent, affluent, or powerful friends would fain secure to them.

As far as a man's welfare depends upon his own actions, he seems commonly, upon the whole, to reap the fruits of his prudence, or of his imprudence, of his virtues, or of his vices; but inasmuch as it is influenced by the conduct of others, he must apparently ever be more or less the sport (under a superintending Providence) of chance or accident, sometimes favouring, sometimes thwarting him.

When we see the vicious successful, not only by chance, but by their own efforts, and the virtuous unsuccessful, we must recollect, that the vicious are sometimes both more intelligent and more prudent, and that unless it may please God *immediately* to interfere, they must, as long as causes shall be allowed to operate their suitable effects, be so far entitled to enjoy worldly prosperity. But the general laws of nature secure to the virtuous an advantage they cannot lose, but by

their own consent, "a sound conscience;" whereas the vicious, with the utmost aid even of talents, riches, and power, will fail to obtain "the Peace that passeth all understanding." For,

"The soul's calm sunshine, and the heartfelt joy
Is virtue's prize."

And so nicely are causes and effects proportioned to each other, by perfect Wisdom, that the virtuous, while they are permitted to enjoy the internal satisfaction arising from their general upright intentions, are left to suffer the self-reproaches attached to the neglect of due attention to their minor duties in life.

The consideration of the influence of chance upon our general welfare, ought to make us but the more earnest to conduct ourselves with wisdom or due caution upon all occasions; since we find we are continually liable to suffer, not only natural evils, and those we may bring upon ourselves, but likewise, from the adverse circumstances which may be imposed upon us by men of all characters and stations, and also by mere Chance. How much, therefore, have we need, of obeying the dictates of that religion, which advises, "On earth Peace, good-will towards men." It bids us to conciliate all men as much as possible, instead of irritating them by our harshness and inhumanity, to become either our avowed or secret enemies, so as greatly to increase our manifold dangers in this very variously and strangely chequered life.

"We are obliged to various duties of humanity, upon account of common interest, benefit, and advantage. The welfare and safety, the honour and reputation, the pleasure and quiet of our lives are concerned, in our maintaining a loving correspondence with all men. For so uncertain is our condition, so obnoxious are we to manifold necessities, that there is no man, whose good-will we may not need, whose good word may not stand us in stead, whose helpful endeavour may not

sometimes oblige us. The great Pompey, who triumphed over nations, the admired darling of Fortune, was beholden at last to a slave for the composing his ashes, and celebrating his funeral obsequies. The honour of the greatest men depends on the estimation of the least, and the good-will of the meanest peasant is a brighter ornament to the fortune, a greater accession to the grandeur of a prince, than the most radiant gem in his royal diadem. However the spite and enmity of one (and him the most weak otherwise and contemptible person,) may happen to spoil the content of our whole life, and deprive us of the most comfortable enjoyments thereof; may divert our thoughts from our delightful employments, to a solicitous care of self-preservation and defence; may discompose our mind with vexatious passions; may, by false reports, odious suggestions, and slanderous defamations, blast our credit, raise a storm of general hatred, and conjure up thousands of enemies against us; may, by insidious practices, supplant and undermine us, prejudice our welfare, endanger our estate, and involve us in a bottomless gulf of trouble: it is but reasonable, therefore, if we desire to live securely, comfortably, and quietly, that by all honest means we should endeavour to purchase the good-will of all men, and provoke no man's enmity needlessly; since any man's love may be useful, and every man's hatred is dangerous."—*Barrow*.

Habit, Custom, Fashion.

Each individual, as we said before, has his peculiar propensities, some of them natural, some acquired; these propensities lead him more or less frequently to repeat certain actions, and these repetitions finally render these actions habitual to him, so that at length, he can scarcely refrain from, or at least feel easy in the omission of them. We give to these several repe-

titions of actions the name of Habit; thus a person is said to have a habit of riding, walking, studying, &c. that he has good or bad habits of life, &c. We acquire habits either *insensibly*, or by *compulsion*, or *voluntarily*: insensibly, by commonly following the natural bent of our inclinations; by compulsion, when we submit to the commands of others, either from the fear of being punished for disobedience, or of causing annoyance to those we love or esteem, or wish to recommend ourselves to; voluntarily, when we steadily discipline ourselves, or idly indulge our fancies.

Habits serve gradually to make our several duties more easy, nay, oftentimes most agreeable to us; but on the other hand, they in like manner also strengthen our evil propensities, and render our resistance to them more and more difficult. Medea, deeply practised in vice, exclaims,

“ Remorse and sense of guilt draw back my soul
But stronger passion does her power control;
With rage transported I push boldly on,
And see the precipice I cannot shun!”

Habit is thus said to be our second nature, because it often gives a force to our propensities, that they derive not from our original constitution; it is evident, therefore, that it must be either a powerful auxiliary, or a most dangerous opponent to the instructors of youth.

As habit is fitted to produce in us, more or less, the love of virtue, and hatred of vice, or the love of vice, and indifference to virtue; so is it calculated likewise, to cause us uneasiness upon the loss of any of our accustomed enjoyments, or upon the removal of certain objects that have long affected any of our senses; and also afterwards to reconcile us, or at least to diminish our regret, upon the continuance of our greater or minor deprivations.

Custom seems to be but another name for habit, for cus-

toms are, we apprehend, but the habits of a community; custom being a propensity the several members of a community generally have, to adopt certain modes of dressing, eating, drinking, visiting, building, seeking amusements, performing religious ceremonies, &c. Some nations, we find, ever remain strictly attached to certain customs, and that others again are prone continually to change them; those who are given to change, seem to have adopted the word Fashion, to denote a variable custom, and the caprices of the fashionable world form a curious contrast to the fixed modes of Hindostan.

Customs are said to be the laws of society, habits in like manner, are no less the laws of individuals, for habits rule individuals no less imperiously; than customs do communities; and, moreover, in the house of an individual, we are in some measure, as much subjected to his habits, as we are to the customs of the community into which we enter, or of which we form a part.

“ If we would live in peace, we must readily comply with the *innocent* customs established in the places where we live. Customs are in effect, inferior laws enacted by the tacit agreement of the generality of men; the non-observation of which, is, upon many accounts, very prejudicial to a peaceable life. For to those concerned in it, it will always seem to intimate a squeamish niceness, a froward perverseness, a manifest despising other men’s judgments, and a virtual condemning their practices of fault or folly, and consequently a monopolizing all goodness, and appropriating all wisdom to one’s-self; qualities intolerably odious to men, and productive of enmity. It incenses the people (highly susceptible of provocation) with a sense of notable injury done, and contempt cast upon it. For the only authority which the commonalty can lay claim to, consists in prescribing rules of decency in language, habit, gesture, ceremony, and other circumstances of action, declared and ratified by ordinary practice; non-conformity to which, is

by them adjudged a marvellous irregularity, contumacy, and rebellion against the majesty of the people, and is infallibly revenged and punished by them.”—*Barrow*.

Example, Precept.

Moral Example is, we apprehend, any particular act, or a combination of acts, that mark any part, or the whole of a man's character, *i. e.* whether he be virtuous or vicious, wise or foolish, also in what manner and to what degree. Thus he may afford the example of being, upon one or more occasions, or in general, just or unjust, considerate or over-bearing, disinterested or selfish, forgiving or revengeful, &c. Good example has little need of Precept to recommend itself, but precept becomes highly impertinent, when not enforced on proper occasions by example. Thus the rich, who practise not the virtues they inculcate, must render themselves objects of contempt to the poor, since they betray their knowledge of what is right, while they expose their weakness, by not conforming their own conduct to their instructions. Favour, riches, and even chance, have often, and may again exalt vice or folly to the highest degree of rank and splendour, but no power, however despotic, can command for them, even when so elevated, that genuine respect and devotion much oftener coveted than obtained.

“ Judges and Senates have been bought for gold,
Esteem and Love were never to be sold.”

“ Examples do more compendiously, easily, and pleasantly, inform our minds, and direct our practice than Precepts, or any other way or instrument of discipline. Precepts are delivered in an universal and abstracted manner, naked, and void of all circumstantial attire, without any intervention, assistance,

or suffrage of sense, and consequently can have no vehement operation upon the fancy, and soon do fly the memory. But good Example, with less trouble, more speed, and greater efficacy, causes us to comprehend the business, representing it like a picture exposed to sense, having the parts orderly disposed, and completely united, contained in a narrow compass, and perceptible at one glance, so easily insinuating itself into the mind and durably resting therein. And this is the most facile, familiar, and delightful way of instruction, which is by experience, history, and observation of sensible events."

"This discourse is verified by various experience; for we find all masters of art and science, explicating, illustrating, and confirming their general rules and precepts by particular examples: mathematicians demonstrate their theorems by schemes and diagrams, which in effect are but sensible instances: orators back their enthymemes (or rational argumentations) with inductions (or singular examples): philosophers allege the practice of Socrates, Zeno, and the like persons of famous wisdom and virtue, to authorise their doctrines: politics and civil prudence are more easily and sweetly drawn out of good history, than out of books *de republicâ*: artificers describe models, and set patterns before their disciples with greater success, than if they should deliver accurate rules and precepts to them; for who would not more readily learn to build, by viewing carefully the parts and frame of a well-contrived structure, than by a studious inquiry into the rules of architecture; or to draw, by setting a good picture before him, than by merely speculating upon the laws of perspective; or to write fairly and expeditely, by imitating one good copy, than by hearkening to a thousand oral prescriptions, the understanding of which, and faculty of applying them to practice, may prove more difficult and tedious, than the whole practice itself as directed by a copy? Neither is the case much

different in moral concerns, since in less time, and with greater ease, we may learn our duty by regarding the deportment of some excellent person, than by attending to many philosophical discourses concerning it."

" Good examples not only inform, but they persuade and incline our reason to good practice, commending it to us by plausible authority. How boldly, for instance, do men adventure their dearest interests, in following such as they deem honest and able to guide them. Even in travelling, if one being ignorant or doubtful of his way, happen to meet a stranger whom he conceives no wise concerned, or disposed to mislead him, he will, without scruple, follow him, and confidently rely on his direction; and in like manner, all good men considered to be in a virtuous course of life, tending directly toward happiness, (our common journey's end) induce most persons to think it reasonable, and safe to accompany them in their progress, or to press after them in their steps."

" Examples do incite our passions, and impel them to the performance of duty; they raise hope, they inflame courage, they provoke emulation, they awaken curiosity, they affect fancy; they set in motion all the springs of activity. It may not be amiss to shew how, particularly."

" First, they raise hope, by discovering to us, and assuredly proving the feasibility of matters propounded, or the possibility of success in undertaking good designs, and that, by the best and most convincing of arguments, *Experience*. Nothing so depresseth hope, and advanceth despondency, as an apprehension of impossibility, or which is equivalent thereto, an extreme difficulty (appearing to surmount our present forces) in the business to be attempted; of such a conceit, despair seemeth a reasonable consequence, for it is a madness to attempt impossibilities. He, therefore, that would effectually persuade the undertaking of any enterprize, must either sup-

pose it, or prove it effectible; and the most easy, the most evident way of proving it, is by example. *Human infirmity* (saith Salvian) *requires the assistance of Example, that it may more easily now perform that, which it knows others to have before done, all posterity being admonished by hearing that what hath once been done, may be done again.*"

"Secondly, examples do inflame courage, for that heat, and active spirit, which in some degree resideth in all men's breasts, is by example kindled, as one flame is kindled by the contact, or approach of another. How many persons timorous, averse from dangerous undertakings, have notwithstanding become very bold and adventurous in war, by the discipline and influence of an exemplary valour: besides, it is a kind of daring, that proclaimeth him a dastard who will not imitate it, which imputation, the lowest courage of man can hardly digest, and will therefore, by doing somewhat answerable, strive to disown it.

"Thirdly, examples provoke emulation, which is another strong principle of activity, moving us earnestly to desire (and thence eagerly to pursue) whatever good, privilege, or advantage, we see another to enjoy. Why shall not I become as good, as commendable, as happy, as any other man? These are the conceits and voices of natural emulation, that mighty passion, implanted in our original constitution, and the which perhaps hath produced more noble effects, than any other inclination of our souls; for all manner of excellency in knowledge, in prowess, in virtue, how often doth it issue from this source? The Apostle to the Hebrews chargeth us, *to provoke one another to charity and good works.*"

"Fourthly, example awakens that curiosity which is natural to us, and of no mean efficacy upon our actions. For whatever we see done, we are apt to be inquisitive concerning it, why, and to what purpose it is done, what the grounds are, and what the fruits of the performance, especially, if the mat-

ter seem considerably important, and the action proceedeth from a person deserving respect; whereof, having passed some competent judgment, we are, by the same instinct of curiosity, farther transported into a desire of discerning by our own trial and experience, whether the event correspondeth to our expectation, so are we easily induced to imitate the actions of others. As vice is by this means ordinarily conceived and propagated, (men by a preposterous and perverse curiosity, being inveigled to try what they see others affect or enjoy) so may virtue also, by the same means, be engendered and nourished, the general ways of producing and maintaining those contrary habits being alike. As therefore, it is a great blemish and reproach to human nature, that *we* (as the Satirist observeth) *have a great proclivity to follow naughty examples*; so there is from hence some amends, that we have also inclinations to imitate good and worthy precedents; the which is somewhat more strong and vigorous, because countenanced and encouraged by the approbation of reason, our noblest faculty."

"Fifthly, examples also do please the mind and fancy in contemplation of them, thence drawing a considerable influence upon practice. No kind of studious entertainment doth so generally delight as history, or the tradition of remarkable examples: even those, who have an abhorrency, or indisposition toward other studies, (who have no genius to apprehend the more intricate subtleties of science, nor the patience to pursue rational consequences) are yet often much taken with historical narrations; these striking them with a delectable variety of accidents, with circumstantial descriptions, and sensible representations of objects, do greatly affect and delight their fancies; especially, the relation of notable adventures, and rare accidents, is wont to be attended with great pleasure and satisfaction. The history which reports the actions of the best men, must in reason be esteemed not only the most

useful, but also the most pleasant, yielding the sweetest entertainment to well-disposed minds; wherein we see virtue expressed, not in bare idea only, but in actual life, strength, motion, in all its beauty and ornaments; than which, no spectacle can be more stately; no object more grateful can be presented to the discerning eye of reason."

"To conclude, and as upon so many accounts we are most strongly invited to follow good Examples, they being of such vast use toward our proceeding in the way to happiness, by conducing to the clear instruction of our understanding, to the forcibly inclining our reason, to the vehement excitement of our passions, to the delightfully affecting our imagination in subserviency to good practices; let us make that due and profitable use of them, which we should and may do."

Master, or Ruling Passion.

The term Master or Ruling Passion seems to express, The strongest prevailing propensity of each individual. If we admit that no two men are constituted alike, we must believe, that every person has *naturally* a peculiar tendency to certain modes of action; and consequently, that the most powerful of them, being the most difficult to restrain, may properly enough be called the master or ruling passion.

But upon a closer examination of this subject, we shall perhaps discover, that the ruling passion, like any other, sometimes originates entirely in *habit*, being foreign to the original character of the individual. We offer an instance of it to the reader, and it is not we believe a rare one, in a letter from the celebrated Lord Chesterfield to his son. His Lordship in thus making a candid confession of the errors of his youth, affords us a striking proof of the extensive and important influence both of *example* and *habit* on human life.

“ The character which most young men first aim at, is that of a man of Pleasure; but they generally take it upon trust, and instead of consulting their own taste and inclinations, they blindly adopt whatever those, with whom they chiefly converse, are pleased to call by the name of pleasure. As it may be of use to you, I am not unwilling, though at the same time ashamed to own, that the vices of my youth proceeded much more from my silly resolution of being, what I heard called a man of pleasure, than from my own inclinations. I always naturally hated drinking, and yet I have often drunk with disgust at the time, attended by great sickness the next day, only because I then considered drinking as a necessary qualification for a fine gentleman, and a man of pleasure. The same as to gaming. I did not want money, and consequently had no occasion to play for it, but I thought play another necessary ingredient in the composition of a man of pleasure, and accordingly, I plunged into it, without desire, *at first*, sacrificed a thousand real pleasures to it, and made myself solidly uneasy by it, for thirty the best years of my life. I was even absurd enough for a little while to swear, by way of adorning and completing the shining character I affected; but this folly I soon laid aside, upon finding both the guilt and indecency of it. Thus seduced by fashion, (in other words example) and blindly adopting nominal pleasures, I lost real ones, and my fortune impaired, and my constitution shattered, are, I must confess, the just punishment of my errors. Take warning then by them; chuse your pleasures for yourself, and do not let them be imposed upon you. Follow nature and not fashion: weigh the present enjoyment of your pleasures, against the necessary consequences of them, and then let your own common sense determine the choice.

“ Were I to begin the world again, with the experience which I now have of it, I would lead a life of real, not of imaginary pleasure. I would not at twenty years be a preaching

missionary of abstemiousness and sobriety; and I should let other people do as they would, without formally and sententially rebuking them for it; but I would be most firmly resolved, not to destroy my own faculties and constitution in complaisance to those who have no regard to their own. I would play to give me pleasure, but not to give me pain, that is, I would play for trifles, in mixed companies to amuse myself, and conform to custom; but I would take care not to venture for sums, which, if I won I should not be the better for; but if I lost, should be under a difficulty to pay; and when paid, should find myself obliged to retrench in several other articles, not to mention the quarrels which deep play commonly occasions. I have not mentioned the pleasures of the mind, which are the solid and permanent ones, because they do not come under the head of what people commonly call pleasures, which they seem to confine to the senses. The pleasure of virtue, of charity, and of learning, is true and lasting pleasure, which I hope you will be long and well acquainted with."

Can we require a more highly coloured picture to shew us the folly and danger of suffering ourselves to be led, like Bruin, by the nose, instead of exercising our own understanding to determine our actions?

CHAPTER XV.

Systems of Education futile.—Principal causes of the great diversity of opinions entertained upon the subject of Education.—Two sorts of Education to be carefully distinguished.—The Education of a child to be suited to his powers, character, and situation in life.—Good Habits constitute a good Education.

Systems of Education futile.

HAVING, as we apprehend, (with Mr. Locke's assistance) discerned what the various sorts of ideas are the mind entertains, what are the different powers it is endowed with to arrive at knowledge, and what are the several excitements, principal, and primary dispositions, that commonly impel man to action ; the next inquiry that seems naturally to present itself is, *In what manner his several powers are likely to be most successfully matured, and his very various propensities duly controlled or encouraged.* Were we all gifted with nearly the same capabilities, and combinations, and degrees of dispositions, and were most individuals of the same class, pretty nearly similarly circumstanced, it would be comparatively easy to adapt systems of education to the several ranks of persons in society. But as the perception of things produces effects according to the constitution and present temper of the mind, in the same manner, as the same sort of food is differently digested, according to the constitution and present state of the stomach, &c. no author has attempted to do more, than to suggest some general principles for the management of youth, to be applied at the discretion of the governor, according to

the peculiarities of each constitution both of mind and body, present state of feeling and health, existing circumstances, and future prospects in life.

Principal causes of the great diversity of opinions entertained upon the subject of Education.

There are very few, if any subjects, upon which men seem to entertain a greater diversity of opinions than upon education. But this is not difficult to explain. In the first place, it is scarcely possible, in very many cases, to trace effects to their proper causes, on account of their remoteness from each other, for children often casually imbibe opinions that determine their conduct years afterwards: Secondly, they are continually influenced by a variety of circumstances, which circumstances frequently escape our notice, or do not come within our observation: Thirdly, though we are aware, that there is as great a variety in the original structure of the intellects and character of man, as in his form and features, yet we frequently find it beyond our penetration to discover what these peculiarities precisely are, in the individual we are concerned to make ourselves the most intimately acquainted with. Mr Locke says, however, that "the distinguishing character of the face, and the lineaments of the body, grow more visible with time, but the peculiar physiognomy of the mind is most discernible in children." These various difficulties serve strongly to prove, how necessary it is carefully to examine, What feelings and dispositions are common to us all, in order to facilitate the discovery of what peculiar restraints and indulgences each child requires; but we cannot hope to succeed, unless we at the same time carefully keep our reason unbiassed, so that we may judge of things as they really are, and not as we wish them to be. Many persons have been perplexed by observ-

ing, that when most pains have been taken with children, they have sometimes least answered the expectations of their friends, and that on the contrary, the neglected have not unfrequently become the most shining and estimable characters. But may not this be reasonably accounted for, by supposing that the children were in the first case fine subjects unhappily mismanaged, or that they were deficient in intellect, or of untoward dispositions, or that some circumstances were more adverse to them than was suspected? In the other, that a superior mind being often left unshackled, attained to eminence by its own strength and sagacity.

Two sorts of Education to be carefully distinguished.

The term Education is by some persons defined to be, The effects our thoughts, actions, and circumstances are calculated to have both upon the mind and body throughout life; while others confine it To the governing and instructing of children. Education, in its most comprehensive sense, may, perhaps, be properly enough called, "The Education of Nature," since she unceasingly subjects us to be influenced by the effects that arise from the very various causes to which we ourselves give existence, as well as to those that are every where operating around us. If, for instance, reason fail to control the appetites, the body is distressed by the consequences of intemperance, and in its turn, either irritates the ill-regulated mind, or causes it to be reformed by so wholesome a chastisement. Such is the education we receive throughout life, for nature never relaxes this sort of authority over us, as long as our reason and conscience are capable of doing each their proper office. The training or educating of a child, we suppose, implies, the regulating, as far as lies in our power, all his habits of life, so as to establish the health both of his mind and body, and to

give either of them a polish his pretensions in society may demand. When we endeavour to cause certain effects, by means that have the most generally answered in practice, we may rationally hope to accomplish our purpose; but otherwise, however suitable our management might prove to a being of our own creation, it is not likely to answer with a creature framed like man. We may variously modify the materials with which nature has furnished us, but we cannot change their constitution; a very sharp razor cannot, we suppose, be manufactured with lead or mercury. Self-education is, The duly regulating our temper and dispositions, or the allowing them, more or less, to determine us to action without the suffrage of our reason.

We may clearly, therefore, distinguish two sorts of education, the one necessarily received from *nature* herself, the other from *man*, and these two, experience assures us, continually and powerfully influence each other. Nature continually influences us, because she has both framed and subjected us to be variously operated upon, in a determined manner, by certain things :—Man, because he as continually and as variously modifies these operations. Our guardians, for instance, discipline or neglect us during our earliest years, and bias our judgment by their precepts, conversation, and examples; our other associates also, both at home and abroad, more or less improve or corrupt us by their various actions; our rulers either encourage virtue, or tolerate and countenance vice in the state, by their moral conduct and distribution of offices; and we ourselves, more or less, wisely or unwisely, regulate the effects these, and many other circumstances, are calculated to have upon our character generally. The degree of responsibility respectively attached to ourselves, our guardians, rulers, and associates, for our errors or vices, it seems reasonable to believe, depends not only upon the degree of constitutional intelligence and firmness we are respectively gifted with, but

likewise upon our being more or less *unavoidably* exposed, either by the mismanagement or wicked designs of others, to imbibe more or fewer evil impressions. “The *Tempter* or the *Tempted*, who sins most?” Temptations are sometimes made so ensnaring, or men are so forcibly driven into vicious scenes or bad habits of life, that even human judges relent in their favour, and shrink from the task of announcing the punishment, annexed by the soundest wisdom to the crime abstractedly considered:—and were it otherwise—miserable indeed would be the lot of those born in adversity. Thus man, as a creature endowed with reason, social love and sympathy, and professing christianity, cannot but earnestly desire that the evils which are not absolutely imposed upon humanity by nature herself, should be judiciously and effectually relieved, and the recurrence of them carefully prevented as far as it be practicable.

Self-Government.

We cannot entertain a doubt, but that some persons find it far more difficult than others, to govern their temper and dispositions, but this consideration ought to serve only to render them yet more attentive, in timely checking any irritation or evil thoughts that may arise, since none but their Creator can know what capabilities they have of subduing them, and we are told that he will judge them accordingly. It behoveth us; therefore, to make every possible effort, in order to obtain the mastery over our propensities of every kind, so shall we find favour in His eyes, “who pitieth us, even as a father pitieth his children, and who remembereth we are but dust.”

Our Temper requires our unwearied attention, because it is unceasingly operated upon, either by persons or things. Parents, children, friends, servants, dependants, acquaintances, countrymen, strangers, &c. all have their claims upon us, and all may tax our patience and forbearance. We are an-

noyed by the ill-timed fawning or perverseness of our domestic animals, by the heat and cold, by the rain and dust, by the attacks of insects, by having too much of one thing, or too little of another, by the derangement of some part of our body, by the resistance of our desires to our reason, &c. And if we examine farther into this matter, we shall discover the strongest proof, that God requires of us to keep continual guard over ourselves, since he has ordained that bad propensities may, by neglect, disturb the sweetest tempers. It is as common to find evil dispositions united with an easy, as good dispositions with a difficult temper. A person of a difficult temper, becomes by proper management and self-control a valuable citizen, a safe friend, and an agreeable companion; while, by self-indulgence, he who has an easy temper often proves a scourge to the community to which he belongs, and a destroyer of the peace and prosperity of his own family. An easy temper, with a well-regulated mind, is indeed a most enviable combination, but sometimes both the temper and dispositions are naturally very perverse, and demand our utmost vigilance.

It is particularly to be observed, that some of the apparent varieties of our dispositions, are often in fact only different degrees of the same; and that we are as liable to err in doing too much as in doing too little; the medium is perfection, but from that, we are ever prone to deviate one way or the other. If we have courage, for instance, we are apt to become rash; if generous, extravagant; if economical, parsimonious; if firm, obstinate; if flexible, too yielding, &c. Thus in so imperfect a creature as man, we must never expect to find directly opposite good dispositions, united in an *eminent* degree in the same person, but readily excuse a failing that seems to arise out of its concomitant virtue; for example, we both expect and sooner pardon undue severity in a steady character, than in one of an

opposite description. But when we find the same persons to be capriciously extravagant and parsimonious, imprudent and exacting, cowardly and rash, &c. we are disgusted, by their betraying not only the defects common to their general character, but those also from which we perceive others of the same stamp to be most commonly exempt. But it is delightful, on the other hand, to behold the extravagant become steadily economical, the parsimonious generous, the rash cautious, &c. such a revolution proves them to have subdued an untoward disposition or bad habit, either of which is a conquest worthy of an immortal spirit.

The Education of a Child to be suited to his Powers, Character, and Situation in Life.

Upon undertaking the education of a child, we ought to endeavour by continual observation, to discover the force of his several intellectual powers, the degree of his bodily health and strength, the character both of his temperament and temper, of his primary dispositions, and his *predominant* directing dispositions, and forming our opinion of his general character from his looks, gestures, manners, language, and other habitual actions, we should next take into consideration in what manner such a subject ought probably to be managed, so as to be made most fully to answer his apparent natural endowments, both of mind and body. We must likewise take into account what is his present situation, and what his future prospects; for though it is commonly impracticable to arrange matters most for his advantage, yet we may prevail with him by suitable discipline, cheerfully to accommodate himself to any adverse and unavoidable circumstances that attend his entrance into life, and his progress therein, and indeed often to turn them to his benefit.

The Education of the Person.

The education of the person concerns the general health, the cleanliness, and care of the different parts of the body that require regular attention. Children differ not more widely from each other in intellect, temperament, temper, dispositions, features, and form, than they do in their Gestures, Movements, and Attitudes, and we must sedulously guard against the frequent repetition of any awkward tricks that may otherwise become habitual to them. But, however, as grace cannot, we suppose, be imparted to another, and as they most certainly may very easily acquire affectation, it appears far more advisable commonly to leave them to their own natural movements, *i. e.* to act in the manner they are constituted to do in these matters (unless they require correction) than to present models for them to imitate.

Education of the Temper and Dispositions.

The education of the dispositions ought to be accommodated to the strength or weakness of them severally; likewise to the character of the temperament and temper. It is here our business to excite, or moderate, or subdue, and generally regulate all propensities and inclinations, according as they may demand our interference; or, in other words, young persons ought to be brought up in such habits of life as are commonly found to be most advantageous to them, not only as individuals, but as members of a family, of a community, and of a certain class and vocation.

Education of the Intellect.

The education of the intellectual powers should be strictly determined by their respective constitutional strength or weakness, as well as by the general character and age of the individual; "for though the faculties of the mind are improved by exercise, yet they must not be put to a stress beyond their

power; the mind, by being engaged in a task exceeding its strength, like the body, strained by lifting at too heavy a weight, has often its force broken, and thereby gets an inaptness, or an aversion to any vigorous attempt ever after." For want of due attention to this rule many parents have suffered severe disappointments, and their children laboured under imputations little deserved.

To the dissipated we would say, "Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no purposes, and it is hardly to be conceived that the infinitely wise Author of all things should create so admirable a faculty as the power of *thinking*, that faculty that comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible Being, to be idly and unprofitably employed."—*Locke.*

To the studious,

————— " May nor thirst of fame,
Nor love of knowledge, urge you to fatigue
With constant drudg'ry the liberal soul."—*Armstrong.*

Many men of fine genius have, we apprehend, sacrificed the enjoyment of a protracted and happy life, and deprived mankind of numerous invaluable monuments of human sagacity and dexterity, by the inordinate indulgence of their most laudable propensities. Intellectual like manual labour must surely require periodical and seasonable relief, fully proportionate to the degree to which the several powers have been kept on the stretch, were it only to restore their proper tone, so as to fit them to return with renewed alacrity to the accomplishment of their arduous task: and if such timely relaxation is highly beneficial, even within the short term of some hours, how indispensable must it necessarily prove to the maintaining of the faculties in a vigorous state during a long course of years? All nature cries aloud that children ought never to be long confined to any one place, posture, or employment. If the body be not duly invigorated by daily and wholesome exercises in the

open air, it cannot attain to that degree of health and strength it is constituted to reach. During four months of the winter, from eleven to two, being commonly the three finest hours of the day, occurring betwixt the morning and evening damps or fogs, they ought to be held sacred for the performance of this very important duty; and the dining at two, or half past, instead of one, would be every way a more advantageous arrangement for those who have passed their infancy. The short interval betwixt breakfast and dinner would, by this arrangement be lengthened, and the long evenings curtailed that confine children so many hours within doors. Indeed it is highly desirable that their hours of study should be altogether determined by the season of the year, since the summer mornings and evenings invite them to live abroad, as much as the "sunbeam in a winter's day" warns them not to lose the short-lived brilliancy of the noon-tide hour.

Good Habits constitute a Good Education.

We may very shortly and yet very properly define a good education to be, A combination of good habits; a bad one the reverse. A youth, for instance, who has acquired habits of early rising and of cleanliness, of daily expressing his gratitude to God, of occupying himself actively, methodically, and profitably, of taking regular and sufficient exercise, of observing temperance in the use of all things, of duly controlling his several inclinations, of considering other people's convenience and comfort as well as his own, and of noticing in those things with which he has to do, the relations between causes and their effects, is in the way to become eminent for his useful virtues, and, if he please, his general accomplishments, though he may have made little progress in what is called learning: and if children be taught judiciously, that is, with due regard to their age, health, and capacity, and suitably to their temperament,

temper, and dispositions, it may reasonably be hoped, not many of them would afterwards feel disposed to persevere in any material deviation from the observance of rules, that imposed only wholesome restraints upon them.

There are few persons probably who cannot recollect many melancholy examples, of the insufficiency of shining talents and of worldly support and applause, to secure a man from the mischiefs attendant upon the continued indulgence of bad habits. A comparison between the conduct, death, and reputation of the noted Duke of Wharton and the celebrated Dr. Franklin, will serve strikingly to illustrate the vast importance of timely encouraging a relish for good, and an aversion to evil habits.

Children are continually reminded that the discipline which is irksome or appears harsh to them, is for their ultimate advantage, that is to say, that future good will arise out of present uneasiness. A child, as soon as he is capable of understanding the meaning of words, is easily made to experience the truth of this and similar observations. If he be idle, for instance, he sees others rapidly advancing before him; if disobedient, he is disliked; if a liar, he is not believed; if dishonest, he is not trusted, &c. and thus he suffers, sooner or later, various sorts of evils naturally arising both from his faults and errors; whereas a diametrically opposite conduct is usually attended, especially at an early age, with diametrically opposite effects, and he is rewarded with the good he has well merited. Such repeated experience, if it be suitably enforced, often makes a strong impression upon the yet tender mind, and induces children subsequently to take heed generally of the consequences of what they are about to do.

We particularly recommend a habit of continually aiming to do every thing, however important or trifling, in the most dexterous, expeditious, and effectual manner possible; and were young people commonly to follow this rule what number-

less ill-imagined, ill-executed, and ill-arranged things would disappear, and universal improvement proportionally advance.

The most difficult part of education, and indeed of human conduct, perhaps, is the disposal of the hours of recreation to the advantage both of the body and mind ;—

“ To please the fancy is no trifling good

Where health is studied —————

————— for

————— whatever cheerful and serene

Supports the mind, supports the body too.”—*Armstrong.*

Rural and social sports and excursions, farming, gardening, botany, geography, the belles lettres, &c. and though last not least, rational conversation, may alternately conduce, if properly measured and timed, to adorn the mind with general information, and to render it cheerful and content, while the body obtains its due share of wholesome relief and refreshment.

Order, Method, Punctuality.

The love of Order originates in our early habits, or in the desire of good ; for the observance of order enables us to do every thing at its proper time and place, to do more, and to do better, and often prevents our losing opportunities that unexpectedly occur either of obtaining good or of avoiding evil.

Being Methodical is the doing things generally in due order ; the observing order “ in the distribution of our time ; order in the conduct of our affairs,” &c. also the placing things where we may readily find them, likewise the being punctual to our time and engagements both at home and abroad, &c. We cannot entertain a doubt of the advantages children derive from regular habits of life ; and, as we know not at what age the want of order might begin to have a prejudicial influence upon their future conduct, we are called upon very early to pay strict attention to this part of their education. By a regular and useful distribution of our time the

mind becomes habituated to making certain exertions at certain hours, and "the settlement of it on fit objects, or its acquiescence in determinate action, conducing to a good end, whereby we are freed of doubts, distraction, and fastidious listlessness, doth minister content."—*Barrow*. Whereas when we yield ourselves up to desultory employments, much time is often lost before we can decide what shall first engage our attention, and we are moreover apt in this case to be easily diverted from business, for the dissipated finding us wavering and embarrassed, have commonly little difficulty in prevailing against our better resolutions.

It is surprising that persons of sense and propriety should some of them attach little importance to Punctuality, since the regular measuring of one's time always marks a mind more or less capable of appreciating its value. Without punctuality there cannot be a proper degree of order observed; and without order many of the most important transactions in life would be liable to be seriously interrupted. Besides, with what shew of reason can we inculcate punctuality to our children and household, and strictly exact it from them, and in a few minutes afterwards, perhaps, give them a striking example of our own irregularity? "And how canst thou say to thy brother, brother, let me pull out the mote that is in thine eye?"

"In small, as well as in great affairs, a due regard to order is requisite. Disorder, like other immoralities, takes its rise from inconsiderable beginnings. They who in the lesser transactions of life are very negligent of rule, will be in hazard of extending that negligence by degrees to such affairs and duties as will render them criminal. Remissness grows on all who study not to guard against it, and it is only by frequent exercise that the habit of order and punctuality can be thoroughly confirmed. The man of order is connected with all the higher powers and principles in the universe, his character is formed on the spirit which religion breathes, for religion in

general, and the religion of Christ in particular, may be called the great discipline of order.”—*Blair*.

Procrastination or Delay.

We have all of us a greater or less propensity to procrastinate, in order to enjoy a little more pleasure, or to put off the moment of labour, till we are more imperiously urged to relinquish the one and to buckle to the other. “Procrastination is the thief of time:” truly it robs us of no inconsiderable share of our duration, and makes us very uneasy during many more hours of the remainder of it. The adhering steadily to the determination to do what we ought, and not what we like, is the grand panacea for this evil.

CHAPTER XVI.

Simplicity, Affectation.—Civility, Good-breeding.—The Fundamental Principles of Education applicable to both Sexes.

Simplicity, Affectation.

WE distinguish simplicity of Character, of Taste, of Language, and of Gesture, Gait, and Manners.

Simplicity of character we understand to imply, a mind not sophisticated by the entertainment (generally) of opinions very contrary to our earliest spontaneous feelings.

Simplicity of taste, the having a high relish for the charms of the country, and a preference for works of art, habits of life, manners, &c. that are commonly considered the most conformable to sound reason.

Simplicity of language, the expressing oneself with more or less grace, without seeking to embellish one's style with the flowers of rhetoric.

One who has simplicity of gesture, gait, and manners, looks, moves, and behaves, as his feelings dictate, without being *immediately* influenced by his own notions of grace and beauty, or by any consideration of what his associates or others may think of him.

Affectation is the acting, speaking, moving, &c. differently from what one would do, but for an overweening anxiety to appear to advantage.

Mother Eve, in the beautiful simplicity of nature, had

“ Grace in all her steps, Heav’n in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love.”

Civility, Good-breeding.

Civility we apprehend to be, the natural expression of our social feelings upon occasions that require us to shew the common courtesies of life towards each other; and when we are not civil we are selfish, *i. e.* indifferent to the annoyance we may thus occasion others. We quote the opinion of Lord Chesterfield as a high authority upon the subject of good-breeding:—“ To sacrifice one’s own self-love to other people’s is a short, but I believe a true definition of Civility;* to do it with ease, propriety, and grace, is Good-breeding. The one is the result of good-nature; the other of good sense joined to experience, observation, and attention. It cannot be exactly defined, because it consists in a fitness, a propriety of words, actions, and even looks, adapted to the infinite variety and combinations of persons, places, and things; for what is good-breeding at court would pass for banter in a remote village, and the homespun civility of a village would be considered as brutality at court.”

“ Good-breeding, like charity, not only covers a multitude of faults, but to a certain degree supplies the want of some virtues, for in the common intercourse of life it acts good-nature, and often does what mere good-nature cannot always do; it keeps both wits and fools within those bounds of decency which the former are too apt to transgress, and which the latter never know.”

* His lordship’s definition does not, however, appear to us correct, because we believe civility is often expressed without the least sacrifice of self-love; so much to the contrary, that it would often cause us pain to resist the inclination we have to practise it.

“ Courts are unquestionably the seats of good-breeding, and must necessarily be so, otherwise they would present scenes of violence and desolation. There all the passions are in their highest state of fermentation, all pursue what but one can obtain, and many seek what but few can enjoy. Good-breeding alone restrains their excesses; there, if enemies did not embrace, they would stab; there, smiles are often put on to conceal tears; there, mutual services are professed, while mutual injuries are intended; and there the guile of the serpent simulates the gentleness of the dove: all this it is true at the expense of sincerity, but upon the whole to the advantage of social intercourse in general.”

“ I would not be misapprehended, and supposed to recommend good-breeding thus profaned and prostituted to the purposes of guilt and perfidy; but I think I may justly infer from it, to what a degree the accomplishment of good-breeding must adorn and enforce virtue and truth, since it can so far soften the outrages and deformity of vice and falsehood.”

“ A ploughman will be civil if he be good-natured, but cannot be well-bred. A courtier will be well-bred if he have but good sense.”

“ Flattery is the disgrace of good-breeding, as brutality often is of truth and sincerity—good-breeding is the medium between these two odious extremes. Love and friendship necessarily produce, and justly authorize familiarity; but then good-breeding must mark out its bounds, and say, thus far shalt thou go and no farther; for I have known many a passion and many a friendship degraded, weakened, and at last (if I may use the expression) wholly flattened away, by an unguarded and illiberal familiarity.”

“ Upon the whole, though good-breeding cannot, strictly speaking, be called a virtue, yet it is productive of so many good effects, that, in my opinion, it may justly be reckoned more than a mere accomplishment.”—*From the World.*

Civility is in fact founded upon the divine precept of doing as we would be done by ; whatever mode of behaviour therefore offends against it, departs so much from genuine good-breeding—it is a spurious sort that may cease with other follies of the day—genuine good-breeding, on the contrary, never changes, nor is it easy of imitation, requiring, as Lord Chesterfield observes, good sense, knowledge of the world, and habitual practice ; whereas, all capricious fashionable deviations from it, any vulgar senseless coxcomb may successfully copy. He who indulges a propensity to insolence, impertinence, or negligence in society toward any one, is absolutely guilty of high treason against the fundamental laws of good-breeding ; and a frequent repetition of the offence stamps a man as ill-bred, whatever his other accomplishments and pretensions in life may be.

The duties attached to civility and good-breeding are strictly confined to making our presence mutually as agreeable, and consequently as little offensive as possible to each other. Whenever we violate the rules of civility, we sin against that forbearance and consideration we are commanded by the highest authority, to practise universally towards all our fellow creatures. To assume a false character with intent to deceive or betray, seems to us, to have no connexion whatsoever with good-breeding, but to be absolutely a breach of morality, marking depravity of mind, not manners.

“ If we would maintain a peaceable estate of life, we must use toward all men those demonstrations of respect and courtesy, which, according to their degree and station, custom doth entitle them to, or which upon the common score of humanity they may be deemed reasonable to expect from us, respective gestures, civil salutations, free access, affable demeanour, cheerful looks, and courteous discourse. These, as they betoken good-will in such as use them, so they beget, cherish, and increase it in those whom they refer to, and the necessary fruit

of mutual good-will, is peace. But the contrary carriages, contemptuous or disregardful behaviour, difficulty of admission to converse, a tetical or sullen aspect, rough and fastidious language, as they discover a mind averse from friendly commerce, so they beget a more potent disdain in others ; men generally (especially those of generous and hearty temper) valuing their due respect beyond all other interests, and more contentedly brooking injury than neglect. Whence this skill and dexterity of deportment (though immediately, and in its own nature of no great worth, regulating actions of small importance, gestures, looks, and forms of speech, yet,) because it is a nurse of peace, and greatly contributes to the delightfulness of society, hath been always much commended. Men have given it a conspicuous place in the honourable rank of virtues, under the titles of courtesy and affability, and the opposites thereto, rudeness and haughtiness, have been deservedly counted and called vices in morality.”—*Barrow*.

“ Good-breeding, which lies not in the putting off of a hat, nor making of compliments, but in a due composure of language, looks, motion, posture, place, &c. suited to persons and occasions, can be learned only by habit and use ; and the carriage is not as it should be till it is become natural in every part, falling as skilful musicians’ fingers do into harmonious order, without care and without thought ; for if in conversation a man’s mind be taken up with a solicitous watchfulness about any part of his behaviour, his motions will be constrained, uneasy and ungraceful. Wherefore it is necessary, that this branch of education should particularly engage the governor’s attention, in order that an habitual gracefulness and politeness in all his carriage may be settled in his charge, so that he need not advice when he has neither time nor disposition to receive it ; for it comes very harshly to a grown man who has lived ever so little in the world.”

“ Good qualities are the substantial riches of the mind, but

it is good-breeding that sets them off, and he that will be acceptable must give beauty as well as strength to his actions. No one contents himself with rough diamonds, and wears them so, who would appear with advantage."

Lord Chesterfield gives his son a general outline of his plan of education:—"From the time you have had life, it has been the principal and favourite object of mine to make you as perfect as the imperfections of human nature will allow: in this view I have grudged no pains nor expense in your education, convinced that *education* more than *nature* is the cause of that great difference which we see in the characters of men. While you were a child I endeavoured to form your heart habitually to virtue and honour, before your understanding was capable of shewing you their beauty and utility. Those principles which you then got, like your grammar-rules, only by rote, are now, I am persuaded, fixed and confirmed by reason. And indeed they are so plain and clear that they require but a very moderate degree of understanding, either to comprehend or practise them. Lord Shaftsbury says very prettily, that he would be virtuous for his own sake, though nobody were to know it, as he would be clean for his own sake, though nobody were to see him. I have therefore, since you have had the use of your reason, never written to you upon those subjects, they speak best for themselves; and I should now just as soon think of warning you gravely not to fall into the dirt or the fire as into dishonour or vice. This view of mine I consider as fully attained. My next object was sound and useful learning; my own care first, Mr. Harte's afterwards, and of late (I will own it to your praise) your own application, have more than answered my expectation in that particular; and I have reason to believe will answer even my wishes. All that remains for me to wish, to recommend, to inculcate, to order, and insist upon, is good-breeding, without which all your other qualifications will be lame, unadorned, and to a certain degree unavailing," &c.

We will compare it with what Mr. Locke says upon the same subject:—"The great work of a governor is to fashion the carriage and form the mind; to settle in his pupil good habits and the principles of virtue and wisdom; to give him, by little and little, a view of mankind, and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praiseworthy; and, in the prosecution of it, to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The studies which he sets him upon are but as it were, the exercises of his faculties and employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness; to teach him application and accustom him to take pains, and to give him some little taste of what his own industry must perfect; for who expects that under a tutor a young gentleman should be an accomplished critic, orator, or logician? Go to the bottom of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or mathematics, or be a master in history and chronology? Though something of each of these may be taught him, yet it is only to open the door that he may look in, and as it were begin an acquaintance, but not dwell there; and a governor would be much blamed that should keep his pupil too long, and lead him too far in most of them. A gentleman that would penetrate deeper, must do it by his own genius afterwards, for nobody ever went far in knowledge, or became eminent in any of the sciences, by the discipline and constraint of a master; but of *good-breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, industry, and a love of reputation*, he cannot have too much; and if he have these, he will not long want what he needs or desires of the other."

Lord Chesterfield, it is evident, expected Mr. Stanhope to assume the air, carriage, manners, and language of a courtier with as much readiness as he put on his birthday suit; but the deluded father however, upon attempting subsequently to polish him, like a second Cymon, by the force of love, only disgraced himself, without removing the chains rivetted upon his son, by the force of long continued habit. His Lordship very

possibly best knew courts, but Mr. Locke certainly proved himself the most intimately acquainted with human nature; for experience serves continually to confirm the truth of his assertion, that good habits, both of morality and manners, is the surest ground-work for future eminence in wisdom and good-breeding.

“It is the exercise of our powers only, which gives us ability and skill in any thing, and leads us towards perfection. A middle-aged ploughman will scarce ever be brought to the carriage and language of a gentleman, though his body be as well-proportioned, his joints as supple, and his natural powers not any way inferior. The legs of a dancing-master, and the fingers of a musician fall, as it were, naturally, without thought or pains, into regular and admirable motions. Bid them change their parts, and they will in vain endeavour to produce the like motions in the members not used to them, and it will require length of time and long practice, to their attaining even to some degree of ability. As it is in the body, so is it in the mind, no person acquires dexterity by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory. Practice must settle the habit of doing without reflecting on the rule, and you may as well hope to make a good painter, or musician extempore, by a lecture, and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker, or strict reasoner, by a set of rules, shewing him wherein right reason consists.”

We have expatiated somewhat largely upon this subject, because Mr. Stanhope's case seems strikingly to illustrate, the force both of Nature and Education. If we want to give nature any particular bias, we must first endeavour to learn at what season, in what manner, and to what degree, we can pretend to do it; for though in some respects, she is pliant enough, yet in others, we shall find her to remain so sternly inflexible, as to mock our utmost efforts to divert her from her purpose.

Propriety, Decency, Impropriety, Indecency.

General propriety and decency of conduct implies, that the usual tenor of a man's actions, is suitable to his station and rank in the commonwealth, to his several relations as husband, father, master, citizen, subject, &c. and that he performs his very various moral duties, the most trifling, as well as the most important, in a manner altogether becoming a well-regulated mind. Such a person will especially be decent in his gestures, speech, and behaviour.

Courteous, Affable, Condescending, Familiar.

Courtesy is the desire of rendering ourselves agreeable to those we associate with. The philanthropist is spontaneously disposed to be courteous to all men; but some persons appear so, only because they have a pleasant way of shewing their good-breeding, or that they desire to be popular. We commonly use the term Affable, when we would express condescension, and thus one gentleman is courteous to another, and affable and condescending to his inferiors; but affability supposes a degree of familiarity in conversation, and thus a superior may be condescending without being familiar.

Easy, Formal, Ceremonious.

We are disposed to be more or less easy in our intercourse with others, or more or less ceremonious, &c.

Respectful, Obsequious.

And to treat them with more or less respect, or to be more or less obsequious to them, *i. e.* to treat them with a degree of deference, their superiority does not command, and that our own proper dignity forbids.

Weeping.

Various sorts of emotions cause us to weep, but it is some-

times entirely physical—a mere morbid sensibility—grief, joy, shame, newly excited hopes or fears, disappointments, recollections, tenderness arising either from love or pure philanthropy, &c. are calculated to draw tears from our eyes. But few weep at calamities to which time has accustomed them, as few laugh at jests with which they have been long familiar.

Smiles, Laughter.

We are more or less disposed to smile benignantly, or maliciously, or scornfully, or merrily, as also to laugh. “Epictetus condemns the laughing upon every occasion as an argument of insufferable levity. A man that is eternally upon the giggle shews a mighty defect of judgment, and that every little occasion of mirth is master of his temper. For this reason, it ought not to be frequent, nor to continue long at a time, nor should it be noisy nor violent, nor convulsive, but shew the evenness and steady government of the mind, by being modest, and scarce exceeding a smile, which moves the lips a little, and yet so, as scarce to make any alteration in the face.”
—*Simplicius's Comment. upon Epictetus.*

The fundamental Principles of Education applicable to both
Sexes.

The fundamental principles of education must be equally applicable to both sexes, since the object is to make both the one and the other healthy, virtuous, intelligent, and well-bred. An early intercourse with the world, and the rougher exercises to which the stronger sex is naturally inclined, prepare men for the proper discharge of their public duties, in which they have often immediately to contend against the most vicious part of mankind, and to bear great bodily fatigue. But the duties of women, though *widely different*, are *no less important*, and the most exalted female genius cannot covet a

nobler employment, than the one nature has unquestionably decreed her, the care of her children's health and morals during their infancy, and the forming of wives and mothers for the rising generation. Nature, by thus placing man's greatest stake in the custody of the weaker sex, proves her impartiality, and as she is supposed always wisely to proportion her means to her ends, she seems by this arrangement, evidently to have assigned woman an equal rank with man in the intellectual world. Grace, beauty, and intelligence, appear to be portioned out without distinction of sex, as without regard to rank.

Gentleness and delicacy are the distinguishing characteristics of woman, and girls cannot be kept too ignorant of whatever may tend to sully the purity of their minds. The happy delusions of innocence, and the blush of unaffected modesty, are not to be beheld with indifference. Were girls generally rationally educated, those who are from circumstances afterwards debarred the gratification of some of their best affections, would be able profitably and satisfactorily to fill up many of the vacant hours such a deprivation must necessarily leave them, and of which we see not a few most laudable examples in the present age.

It is only the latter part of the following quotation, from Mr. Locke, that does not afford excellent rules for the management of girls, as well as of boys. He says, "Begin sometimes nicely to consider your son's temper, and that, when he is under the least restraint. See what are his predominant passions and inclinations, whether he be fierce or mild, bold or bashful, compassionate or cruel, &c. for as these are different in him, your authority must hence take its measures to turn him different ways, as your judgment shall direct. These native propensities, these prevalencies of constitution, are not to be cured by a direct contest; and after all, the bias will always be on nature's side, so that if you carefully observe his

character in the first scenes of his life, you will ever after be commonly able to judge, which way his inclinations are likely to lead him under particular circumstances."

"When by making your son sensible that he depends on you, and is in your power, you have established your authority; and by being inflexibly severe, when obstinately persisting in any ill-natured trick, but especially lying, you have imprinted on his mind that awe of you which is necessary; and on the other side, when by permitting him the full liberty due to his age, and laying no restraint in your presence to those childish actions and gaiety of carriage, which whilst he is very young, are as necessary to him as meat or sleep, you have reconciled him to your company, and made him sensible of your care and love of him; especially, by being kind to him after a thousand fashions, which nature teaches parents better than I can; he is then in the state you could desire, and you have formed in his mind that true reverence, by which you will always have hold upon him, to turn him to the ways of virtue and honour."

"Though I have mentioned the severity of a father's brow, as one main instrument, whereby your son's education is to be conducted, yet I think it should be relaxed as fast as the young man's age, discretion, and good behaviour will allow; even to that degree, that you will do well to consult him about those things wherein he has any knowledge or understanding; for by gradually treating him as a man, you will insensibly raise his mind above the usual amusements of youth, in which it is commonly wasted. If you would have him open his heart to you and ask your advice, you must set him the example; and there is scarce any young man of so little thought, or so void of sense, as not to be glad of a sure friend, whom he might freely consult; but the reserve and distance fathers keep, often deprive their sons of that most effectual protection against the dangerous influence of youthful passions."

"Would your son engage in some frolic, or take a vagary,

were it not much better he should do it with, than without your knowledge? For since allowances must be made to young men, the more you know of his intrigues and designs, the better you will be able to prevent greater mischiefs, by letting him see what is likely to follow from his rashness. But whatever he consults you about, unless it lead to some fatal and irremediable evil, be sure you advise only as a friend of more experience, otherwise it were to prevent him having recourse to you in future difficulties, and thus to deprive him of your counsel. You must consider that he is a young man, and has pleasures and fancies which you are past, and you must not expect him to have the same inclinations and thoughts at twenty, as you have at fifty. All that you can wish is, that since youth must have some liberty, some outleaps, they might be with the ingenuity of a son, and under the eye of a father, and then no very great harm can come of it. This will increase his love and esteem of you, without lessening your authority, which being thus established, will always be sacred to him, and prove as irresistible as the principles of his nature."

"In all the whole business of education, there is nothing like to be less hearkened to, or harder to be well observed, than what I am now going to say; and that is, that children should from their first beginning to talk, have some discreet, sober, nay wise person about them, whose care it should be to fashion them aright; and he who procures his child a mind tempered to virtue and usefulness, and adorned with good breeding, makes a better purchase for him, than if he laid out the money for an addition of more earth to his former acres. It is bad husbandry to make his fortune rich, and his mind poor. As the father's example must teach the child respect for his tutor, so the tutor's example must lead the child into those actions he would have him do. It will be to no purpose for the tutor to talk of the restraint of the passions, whilst any

of his own are let loose, and he will in vain endeavour to reform any vice or indecency in his pupil, which he allows in himself. His practice must not cross his precepts, for ill patterns are sure to be followed more than good rules."

"A governor should teach his scholar to guess at, and beware of the designs of men he hath to do with, neither with too much suspicion, nor too much confidence; but as the young man is by nature most inclined to either side, rectify him and bend him the other way. The only fence against the world is a thorough knowledge of it, into which he should be entered by degrees as he can bear it, and the earlier the better, so he be in safe and skilful hands to guide him. The scene should be gently opened, and his entrance made step by step, and the dangers pointed out that attend him from the several degrees, tempers, designs, and clubs of men. He should be prepared to be shocked by some, and caressed by others; warned who are like to oppose, who to mislead, who to undermine him, and who to serve him. He should be instructed how to know and to appreciate men, where he should let them see, and when dissemble the knowledge of them, their aims, and workings. And if he be too forward to venture upon his own strength and skill, the perplexity and trouble of a misadventure now and then, that reaches not his innocence, his health, or reputation, may not be an ill way to teach him more caution. Thus, by safe and insensible degrees, he will pass from a boy to a man, which is the most hazardous passage in life. A young man should therefore be carefully handed over it, and not abandoned at once to the world, and so find it quite another thing from what he had been taught to expect. The longer he is kept hood-winked, the less he will see when he comes abroad into open daylight; and an old boy at his first appearance, with all the gravity of his ivy bush about him, is sure to draw on him the eyes and chirpings of the whole town volery, amongst which there will not be want-

ing some birds of prey, that will presently be on the wing for him."

"Young men so hood-winked are easily persuaded by other kind of tutors, which they are sure to meet with, that the discipline they were kept under, was but the restraint of childhood, and that the freedom belonging to men, is to take a full swing of the pleasures hitherto forbidden them. Thus a young novice is induced to court credit and manliness, by running counter to all the rules of virtue, which have been preached to him by his tutor, and discovers too late, that those who have persuaded him to throw off the restraints of morality, which they call being governed by others, do it only, that they may have the government of him themselves, and use him to their own advantage. The shewing him the world as really it is, before he comes wholly into it, is one of the best means, I think, to prevent this mischief. He should be told the arts they use, the trains they lay, and now and then have set before him the tragical or ridiculous examples of those who are ruined, or being ruined this way; and such examples of disgrace, diseases, beggary, and shame, brought upon hopeful young men by the infamous arts of those, who make it their business to corrupt, must be the most effectual landmarks to warn him of danger."

RECAPITULATION.

HAVING examined the several component parts of Man, as far as the object we had in view required, we will now take a general survey of him, and so terminate our labours.

He is composed of body and mind; the body having senses and sensation; the mind, understanding, sensibility, and volition.

He has excitements to urge him to the use of his several faculties.

<i>Pleasure and Pain,</i>	<i>Self-love,</i>
<i>Desire or Volition,</i>	<i>Social Love,</i>
<i>Love and Hatred,</i>	<i>Sympathy,</i>
<i>Hope and Fear,</i>	<i>Conscience,</i>
<i>Desire of Reward and Fear of Punishment.</i>	
<i>Desire of Praise and Fear of Blame.</i>	

Principal directing dispositions, the immediate, or more or less remote origin of most of his propensities both good and bad.

<i>Desire of Happiness,</i>	<i>Desire of Wealth,</i>
<i>Desire of Ease,</i>	<i>Pride,</i>
<i>Ambition,</i>	<i>Vanity,</i>
<i>Desire of Pleasure,</i>	<i>Desire of Change,</i>
<i>Desire of Independence,</i>	<i>Desire of Novelty,</i>
<i>Desire of Power,</i>	<i>Curiosity,</i>
<i>Desire of Occupation.</i>	

A native character, being of a sanguine or phlegmatic temperament, and of an easy or difficult temper.

Primary dispositions that betray themselves at the dawn of his reason, he being either

Active or Indolent,

<i>Patient or Impatient,</i>	<i>Docile or Obstinate,</i>
<i>Contented or Discontented,</i>	<i>Reserved or Unreserved,</i>
<i>Courageous or Fearful,</i>	<i>Decisive or Indecisive,</i>
<i>Bold or Timid,</i>	<i>Attentive or Inattentive.</i>

He is disposed to *Love and Hate*, also to be

<i>Angry,</i>	<i>Forgiving,</i>	<i>Jealous,</i>
<i>Resentful,</i>	<i>Grateful,</i>	<i>Envious.</i>

He has reason, experience, and example, to enable him more readily and confidently to regulate his several propensities, and to determine his proper line of conduct in life.

Habit to acquire a relish for the practice of his numerous moral duties, and also imperceptibly to lessen the sense of those evils from which he cannot escape.

We find him in some things fettered by the law of insurmountable necessity, or fatality, and in others left a free agent, and thus some of his actions are voluntary, some involuntary.

Subjected to human power, he is commonly left, more or less, at liberty, but liable to be compelled to remain in confinement, or to suffer bodily pain, or death; or to be restrained from indulging his inclinations: upon all which occasions, he is under the arbitrary necessity of submission. But no human power can *directly* compel him to action, that can be done only *indirectly* by the agency of *fear*.

He is born with a certain constitution both of mind and body, which are more or less injured, or brought to a greater or less degree of perfection, by being judiciously or injudiciously managed.


A good education consists in a combination of good habits, tending to bring the powers both of the mind and body, into that healthy and sound state, as shall most effectually qualify them, properly to perform their several functions throughout life.

Nature most clearly manifests her intention, that we should partake of, but not abuse her very various bounties ; for excess and want both produce, though in diametrically opposite ways, sickness, vice, and consequent misery ; whereas, a wholesome variety of pleasures, enjoyed with moderation, serve to promote health, cheerfulness, and content, and to encourage us to persevere in the practice of virtue. *Uneasiness it is*, that the most frequently causes us to be restless and *eager of change*.

But in what manner a creature constituted like man, could be altogether the most successfully educated, seems to be a question likely to divide the opinions of mankind, as long as it shall remain impracticable to trace *moral effects* indubitably to their *proper causes*. However, though we cannot trace them *indubitably*, yet we may, we imagine, very *satisfactorily* do so, by the means of *continual experience*, for the most preferable mode of educating man, must necessarily be that, which upon the whole, is found to be productive of the greatest degree of virtue, health, and useful information, and consequently of the most general happiness. Man cannot long be truly virtuous, wise, healthy, and happy, but by conforming himself to the laws of nature, since nature it is, and not education, that has given him those faculties and feelings he has, to act and to enjoy life.

But to conclude, the peculiar constitution of each individual, may be more or less perfected by education, but cannot be *essentially* changed by it, indeed, so far from being essentially changed by it, the constitution of his body, as well as of his mind continually, we believe, determines the general effects direct management, and likewise casual circumstances, produce upon both his Moral and Intellectual Character.

THE END.



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